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Abstract 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks are computer networks consisting of miniaturised electronic 
devices that aim to gather and report information about their environment. The devices are 
limited in computational ability, temporary and permanent memory and communication 
ability. Furthermore, the devices communicate via a wireless unregulated medium and usually 
operate on finite power sources such as batteries.  
 
Security in Wireless Sensor Networks is the research area that seeks to provide adequate level 
of security for the limited sensor devices, aiming to increase the possible applications of 
Wireless Sensor Networks and allow them to be deployed for a wider variety of tasks, 
including monitoring of critical conditions or valuable infrastructure. The area has to solve the 
problems associated with the limited nature of the devices. Traditional security mechanisms 
are inappropriate for Wireless Sensor Networks, because they were not designed for resource-
constrained environments. 
 
This research attempts to solve the problems associated with secure message exchange via an 
open medium without introduction of significant resource overheads. The result of this 
research is SecRose, a security mechanism for the data-transportation layer of Wireless 
Sensor Networks. 
 
SecRose provides a higher level of security than the existing proposals while it demonstrates 
better performance characteristics. In particular, the mechanism introduces authenticated 
acknowledgements and key management, improves the provided cryptographic strength and 
helps in securing the routing protocols. On the other hand, the mechanism operates without 
significant computational or communication overhead and is backward compatible with 
existing sensor network applications. 
 
The thesis discusses the requirements, design and evaluation of the mechanism and 
demonstrates how its goals are achieved by following alternative approaches to provide the 
security properties. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
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1. Introduction  
3 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks constitute a promising technological advance that poses 
contradicting research challenges. The networks are limited, miniaturised computers that aim 
to sense and wirelessly report information about their environment. Typical networks are 
expected to be self-organising and able to operate with little or no human interaction. 
 
Provision of security widens the possible application of sensor networks and is therefore a 
desirable marketing feature. On the other hand, security would require utilisation of energy 
resources, a precious commodity for the longevity of the battery powered wireless sensor 
networks.  
 
This contradiction has posed a significant research challenge aiming to provide adequate 
security in a minimalistic resource-constrained environment. An area of research was created 
to explore the possibilities of providing Security in Wireless Sensor Networks [1]. A 
particular field of this research area is interested in the security of the exchanged messages. 
This field is the specific area of our research and is known as security for the data-
transportation layer.  
 
This document describes SecRose, a mechanism that provides security for the data 
transportation layer. Briefly, our thesis is that SecRose provides a level of security that is both 
better and consumes less energy than similar mechanisms. 
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1.2 Motivation 
 
The security in wireless sensor networks paradox  
There is a significant amount of research literature regarding data-transportation layer security 
for wireless sensor networks. The literature includes contributions that range from simple 
frequency hopping systems to complex public-key cryptosystem attempts. The literature 
covers scenarios that range from human heartbeat monitoring   military battlefields. 
Seemingly, many of these solutions were developed under unrealistic assumptions. 
Consequently, only a few of those solutions have made it to actual commercial products.  
 
In our belief, three factors caused this paradox. Firstly, initial research set unrealistic targets. 
Secondly, improvements in microprocessors allowed conventional security mechanisms to be 
applied in many WSN applications. Finally, but most importantly, the assumptions of what is 
possible and profitable were narrowed down as sensor networks progressed.  
 
As a consequence, there is only one proposal considered to be the de-facto standard in our 
area of research and that is the TinySec security architecture [2]. 
 
Inadequate security systems 
TinySec is a relatively old mechanism that was publicly released six years ago and has not 
been updated since. TinySec is well designed, documented and most importantly fully 
implemented. On the other hand, it does not provide any cover for some of the available 
attacks or it provides limited level of security for others.  
 
Other systems that were developed after TinySec attempt to improve it but they use untested 
or poorly evaluated innovations while there is no evidence on whether they were actually 
implemented on code or not. 
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Our thesis 
SecRose is a data-transportation layer security mechanism based on an alternative than the 
existing direction. The resulting mechanism provides adequate security in conjunction with 
fewer resource requirements.  
 
In brief, SecRose provides: 
 Key management to facilitate frequent changing of used keys in a manner that is 
energy efficient and does not leak information to adversaries 
 Authenticated acknowledgements which can secure third party routing protocols and 
validate communication integrity 
 Up-to-date cryptographic strength using an established cryptographic cipher that 
natively provides appropriate key length 
 Alternative solutions for semantic security and freshness that are subject to different 
limitations and conditions than other proposals 
 Equal level of authentication as any other mechanism which provides acceptable level 
of confidence 
 
In addition, SecRose manages all these features without requiring significant resources. 
Importantly, the mechanism is more efficient than TinySec, which acts as the primary basis of 
comparison. 
 
SecRose is based on generic assumptions that are similar to other mechanisms. Most 
importantly, SecRose assumes that the node‟s hardware is secure and it cannot be tampered 
with.  
 
Finally, SecRose includes useful non-functional requirements like backwards compatibility, 
ease of deployment, scalability and others. Adaptation of SecRose requires minimal effort and 
provides optimal results. 
 
 
  
6 
 
1.3 Contribution 
 
This thesis contributes SecRose, a data-transportation layer security mechanism, which is 
capable of providing a higher than the currently available level of security without introducing 
significant resource overhead. SecRose achieves its aims by introducing innovative features 
or alternative design or by improving on existing functionality.  
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1.4 Intended audience 
 
This document is intended to computer scientists. In particular, the document assumes that the 
reader is familiar with the following topics. 
 
Principles of security 
The document does not cover the generic principles of computer security, cryptography or the 
required mathematical background. Although complex, formal, explanations are present in 
very few sections, an understanding of network security and cryptographic principles is 
assumed. 
 
Background reading includes references [3-6] 
 
Computer and telecommunication networks 
The mechanism operates on a computer network. Knowledge of computer communication 
techniques is assumed. In particular, knowledge of the OSI model and the protocols that 
operate at its lower layers is essential to follow the concepts described here. Some knowledge 
of telecommunications and the related electronic engineering is also assumed. 
 
Background reading includes references [7-10] 
 
Desirables 
In addition to the above background knowledge, knowledge about programming and 
processor operation would be beneficial. If the reader wishes to understand the proof-of-
concept and its optimisations code then extensive knowledge of event-driven C programming 
and processor operation is required. 
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1.5 Thesis structure 
 
This document is organised in seven chapters each addressing a different problem in relation 
to our research. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the research area, provides background information and gives statements 
of our thesis and motivation. 
 
Chapter 2 is a literature review of the area, which includes an overview of wireless sensor 
networks, the application security on them and description of similar work. The chapter 
concludes by describing our desired research direction and baseline requirements. 
 
Chapter 3 provides the system requirements for our proposal and gives rationale for each 
requirement. 
 
Chapter 4 gives a detailed and clean design and operation the SecRose mechanism, its 
components and interfaces. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a description of the proof-of-concept implementation. 
 
Chapter 6 evaluates SecRose against the requirements, states the level of security provision 
and critically compares its security and performance with other proposals. 
 
Chapter 7 provides further work and conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature review 
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2. Literature review 
 
This chapter presents and evaluates the existing work in the area. A generic introduction to 
the role of Wireless Sensor Networks is given first, along with software and hardware. Then 
the chapter discusses the security of sensor networks and existing work that is similar with 
this thesis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the baseline requirements and the 
challenges of this project.  
11 
 
2.1 Introduction to Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
 
2.1.1 Overview 
 
Terminology definition 
The definition of Wireless Sensor Networks can be traced in research work appearing on or 
soon after 2000. The term is abbreviated as WSNs while they are also referred to as sensor 
networks. The terms are used to describe a network of sensor nodes connected together 
wirelessly. The definition of a sensor node was also provided in the same period but the exact 
first appearance of both terms is difficult to trace. 
 
The most popular definition of a sensor node came by a survey work from Akyildiz et al. [1] 
when they said ―recent advances in wireless communications and electronics have enabled 
the development of low-cost, low-power, multifunctional sensor nodes that are small in size 
and communicate untethered in short distances.‖ They have also defined a sensor node to 
consist of ―sensing, data processing, and communicating components.‖ The work of Akyildiz 
et al., cited by a considerable number of authors, is probably the most reputable survey paper 
of the area. Additionally, it was published after the field had matured and so their definitions 
are considered accurate. 
 
Purpose 
Sensor networks are a technologically improved version of the simple electronic sensor 
devices used in automation applications. Their main purpose is to monitor one or more 
environmental parameters and then report to one or more central locations, called base 
station(s) [1]. 
 
Their computational and communication capabilities widely broaden the application range of 
the simple sensors that they replace. They were initially thought to be useful in military, 
health and commercial applications [1]. Since then, they have been commercially advertised 
as capable of working in industrial applications, building automation and asset management 
[11]. An important application field that has recently become very popular is in assisting 
scientific work that requires monitoring the natural environment; various scenarios include 
12 
 
bio system monitoring [12], wildfire protection [13], global warming [14] and agriculture 
[15]. 
 
Characteristics 
There is great debate on the detailed abilities and characteristics of sensor networks. Although 
most research recognises a set of properties what sensor networks should possess, they 
disagree on what the reality allows them to accomplish. The difference of theoretical and 
practical limitations fuels the academic debate and recent research tends to deny previous 
statements. For example Akyildiz et al. state that ―a sensor network is composed of a large 
number of sensor nodes that are densely deployed‖ [1] while Gamage et al. claim that a such 
network is ―mythical‖ [16]. 
 
Although authors fail to agree on defining limits, there is consensus on a core set of generic 
characteristics. The characteristics listed by [1] are in agreement with both early publications, 
as in [17-19]  and with later work, for example [20-22]. All the above authors characterize 
sensor networks as self-organising, able for in-network processing, fault tolerant and scalable. 
However, despite the agreement on the concept of scalability, the actual size of a typical 
network is a highly disputed property. Gamage et al. in [16] claim that a practical network 
size might be one hundred nodes while [23] use examples with network sizes of 10,000 
nodes.  
 
Limitations 
Every published work agrees that the sensor devices are limited in computational, storing and 
communication capabilities when compared with traditional computer networks. However, 
the literature does not express a homogenous definition on the exact limitations of sensor 
devices.  
 
The ultimate limitation of sensor networks is the fact that they operate on a finite power 
source. This argument is extensively supported by the literature as there are publications 
attempting to address the problem, for example [19, 24-28] and others that consider it a 
limitation, as in [1-2, 16, 21, 29-30]. Since different power sources provide different energy 
capacity [11], there is variation on offered abilities.  
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The typical sensor device that dominates the literature is the MICA2 node [11]. It offers an 
8MHz CPU and communication capabilities at the rate of 38.4KBps. This device can run 
TinyOS [31] and benefits from the TinySec [2] security mechanism. Much more capable [11] 
and less capable devices [32] also exist. Thus, differences in capabilities are usually 
associated with differences in the devices physical size as well. 
 
Security considerations 
The modern world is full of security risks and every networked computer system is a potential 
target [6]. Wireless Sensor Networks are no different; security must  
be provided by in order to make them suitable for a wider range of applications [33].  
 
Many of the potential application scenarios for wireless sensor networks are either too critical 
[34] or too valuable [35] to be run without an acceptable level of security. Therefore, security 
can help Wireless Sensor Networks to reach reaching their full potential by making them 
more attractive, a prospect that would result in fewer costs and easier use of WSNs 
everywhere.  
 
However, the limited nature of the devices is an important obstacle in providing adequate 
security [28], sufficient to enable application in most environments [2]. Traditional security 
mechanisms cannot operate in sensor networks as they are too demanding in resources [29]. A 
new security solution has to be developed to provide an acceptable level of security with as 
low as possible impact to the longevity of the sensor network. 
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2.1.2 Operational scenarios 
 
Wireless sensor networks have been proposed for a variety of different applications [1]. This 
subsection presents popular application fields and gives a brief description of representing 
operational scenarios. The application fields that demonstrate similar characteristics can be 
grouped into four categories: military applications, automation systems, health monitoring 
and environmental monitoring. Finally, the importance of security in each of the different 
application scenarios is discussed. 
 
Military applications 
Wireless sensor networks are considered suitable for military applications, since their abilities 
make them attractive for C4ISRT
1
 systems [1]. Their ability to be deployed rapidly, self-
organise and then operate while tolerating possible faults was valued as a cheap alternative to 
previously used military sensors.   
 
Typical military applications assume that sensor networks are very large and aim to equip 
them with methods to resist intelligent attacks by the enemy. Their ultimate target is to allow 
the network to remain functional even when it is attacked. Military interests helped promote 
research in WSNs and in the area of security in particular. Notably, it has been suggested that 
the assumptions and requirements of military applications are unrealistic and that the limited 
nature of WSNs cannot support them [16]. 
 
The most difficult requirement is to maintain the security of the network using a system that 
does not trust any component. This idea posed an intriguing research question that produced 
important contributions to knowledge, primarily the probabilistic key management schemes 
for wireless sensor networks. Examples include the work presented in [23, 27, 36-39]. 
 
A prime example is the work of Eschenauer and Gligor [37] where the authors specifically 
designate a solution suitable for military sensor networks. They assume a wireless sensor 
network which may be deployed in hostile environments, consists of tens of thousands of 
nodes, its size is dynamically scalable, might be subject to eavesdropping attacks and most 
importantly; its limited nodes are susceptible to capture and intelligent manipulation by 
                                                 
1
 C4ISRT refers to the concept of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance. 
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adversaries. The authors provide a solution that limits the impact of attacks to a small subset 
of the network. 
 
The security requirements of such applications are rather obvious; with lives and national 
interests at stake, the military cannot rely on a system that the enemy can disable. Current 
surveillance systems like satellites and drones are expensive and the WSNs promised a radical 
decrease in costs. If WSNs were proved equally secure and reliable, they could replace or 
complement existing surveillance methods. 
 
Automation systems 
This category includes applications that utilise a wireless sensor network to monitor the 
condition of a particular structure or machinery. Possible application fields include industrial 
applications and building automation. There are two examples to illustrate their 
characteristics. 
 
The first example is [40], where BP uses a sensor network to monitor the vibrations of 
rotating machinery onboard a tanker ship. Vibrations are known to be representative of the 
condition of any rotating machinery. Therefore, BP can remotely monitor their equipment and 
plan servicing only when required. Consequently, both servicing costs and valuable port time 
is saved. The wireless nature of WSNs allows BP to retrofit this system on any of its tankers 
without special planning. 
 
The second example, described by Huang  in [41], is a sensor network that monitors 
temperature, humidity and airflow in the rooms of a building. Because of the accurate 
monitoring, the system is able to fine-tune the air conditioning parameters to save energy and 
produce a more pleasant environment. 
 
These applications share a common set of characteristics. These sensor networks are: 
 operated within a controlled environment, in a man-made structure 
 composed of a relatively small number of nodes 
These similarities are usually present in all automation applications. WSNs provide a modern 
solution to the problem of automation, which was tackled in the past by utilising wired 
sensors, e.g. thermostats, which reported raw data to a central system. The central location 
then analysed the data, made decisions and possibly engaged into corrective action. In the 
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sensor network paradigm, the nodes analyse the gathered data and the central location now 
focused in utilising the information rather than obtaining it. The wireless nature of WSNs is 
cheaper and allows for much faster and easier deployment, especially in retrospective 
installations. 
 
BP expects sensor network applications to make a high impact in the Industrial sector in the 
coming years [35] while Rabaey et al. claim $55 billion USD annual savings should air 
conditioning monitoring be improved by the use of wireless sensor networks in the US [42]. 
Those statements, accompanied with the low cost and ease of deployment, suggest that the 
generic market of commercial applications for wireless sensor networks will thrive in the 
future. 
 
There are pragmatic reasons why security must be provided to automation applications, 
regardless of their importance. First and most importantly, any system might be attacked by 
anyone for no obvious reason [6]. Secondly, there are increasing concerns that an attack 
aiming to facilitate espionage or sabotage might happen in industrial automation systems and 
if successful it might incur costs and disruption[43]. Moreover, sensor networks are often 
parts of bigger systems. If they are not secured, they are a weak link risk to other systems.  
  
Finally, security-aware organisations are unlikely to invest into systems that are not properly 
secured, regardless of the system‟s role. Security might act as catalytic influence when 
deciding to deploy a WSN. Consequently, security makes WSNs more marketable and gives 
them a higher chance of adaptation by companies. 
 
Healthcare 
There is a range of sensor network applications directly applicable to the health and fitness 
sector. Usually such applications operate in the Personal Area Network (PAN) domain, as 
they are wearable devices utilised to monitor the biological condition of a patient or an 
athlete. Although there are many genuine health applications, most of them are commercial 
products and are not associated with published academic work. These products are outlined in 
[34]. 
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References [34, 44] describe healthcare WSNs with the following characteristics: 
 they operate in a relatively safe indoors environment 
 the network consists of a small number of nodes, usually less than five 
 they have to be small enough to be comfortable to wear 
 they are not limited by power as their user is able to replace the batteries 
 
An example health application is the one described by Milenkovic et al. [44]. Their system is 
a wearable sensor network that has to be secure, reliable and interoperable. Its objective is to 
allow patients to live in their home while allowing the hospital to monitor them constantly. 
The system consists of few very small sensor nodes, a personal server and a base station. The 
patient wears the small sensors and the personal server while the base station can be located 
anywhere in the house as long as it is connected to the hospital via the internet. The small 
sensors report on the higher-capability personal server, which in turn transmits the 
information to the base station. From that point, information can be transmitted to the 
hospital. This solution allows the doctors to monitor the patient while they enjoy the comfort 
of their home. 
 
Any health record is considered private in many jurisdictions and it is protected by 
appropriate legislation. For example, health condition is considered as “sensitive personal 
data” by the U.K. Data Protection Act 1998 [45]. Healthcare sensor networks might generate 
information classified as health records and thus they must conform to these legal 
requirements. On the other hand, fitness systems might not require security but high-end 
fitness systems might have security enabled as they can be used for health monitoring as well. 
 
Environmental monitoring 
This category includes various applications that aim to monitor some aspect of the natural 
world. Examples are applications intended to monitor bio systems [12], wildfire [13], the 
effects of global warming [14] and agriculture [15].  
 
The first example, known as the Great Duck Island project, is intended for natural habitat 
monitoring in general and more specifically to monitor “seabird nesting environment and 
behaviour” [12]. The nodes on this system are deployed in seabird nests to monitor incubation 
and other breeding patterns. They also aim to correlate the bird‟s behaviour with other 
environmental parameters, such as temperature. 
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In the second example, the authors describe a wireless sensor network deployed in a forest 
[13]. The network monitors temperature and humidity and reports to other components of the 
system. This information can then be used to determine the risk of fire breaking out while 
temperature itself is a clear indicator of an actual fire ignited in the forest. The authors 
describe a system capable of accurately reporting the location of a fire.  
 
The third example is part of a scientific project that “focuses on sub-glacial bed deformation” 
[14]. This system uses sensors deployed under the moving glacier at a depth of 50 to 80 
meters. Once the custom sensors were deployed, they were non-recoverable and their 
longevity would rely on their battery. The sensors monitored temperature, pressure and tilt 
information. 
 
The final scenario is a representative of systems that might be used in farms to assist in 
regular activities like farming and cattle grazing. The systems might consist of either static 
sensors that monitor ground moisture or mobile sensors attached to livestock. The authors 
describe systems for both objectives and there are companies that selling such systems 
commercially [11]. 
 
These applications are quite different and each has its own problems and requirements. 
However, they share a set of common characteristics: 
 the network covers a large geographical area, nodes might be separated by significant 
distances 
 the nodes are deployed in the physical environment, exposed to harsh conditions 
 the network is expected to function for a large period of time  
 the individual nodes might remain in network isolation for months 
 the nodes might employ data aggregation and batch reporting techniques 
 the network needs to be reliable and robust 
 the network might sleep for long periods of time before it activates and reacts to 
events 
 the network needs to be remotely managed 
 the nodes might be fully mobile 
These common features are usually dictated by the nature of the environmental monitoring 
activity. In the glacial monitoring application for example, the difficulty of deployment and 
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the non-recoverability of the sensor nodes required them to remain in operation for as long as 
possible. 
 
It is evident that wireless sensor networks might be used in a range of environmental 
monitoring applications for scientific, welfare or Health & Safety reasons. Since the current 
environmental concerns require even more remote monitoring capability, sensor networks will 
probably become a tool to scientists of other disciplines.  
 
Many of these applications require security for reasons similar to the automation systems 
discussed before. For example, security is a perfectly justifiable requirement for wildfire 
monitoring WSNs. However, others applications might not seem to require security, for 
example seabird behaviour monitoring. Security is a desirable requirement even in these cases 
since any insecure system might be attacked even if there is no apparent reason or gain [6]. 
Provision of security in all applications would increase the confidence in the reliability of 
WSN-generated information. 
 
 
2.1.3 Hardware platform 
 
This subsection discusses the hardware in use for wireless sensor networks. The 
computational and communication abilities of hardware, the physical structure of sensor node 
hardware and the way that they are organised are discussed. This subsection concludes by 
analysing the implication of the hardware‟s abilities and limitations to the security of sensor 
networks. 
 
Capabilities 
One key advantage of wireless sensor networks against conventional sensors is their ability to 
process data and wirelessly communicate information only when that is required. In order to 
facilitate their advantage, sensor devices are equipped with a modern but lightweight central 
processing unit (CPU), and a radio communication component [1]. 
 
The CPU of a sensor node acts a central decision maker, controller and coordinator for all 
components of the device [1]. As discussed in 2.1.4, the CPU might be limited in 
computational power but it is rather complete in features and capable of running miniature 
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operating system. A variety of microcontrollers has been used in sensor devices. Their 
computational capabilities range from 16-bit 8MHz[46] to 32-bit 419MHz processors [47]. 
 
In addition, the hardware provides temporary and permanent storage. Typical nodes like the 
MICA2 node offer 4KB configuration EEPROM, 128KB program flash memory, 512KB 
serial flash memory [48]. 
 
Essentially, the sensor device is a very small computer with processor, memory and radio 
acting as input/output interface. The devices have to be minimalistic because they depend on a 
finite power source but current research is implementing features found on larger devices. 
Examples of such features are; security [2], fault-tolerance [49], scalability [50], multi-agent 
systems [51] and others, as described in [1]. In addition, the CPU allows for energy savings as 
demonstrated in [31, 52]. The radio component on the other hand acts as the input/output 
interface and enables devices to form a network. 
 
Components and organisation 
Sensor hardware follows a modular design where individual components form tailored sensor 
nodes suitable for all possible usages. There are four types of modules, as defined by [1]; 
 main boards; provide computation, communication and storage 
 sensing boards; host analogue or digital electronic sensors 
 connectivity boards; provide other than radio connectivity like USB 
 power sources; provide energy 
The typical sensor node consists of a sensor board, a sensing board and a power source [53]. 
The exact components are determined by the role of the node in the network. Some nodes 
might lack a sensing board or benefit from connectivity boards or auxiliary power sources. 
The components are connected in the form of a stack and enclosed in a case occupying about 
100cm³ of volume. The sensor devices might utilise any existing sensing technology; from the 
simplest microphone, to complex cameras or anything else technology can sense [1, 11]. For 
an example sensor, see Figure 1.  
 
Each main board consists of four basic components that are connected together using one or 
more PCBs [1]. The microprocessor and storage components are usually integrated in one 
chip while the radio component might be separate. Figure 2 illustrates how components on 
different modules interface with each other. The sensing unit marks components hosted in the 
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sensing board, the processing unit and the transceiver are hosted in the main board. Primary 
and auxiliary power sources are also illustrated. 
Future sensor nodes might integrate all the 
components in a single chip, as shown by Khan et 
al. in [32]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: an advanced sensor node.  
The picture illustrates the sensing board, which 
includes a camera, the sensor board in the middle 
and a connectivity board on the bottom. The scale 
of the picture is close to real life size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: component organisation. Figure is based on similar figure from  [1] 
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Security implications 
As shown in the hardware explanation and examples, the devices are limited in their abilities 
but they are complete computers but they cannot handle large amounts of data, they are very 
slow in their processing and extensive utilisation of resources reduces their lifetime.  
 
Therefore, any design of a security protocol must consider three important points in their 
proposal; the amount of permanent or temporary memory required to operate, the time it takes 
for the security computations to conclude and the energy overhead introduced. 
 
Traditional security mechanisms often require ability to apply complex processing on large 
amounts of data. As explained in [2, 28-29], sensor devices lack storage capacity. In fact, they 
cannot even hold variables of sufficient size to accommodate a traditional security 
mechanism[29] like the Public Key Cryptography described by [54]. The security components 
that can be utilised for WSN use have to be selected while taking memory requirements as a 
criterion. 
 
Another problem with traditional security is the processing overhead that it introduces. 
Although a sensor network‟s processor is capable of executing any calculation, it cannot do so 
fast enough. Many sensor network applications would require rapid response [13] from the 
sensor network and more significantly, some network communication methods are based on 
timeouts, they cannot operate if normal latency exceeds a certain threshold. 
 
A sensor node might eventually execute a computation and might manage to send the 
information over its network but continuous execution of difficult computational tasks would 
deplete its resources and result to a disabled network. A MICA2 node running on full power 
would only last for 2 weeks before its batteries dry out [2]. Therefore, effort must be made so 
that security designs o not deplete the battery source as similar efforts were done for other 
systems of a WSN, for example [1, 19, 24, 31, 55], accounts for energy consumption in one 
way or another.  
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2.1.4 Software platform 
 
Sensor networks are miniature computers that can run software. There is usually an operating 
system and an application which runs on it [1]. The software is often developed using PC 
simulators. This subsection describes the operating systems, the simulators and the security 
challenges associated with operating systems. 
 
Operating systems 
The Operating System (OS) provides the underlying mechanisms that allow the applications 
to interact with hardware. The purpose of the OS as defined by [31] is; 
 manage the limited resources of the device 
 perform the requirements of the sensor network in real-time 
 balance modularity, flexibility and optimisation 
 provide a low power platform to run applications 
In order to achieve its purpose, the OS provides reusable APIs to the applications. The tasks 
are executed via the APIs as desired by the application, allowing it to become the main 
component that controls the device‟s behaviour. This is a typical design found in operating 
systems suitable for low end devices, like the TinyOS [31]. High end devices might run 
different operating systems that allow for multitasking and are therefore based on different 
designs [56]. 
 
Although a number of operating system designs have been proposed, for example [56-58], 
TinyOS enjoys the highest popularity by researchers, organisations and commercial 
distributors, references [1, 12-13, 15, 28, 31, 40, 44, 59]  directly or indirectly endorse 
TinyOS. It is a flexible, application-specific operating system for sensor networks. It is a 
component-based, event-driven operating system written in nesC, a dialect of C. TinyOS 
provides a lightweight networking architecture featuring Integrated-Layer Processing, power 
management, hardware/software transparency, precise time synchronisation and routing.  
 
Simulators 
Due to the nature of wireless sensor networks, development of complex applications might be 
a difficult process. Testing small changes in the applications might require many hours of 
preparation and expensive hardware [60-61]. WSN simulators have been developed to tackle 
these problems. A simulator attempts to represent the behaviour of the sensor hardware on a 
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personal computer in a manner that would assist research on sensor networks and 
development of applications. 
 
As discussed in our survey paper on WSN simulators [61], there are many simulators 
available to potential developers. The present research has concluded that the TOSSIM [62] 
simulator is suitable for development stage and the Avrora [63] simulator should be used for 
evaluation purposes.  
 
Security implications 
The existence of a miniature OS is advantageous and does not pose any problems far as 
security is concern. In fact, the existence of the OS helps in providing efficient security as 
much as it helps with other WSN applications. 
 
 
2.1.5 Networking 
 
This subsection discusses the networking capabilities if hardware and how they are utilised by 
the TinyOS operating system to achieve wireless communication. The topology of sensor 
networks is also described. Finally, the security implications of the networking model of 
WSNs are analysed. 
 
Network capabilities 
As explained before, the sensor devices are miniature computers and the radio component acts 
as an input/output interface. The combination of radio with CPU and storage creates a 
network. Sensor networks benefit from features such as medium sharing [2, 64], self-
organised routing [65] and packet division [64]. These features are similar to what is found in 
all computer networks, only greatly optimised and miniaturised for energy efficiency and 
better suitability on a constrained environment.  
 
A variety of radio capabilities is observed. The exact details of radio operation and medium 
utilisation are defined by the operating system
2
 but the OS may or may not follow an 
international communication standard. 
                                                 
2
 Discussed in 2.1.3. 
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Low-end devices use customised communication methods designed for low power 
consumption. For example, the popular MICA2 node [48] provides a radio component able to 
communicate at 38.4KBps but relies on the operating system to define the method of medium 
access. 
 
High-end devices with increased abilities have adapted existing communication standards to 
improve compatibility, such as Bluetooth [66] and IEEE 802.15.4 [67]. For example, the 
Imote2 [47] node is capable of 250KBps data rate and compatible with IEEE 802.15.4. 
 
Typical network topology 
Wireless sensor networks follow loosely defined rules on network topology and deployment. 
As explained by [1] and illustrated in Figure 3, the networks are “usually scattered‖ in a 
―sensor field.‖ Alternative topologies have also been identified, for example [19, 44, 68]. 
Nevertheless, each node performs a predefined role; it can be a sensor node, a cluster head or 
a base station.  
 
The network design and the application‟s specifics dictate the exact role. Sensor nodes are 
devices that act as data generators and they need to communicate this information with the 
base station. Since the base station is often out of range, the sensor nodes can utilise 
neighbouring sensor nodes or cluster heads  [19] to propagate their information [1].  
 
An important role in a wireless sensor network is the base station, or sink. They act as a 
gateway between the wireless sensor network and other devices or computers. In order to 
facilitate this functionality, they are equipped with appropriate hardware and software.  
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Figure 3: a typical sensor network. Based on similar figure from [1]. 
 
Security implications 
The devices are capable of communicating information in relatively small packets [29]. They 
cannot transfer data fast enough [28] and the act consumes a disproportionate amount of 
resources [69]. In addition, the network is prone to various DoS-type attacks [33], including 
routing attacks, and it may be unreliable[28]. Therefore, every security protocol must be 
designed to work with small packets and be resilient. Ultimately, they have to be energy 
efficient. 
 
Security mechanisms require inclusion of additional information to function. For example, 
TinySec[2]  introduces a 5-byte overhead compared with TinyOS. Assuming maximum 
payload of 29 bytes, the security overhead is about 12%. This affects resiliency, energy 
efficiency and latency. In contrast, if the packet could carry 200 bytes payload then the 
overhead would be 2.5% and its impact would be equally smaller. Clearly, the small packet 
size of WSNs affects the operational margins of security protocols. 
 
Resiliency will help the network to cope in cases where reliability issues cause the network to 
malfunction and when the network is under DoS-type attacks. However, resiliency is usually 
achieved by sending additional information, like parity-based error-correction[67] and replay 
of badly transported information [64]. Resiliency is therefore a trade-off with energy 
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efficiency and security mechanisms that operate at the transportation level have to account for 
this matter. 
 
Security mechanisms have to select an appropriate trade-off between resiliency, overhead and 
level of security provision. Success in this problem achieves energy efficiency and ultimately 
increases the longevity of the network and widens the application possibilities. For these 
reasons, security mechanism to opt to use computational resources instead of radio because 
every bit transmitted is equivalent in energy costs to 800-900 instructions [69]. 
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2.2. Security in Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
This section explains what security is, its requirements and how they are applied in WSNs. A 
brief overview of security, and how it is applied in Wireless Sensor Networks, is given. Then 
the threat model is presented and the section concludes by explaining how different research 
groups apply security on different levels. 
 
 
2.2.1 Overview of security 
 
Definition 
References to security in this work are shorthand for Information Security. The U.S. Code 
Collection [70] defines the term Information Security to mean “protecting information and 
information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
destruction.” The same document defines that Information Security should provide; 
 Integrity; “guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and 
includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity” 
 Confidentiality;  “preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, 
including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information” 
 Availability; “which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information” 
The above is an idealistic description of what a secure system should provide. Practice has 
shown that computer systems that are operated by humans cannot fully meet the requirements 
to be unconditionally secure. For this reason, a system‟s security is considered satisfactory 
when it makes the system computationally secure. Various degrees of security like 
unconditional security, computational security, ad-hoc security and others are described by 
Menezes in [3]. 
 
Despite the limitations on reaching unconditional security, an acceptable degree of security 
can be provided, bit there will always be trade-offs between the desired security provision and 
the practical limitations. Despite the fact that it is more correct to refer to security with 
relativistic expressions like degree of security or level of security provision, when a system 
provides an acceptable degree of security, it is said that this system is secure. The degree of 
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security a system must provide in order for it to be considered secure varies greatly and 
depends primarily on the aim of the system and its limitations. 
 
Importance 
Security is rapidly becoming an important part of the modern world. Be it protection against 
national threats or safe monetary transactions, security is important and here to stay [5].  
 
Wireless Sensor Networks are no different from other computer networks in the level of 
security that they must provide. The literature that highlights the importance of security of all 
computer systems; 
 every networked computer system is a potential target [6] 
 security will make WSNs suitable to a wider range of applications [2, 5, 33] 
 security and privacy might be legal requirements [45] 
 applications may be critical [34] or valuable [35] enough to justify security 
Each of the above references makes clear that the type of system is irrelevant to the security 
requirement. 
 
Therefore, the security of WSNs has to be regarded as important as any other security system. 
The associated problems must be treated equally and the final solution must provide a security 
level that is comparable with other systems. After all, sensor networks are often parts of larger 
systems. If not equally secured they would become weak links on these systems. 
 
Basic requirements 
The aim of security in wireless sensor networks is no different that the aims for any computer 
network. As defined by [29], the basic requirements of a secure sensor network would be; 
 Data confidentiality; information stored or in transfer on a sensor network should not 
be leaked to adversaries 
 Data authentication; messages must be authenticated so that trust on them can be 
earned. Upon reception of a message, the receiver must be able to determine to trust or 
reject it  
 Data integrity; a trust requirement is that a receiver must be able to determine if a 
message has been altered by an adversary while it was in transit 
 Data freshness; messages must demonstrate to the receivers that they are not replays of 
older recorded messages 
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These requirements comply with the generic information security definition and they 
represent what a basic security system should provide. Provision of these requirements in a 
sensor network would protect it from the attacks described in the threat model
3
.  
 
Desired level of security provision 
Different applications have different security requirements; there is no level of security 
provision uniform for all cases. However, analysis of the literature points to the minimum 
level of acceptable protection against security threats. 
 
The level of confidentiality is directly related to encryption strength [3] which is determined 
by the effective key length [4]. Acceptable key lengths are provided by various organisation 
and researchers. Since they are related to technological advances, they differ for each calendar 
year. In reference [71], NIST proposes that that 80-bit keys should not be used after the year 
2010, a fact supported by [72]. In addition, this argument is indirectly supported by [73] in 
which CNSS stated in 2003 that 128-bits encryption is “sufficient to protect classified 
information up to the SECRET level.‖  
 
Authentication and integrity provides an assurance, or confidence, that the messages have not 
been forged or altered while in transit. It is suggested that the level of this assurance must be 
high enough to match the provisions of confidentiality [3]. 
 
As explained by [29], there are three levels of freshness; no freshness, weak freshness and 
strong freshness. References [29, 31] agree that most WSN applications require weak 
freshness and that it is up to the individual application to provide strong freshness when 
needed. 
 
Since WSNs are limited, they should only be matching the minimum level of security but one 
might argue that even this is too high and unnecessary. Such argument does not properly 
consider the importance of security as discussed previously. In specific, it treats WSNs as less 
important parts of a system or as compelled to be unacceptably insecure. Nevertheless, 
attempts to provide WSNs with that level of security by a number of researchers are seen in 
the literature[30, 74]. 
  
                                                 
3
 Will be discussed next, in 2.2.2. 
31 
 
2.2.2 Threat model 
 
In addition to the basic requirements, the individual threats need to be accounted in order to 
provide the desired level of security. This subsection describes what these threats are, how 
they are carried out by attackers and what the possible evasive solutions are. The threat model 
is discussed and proposed countermeasures are explained. Some of these solutions are more 
closely connected to this research and thus discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
Attacks on confidentiality 
The wireless communication medium that sensor networks use to communicate implies that 
any receiver in range is capable of reading all radio traffic [33]. Therefore, data must be 
sealed from eavesdroppers and this constitutes the requirement of confidentiality, which is 
met via encryption. Sufficiently complex encryption schemes are implemented in WSNs with 
care, as strong encryption methods are associated with high computational overheads [29].  
Nevertheless, most systems that attempt to achieve confidentiality introduce encryption 
schemes with varying computational difficulty. Attacks on confidentiality are known as 
cryptanalytic attacks, discussed in [3], and are characterised by a level of required 
computational complexity before they conclude by revealing the encryption key. 
 
The most known cryptanalytic attack is the known-plaintext attack, popularly known as brute 
force attack. It involves obtaining a plaintext and the associated output ciphertext. By 
knowing two of the three inputs of the encryption function, the attacker can tries every 
possible key value until the correct key is revealed. Brute force attacks have a complexity 
equal to the effective key length of the encryption function. Longer keys provide greater 
confidentiality. 
 
Other confidentiality attacks aim to reduce the level of computational complexity required by 
discovering a fundamental flaw in the mathematics underlying the encryption function. There 
are many types of cryptanalytic attacks in this category [3]. Cryptanalytic attacks usually 
require a number of conditions or pieces of the cryptographic input or output  data to be 
acquired before they can be executed [3].  
 
Cryptanalysis of encryption functions is the ongoing process conducted by the cryptographic 
community that aims to discover cryptanalytic attacks in existing algorithms. Using an 
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encryption function that is well analysed by the cryptographic community is a way to further 
protect the confidentiality of a secure cryptosystem. 
 
Attacks on authentication and integrity 
Communications via an open wireless medium allows attackers to alter or inject messages 
into the medium [33]. These attacks involve utilising a carefully crafted and powerful 
transceiver to overwrite the radio signals emitted by the network devices. Although it requires 
a skilful attacker, it is easier to conduct than a brute force attack on confidentiality, as it does 
not require great computational ability.  
 
The efficient solution to this problem is to employ a cryptographic hash function to protect 
messages [3]. The function accepts the sender‟s identification information and the data as 
input and outputs a cryptographic signature. This is then appended to the data in the form of a 
Message Authentication Code (MAC). Each signature is associated with a probability of 
failure, known as confidence. Depending on the kind of hash function, the length of the input 
data and the amount of unique possible output, the exact probability that the protection might 
fail can be determined. 
 
The hash function might be derived by the encryption function itself, as it was for example 
proposed in TinySec[2]. Under this solution, a possible attempt to inject authenticated 
messages or to alter existing messages would require knowledge of the authenticity 
mechanism‟s key, which in turn requires a cryptanalytic attack. Such authentication 
mechanism is believed to be as secure as the encryption function upon which is based [75].  
 
Attacks on routing 
Routing security is not a direct threat since most routing protocols can be protected if the 
security requirements for message exchange are met. However, many attacks become 
available if the security mechanism fails to protect the routing messages. These vulnerabilities 
are clearly demonstrated by Karlof et al. [76]. The majority of routing attacks is briefly 
described here. Many of the routing attacks described here might be classified as Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks in the literature. Other DoS attacks are further discussed later. 
 
If allowed to spoof, alter or replay routing information, an attacker can manipulate the routing 
table with bogus routing information. Successful manipulation allows the attackers to create a 
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number of problems including routing loops, attract or repel network traffic, extend or shorten 
routes, generate false error messages, partition the network, increase end-to-end latency etc.  
 
Black hole and Sibyl [77] attacks aim to place a malicious node inside the network. This node 
will be able to choose whether to forward or drop a packet; it will therefore conduct a 
selective forwarding attack. The aim of the attacker is to provide a location on the network, 
which would look extremely attractive to the routing protocol and thus trick it to route traffic 
via the area under attack. Usually the method involves compromising a node or injecting 
nodes in the network. It therefore requires either insecure hardware or weak authentication. 
 
A wormhole attack [78] creates and provides an actual high quality route between two points 
on the network using a communication medium normally unavailable to a sensor network. 
This route would quickly attract traffic and the attacker can then manipulate traffic in the way 
they choose. This attack requires the attacker to be able to inject packets or nodes in the 
network. 
 
The HELLO flood attack utilises a powerful transceiver to broadcast a HELLO message that 
will trick distant nodes to believe that the attacker‟s node is neighbouring them. A laptop-
class attacker can convince the whole network that they are a preferred route via a HELLO 
flood attack and thus it will make other attacks possible. This is another attack that requiring 
ability to inject nodes. 
 
The final potential attack documented by [76] is acknowledgement spoofing. The attack 
involves recording and then replaying a legitimate acknowledgement message at the attackers 
will in order to pretend that a destroyed link is in good working order. That implies that the 
attacker can destroy nodes and hide that fact from the network. In addition, the attacker can 
trick the routing protocol and make it think that low quality routes are actually healthy routes. 
That would lead to higher energy consumption and increased latency. This attack requires the 
ability to inject acknowledgement messages. 
 
Denial of Service attacks 
The term Denial of Service (DoS) attack is loosely used to describe attacks that cause 
complete or partial system failure. Usually, the attacks involve sending a powerful 
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transmission in order to jam the radio channel or to confuse the medium access control 
protocol. 
 
Brutal DoS attacks involve completely blocking the communication medium by causing 
interference. The low power radio capabilities of sensor networks mean that it is relatively 
easy to create a portable transmitter with enough power to jam the network [76]. There is no 
easy defence against such attacks [28], although some groups are working on solutions given 
particular assumptions [79]. 
 
A survey of intelligent attacks and countermeasures is provided by Wood and Stankovic [80] 
who describe DoS attacks that do not rely on raw power but flaws in the design instead. It 
might be possible for an attacker to inject a small, maliciously structured message that would 
exploit a design vulnerability of the system. The target of the attacker is to trigger 
asymmetrical resource usage, in the sense that the attacker can cause a great problem to the 
system with little effort on their part. 
 
Physical attacks 
Secure systems are vulnerable if an attacker obtains physical access in the hardware that hosts 
the system. This is as true for sensor networks as for every other system. Initial research in 
sensor networks suggested that they would be vulnerable to physical attacks including node 
tampering and reading of memory contents. 
 
Such potential attack would be catastrophic for a secure cryptosystem that relies on keys as 
those have to be stored on memory and thus revealed to the attacker in case of node 
tampering. It is therefore essential to design systems that would sustain physical attacks as 
well. Research in this area has taken many directions depending on different assumptions
4
.  
 
Attacks on single points of failure 
By definition, every system will have a component, which would be weaker than the other 
components. Examples of such components in wireless sensor networks might be cluster 
heads and base stations. A carefully designed secure wireless sensor network should disclose 
as little information as possible on the location of such singe points of failure. Additional, 
non-physical, points of failure might involve poorly designed components of the system.  
                                                 
4
 This topic is further discussed in subsection 2.3.1. 
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The work of Deng et al. [81] analyses the security of the base station viewing it as a single 
point of failure. There are other examples in the literature that refer to the importance of 
single points of failure but very little published research considers just that. 
 
 
2.2.3 Application of security 
 
Security is a large area of research with lots of different branches. In sensor network security, 
there are at least three major branches: key management, data transportation security and 
routing security. There is also work that cannot be categorised, like hardware security or DoS 
attack prevention. 
 
Each of these research areas attempt to solve security problems found at different levels. A 
uniform level of security must be provided to achieve effectiveness in the final solution. Any 
finalised security system will have to either be a combination of solutions from different areas 
or at least be compatible with other work. There may be no academic work assessing how 
various security systems could be combined to form a uniformly secure sensor network. 
 
Key management 
Key management is an important part of security in all computer networks [3]. In sensor 
networks, the term refers to the process of key agreement in a protected from adversaries 
method. In sensor networks, these keys are indented for use by the security mechanism of the 
data transportation layer. 
 
Most key management schemes assume that that no component of the system can be trusted 
under almost any circumstance. These solutions expect that at least some component will be 
compromised and then used to launch an attack on the system. Sensor node hardware is 
believed to be susceptible to compromise, a problem known as node compromise.  
 
Solutions found in the literature aim to limit the impact of a node‟s hardware compromise. 
There are relatively old [23, 82-83] and relatively recent [20, 84-85]  proposals based on this 
assumption. The solutions might be categorised by type in probabilistic solutions and 
location-aware solutions. Other types of solutions and hybrids also exist. 
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Data-transportation layer security schemes 
This research area attempts to provide security for the process of transporting messages 
between the sensor nodes. The solutions apply their security features on the sensor network 
equivalent of the OSI data transportation layer [66]. The systems are responsible for providing 
security properties like encryption and authentication for the data exchanged information.  
 
These schemes are focused into providing energy efficient security and thus they rely heavily 
on the security of other components. Importantly, they ignore hardware and routing security. 
These problems are not considered relevant to this research area.  
 
This research area is relatively more recent than other areas and there are not many well-cited 
solutions. There are no distinct categories in this research area. 
 
Routing security 
Routing refers to how a sensor network is organised and how available message paths are 
defined. This process involves exchange of information which if not secured might enable 
DoS attacks.  
 
There are a number of proposals tackling the generic routing problem [17, 24, 65, 86-89] but 
most research is focused on providing energy-efficient routing. Surprisingly and despite the 
fact that most routing protocols seem vulnerable [76], very few articles consider both security 
and efficiency of routing. 
 
Other areas 
There are also open security questions in hardware security, prevention of denial of service 
attacks, management of points of failure and most importantly: cryptanalysis and 
benchmarking of encryption algorithms. All these potential problems are related to the 
security of wireless sensor networks but not directly related to this research. 
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2.3 Related work 
 
This section describes and critically analyses important work seen in the literature that relates 
to the proposed system. The proposal is primarily a security mechanism acting on the data 
transportation layer but it includes a key management system as an important part of the 
solution. 
 
This section starts with an overview of the research area, explaining how security is applied in 
wireless sensor networks. Then it presents work that is both important and directly related to 
this proposal; key management and data transportation layer security schemes.  
 
This section concludes by discussing routing security and other work, which is related to 
security in sensor networks but not directly related to this proposal, like routing security and 
other work. 
 
 
2.3.1 Key management schemes 
 
This subsection presents established key management schemes found in the literature. 
 
Probabilistic key management 
Probabilistic key management schemes work by clustering the network into virtual groups of 
nodes. Nodes in a group share the same security state but groups benefit from different states. 
This design limits the impact of node compromise to affect only its group instead off the 
entire network. The way distinctive groups are created and managed is what differentiates the 
solutions. Most of these proposals assume that the sensor network is large and dense. 
 
The work of Du et al. [23] is one of the oldest and probably the most cited. They have 
described a system in which nodes are pre-loaded with keys randomly selected from a large 
pool of keys. The pool of keys has to be larger than the size of the network but the number of 
keys loaded is much smaller than that. The density of the network, i.e. how many neighbours 
a node will have on average, defines how many keys should be loaded in each node. For a 
given the pool size, network size, density and number of keys loaded on the nodes, the 
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probability of two neighbouring nodes sharing the same key can be calculated. A share 
probability greater than one guarantees that the vast majority of node pairs will be able to 
discover a common key loaded on both ends of the pair and secure communication can 
commence. On the other hand, attackers who compromise one node can only obtain a limited 
number of keys, which does not allow them to intercept the communications from the whole 
network. 
 
A similar but more efficient approach is proposed by Pietro et al. [84]. The main difference is 
that nodes are loaded with keys from the pool while obeying a mathematical relation, which 
allows all nodes to know in advance which keys are loaded on every other node. This is done 
with the help of a pseudo-random number generator, which accepts the node ID as seed, 
effectively selecting keys using the node‟s ID as a selection criterion. Therefore, anyone who 
knows the node ID also knows the keys that are loaded on the node and thus nodes know in 
advance which key to use for communicating with another node, without the need of a key 
agreement process, saving key-agreement radio communication overheads. 
 
Location-aware key management 
Discovering the physical location of a node is rather straightforward for advanced nodes that 
incorporate GPS receivers in their sensing board. This information is a valuable asset, which 
can help improve not only efficiency and information gathering but security as well. The 
following are a set of different proposals that enhance the security assuming that the 
network‟s physical topology is known. 
 
The authors of [82] claim that by using location awareness they can achieve graceful 
degradation of network performance while nodes are gradually compromised. The method 
works by dividing the deployment area of the network in a virtual grid. Each cell of the grid 
may contain some nodes, which have a certain relative position on the network and use keys, 
which are shared only by their neighbours to communicate. The grid is determined by using 
the range of the nodes to identify which nodes are nearby and then the cell keys are derived 
from a master key, which is in turn deleted. If a potential attacker compromises one node in a 
cell of the grid, they only take control over that cell, instead of the whole network. More 
compromised nodes mean more compromised grids as well but the process is gradual and not 
destructive after a certain threshold of compromised nodes is reached. 
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The work of [20, 85] relies on robots or robot-assisted manual determination of node location 
and of the keys that will be loaded in the nodes. After the nodes are randomly scattered in the 
environment the area is traversed by robots who note the location of the nodes and load keys 
on them using rules defined by the method. The system can provide highly enhanced security, 
even compared to public key cryptography but unfortunately, it involves the difficult 
requirement of utilising robots. 
 
Other proposals 
The literature includes proposals that are simpler that those discussed previously but still 
expect network hardware to be insecure. An example is provided here for completeness. 
 
The proposal of Zhu et al. [83] works by categorising types of messages, and security 
requirements of these messages. The authors distinguish four types of messages and they 
establish four types of keys: 
 an individual key shared between each node and the base station 
 a pair-wise key shared between other nodes 
 a cluster-key shared with multiple neighbouring nodes 
 a global key shared by the whole network 
They also provide a protocol for weak local broadcast authentication, based on the use of one-
way key chains. The authors claim that they can use a master key for few seconds before an 
adversary can capture a node and obtain it. They use this key immediately after deployment to 
involve a simple handshake and then they derive a unique pair key using the information 
exchanged in the handshake and the master key. Finally, they erase the master key. After 
initial negotiation and agreement on the pair keys, the authors build upon this secure platform 
to share all the other keys they define in their mechanism.  
 
Discussion 
The hardware‟s insecurity assumption that leads to the development of complex key 
management schemes has been disputed in other work in the literature. There is strong 
evidence that the assumption is both unrealistic and too extreme for pragmatic wireless sensor 
networks. Notably, Gamage et al. [16] have strongly expressed their objections to both the 
realism of the assumption and the feasibility of systems that attempt to accommodate it. In 
40 
 
addition, the work on references [90-92]
5
 indicates that hardware can be secured, effectively 
solving the problem of complex key management. 
 
In addition, even if complex key management is adapted, the sensor network will ultimately 
fail. Complex key management schemes can only delay the ultimate failure of the system and 
maybe allow for more time for corrective action to take place but they cannot infinitely do so. 
Therefore, complex key management will eventually fail as well. 
 
In support to the above arguments, there is a clear tendency to ignore this problem by many 
other authors [2, 21, 30, 93-94]. This research sides with these authors and chooses not to 
actively seek a solution to the supposed hardware security problems.  
 
Implications 
Developers of wireless sensor networks are likely to agree with Gamage et al.[16], that 
complex key management is not necessary. However, there are few alternative, more simple, 
options, for example [83] which is probably too simple. 
 
There is no key management mechanism in between the two options. A mechanism that 
would; 
 not use the same key for large groups of nodes  
 automatically change keys when they are likely to become a security liability 
 keep its state secret and operate without leaking information over the radio 
 not require storing large numbers of keys on the sensor nodes 
Such hypothetical simple key management system would be less complex than other key 
management systems while it would provide better security than lack of key management. It 
would also require fewer resources than complex key management systems.  
 
One might argue that data-transportation layer security mechanisms do not need to provide 
key management as this can be done at application level. Therefore, provision of a key 
management is unnecessary. However, a different key management system means that the 
cryptosystem is not designed comprehensively; it relies and trusts the security of other 
subsystems and it may therefore be inconsistent. 
                                                 
5
 Discussed in 2.3.4. 
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Consequently, the data transportation layer security schemes in references [2, 21, 30, 93-94], 
which are further discussed in the next subsection, might not perform securely if they are used 
in conjunction with the wrong key management scheme.  
 
 
2.3.2 Data transportation layer security schemes 
 
This subsection presents the three established data transportation security schemes found in 
the literature. The solutions are presented in chronological order; SPINS, TinySec, MiniSec 
and SenSec. These mechanisms form the basis of comparison for this proposal, which is also 
a security mechanism for the data transportation layer. 
 
The SPINS proposal 
SPINS [29] by Perrig et al. published in 2002 was the earliest attempt to evaluate and 
implement secure wireless sensor networks. The work provided two protocols, a network 
encryption protocol named SNEP and µTESLA, an authentication protocol. At the time of 
development, sensor networks were expected to suffer from unrealistically low resources and 
thus the authors discuss if a secure sensor network is even a realistic target.  
 
To facilitate the realism argument, the authors list a set of requirements that a system must 
fulfil in order to be regarded as secure
6
. Briefly, they are confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity and freshness. They define that nodes should never be trusted, they rule out public-
key cryptography as an option and then they proceed into describing their protocols.  
 
From an operational point of view, the authors identify base station to node (broadcast) 
communication as the fundamental communication primitive but they also distinguish node to 
base station and base station to node communication as possible patterns. 
 
Their security protocols are regarded as security primitives, building blocks. They are 
provided in the basis that future work will build upon them to achieve the security 
requirements. SNEP provides for all requirements except authenticated broadcast. It operates 
                                                 
6
 The full requirements are discussed in 2.2.1. 
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by encrypting messages using a private key shared by the communication pair. In addition, it 
uses a secret counter, which is incremented by 1 after each communication but not transmitted 
with the message. µTESLA uses a symmetric encryption mechanism to authenticate messages 
from a small number of authenticated broadcasters. Both protocols seemed promising but they 
were never implemented[2]. 
 
The TinySec mechanism 
TinySec [2] was the first protocol to ignore hardware security, ignore key management and 
simply provide security at the data transportation layer. It is currently considered the standard 
security mechanism for sensor networks by many literature articles [95-97]. TinySec 
introduces about 10% increase of energy consumption compared with unsecured TinyOS 
operation. 
 
The protocol is built as an extension to the TinyOS platform and it alters the original packet 
format to facilitate the security features. TinySec meets each of the security requirements set 
by SPINS [29] . It achieves confidentiality by encrypting message contents using SkipJack 
[98]. Authenticity and integrity is facilitated with a 4-Byte message authentication code 
(MAC) which is also generated by the SkipJack cipher under the CMAC standard [99]. 
Finally, freshness and semantic security are achieved via an initialisation vector.  
 
TinySec provides two packet types in an attempt to increase energy efficiency: the TinySec-A 
packet, which only provides message authentication and the TinySec-AE packet, which 
complies with all the basic security requirements.  
 
The MiniSec mechanism 
MiniSec improves the performance of TinySec, is more resilient to network error and uses a 
different approach to generate and transmit the initialisation vector. MiniSec uses SkipJack in 
OCB [100] mode of operation as encryption function. This mode of operation provides 
encryption and authentication. MiniSec seems to be an equally secure optimisation of TinySec 
while it otherwise offers very few innovative security features. 
 
MiniSec greatly optimises the way the initialisation vector (IV) is implemented by using a 
number of solutions including overloading, Bloom Filters [101], epochs and time 
synchronisation protocols [102-103]. In further optimises the efficiency of the network by 
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introducing packets that are suitable for different communication types. Figure 4 illustrates 
the security-related radio overhead of various solutions. 
 
The SenSec mechanism 
The SenSec[30] framework is promoted as a TinySec alternative as well. It is solely based on 
TinySec and aims to improve its security provision and some of the performance. SenSec 
employs a packet format which is very similar to TinySec [2] but claims that it is slightly 
better than it. The major difference in packet format from the TinySec scheme is the way the 
IV (Initialisation Vector) is constructed.  
A custom and improved variant of SkipJack [98] is used in SenSec. The customisation claims 
to provide 144-bit security and is based on the DES-X [104] method. They call this variant 
SkipJack-X. They also aim to reduce the computation cost of MAC processing by using a 
one-pass MAC computation mechanism. They claim that their MAC mechanism is secure as 
long as “the total amount of packets being encrypted and authenticated with the same key is 
much less than 2
32
.” 
 
SenSec defines a hierarchical access control scheme divided in three levels and thus they use 
three levels of keys; global key, cluster key and sensor key. By using these three keys, they 
can produce three packet types for use in the appropriate context. They claim that this method 
is resilient to node capturing attack as well since revealing the keys in one node will not 
compromise the whole network but only one group of nodes. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Packet overhead of TinyOS, TinySec-AE, MiniSec-U and SenSec. 
 Numbers represent the size of packet‟s header and MAC/CRC in bytes. 
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Other mechanisms 
As this research was been conducted, more security schemes have appeared in the literature. 
Recent mechanisms like, ContikiSec [93] and FlexiSec [94] will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
  
Finally, an alternative solution to data transportation security is ZigBee [105]. It is the 
lightest, fully developed security standard for small devices and it might be suitable for high-
end sensor boards but it is still extremely costly for the low-end devices that this project 
targets. 
 
Discussion 
TinySec and MiniSec offer 80-bit complexity which is deemed unacceptable by  2010 [71-73] 
but both research groups claim that their mechanism can be used with any encryption 
algorithm and thus the possibility of higher complexity is not ruled out. The encryption 
function is indeed a black-box type of component, which can be upgraded without redesign of 
the system. However, the related implications in energy efficiency have to be taken into 
consideration. Should such an update be ever implemented, the mechanism would have to be 
re-evaluated and comparisons with other mechanisms would need to be discussed again. 
 
On the other hand, the authors of MiniSec apply the key whitening technique to SkipJack and 
they call it SkipJack-X. Key whitening is an anecdotal term coined by J. Rivest and it is 
briefly explained by Schneier [4]. The scheme is better than plain SkipJack but not as good as 
a cipher that would natively offer greater cryptographic strength. This solution poses two 
problems, which are discussed next. 
 
The first problem regards the effective key length. According to Schneier‟s explanation, 
SkipJack-X should increase the complexity to 2
n + (m/p) 
where n is the key length, m is the 
block size and p is the number of known plaintexts. Therefore, SkipJack-X does offer greater 
complexity but the true effective key length is reduced if the attacker is able to obtain a 
number of key lengths. Sensor networks whose purpose is to report a single value to the base 
station allow the attacker to guess possible plaintexts and reduce the complexity to 
unacceptable standards.
7
 
 
                                                 
7 Suppose that a network measures ambient temperature. The attacker can use a thermometer to find the temperature that nodes should be 
reporting and monitor the network for 24 hours. Using the method, the attacker might be able to obtain 10 plaintext-ciphertext pairs. That 
would reduce the complexity to ~2^87 bits, way below acceptable standards of 2^128 bits. 
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Secondly, the approach might be problematic because the specific application of key 
whitening for SkipJack has not been crypt-analysed. There is no information on the security 
of SkipJack-X on the published literature. It is unknown if other limitations of the SkipJack 
cipher might cause further reductions to complexity and it is unknown if whitening can 
protect the particular cipher from future cryptanalytic attacks. If that is true then MiniSec 
might not provide the required 128-bits of complexity. 
 
It seems that no existing data-transportation security mechanism is up to date with modern 
security requirements and that none provides a comprehensive solution, as they lack key 
management.  
 
Implications 
It is rather clear that a system that would provide an acceptable level of confidentiality, 
authentication and integrity is missing from the current literature. Even more modern 
mechanisms than the established TinySec, MiniSec, SenSec triplet, do not offer 128-bits 
encryption while simultaneously being capable of operating in low-end devices like the 
MICA2 node.  
 
This research aims to provide a mechanism that would provide acceptable level of security 
and meet modern requirements for encryption complexity.  
 
 
2.3.3 Routing security 
 
Secure routing protocols 
There are many routing protocols proposed for use in wireless sensor network but most of 
them are proved insecure by Karlof et al. [76] in their 2003 survey paper. Since then a number 
of new proposals attempt to tackle the problems revealed. A few recent and more secure 
protocols are presented for completeness in this subsection. 
 
Wood et. al describe a protocol family called SIGF in [106]. It consists of two configurable 
and secure routing protocols. Along with the traditional routing duties, the authors claim that 
their protocols are secure against some of the problems identified by [76]. The protocol family 
does not store routing information on a table and therefore attacks that manipulate the routing 
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table with bogus entries are not applicable. In addition, wormholes and HELLO floods are not 
possible due to the dynamic route selection of SIGF. However, the authors admit that 
protection against other attacks is impossible without a reliable authentication mechanism. 
 
Finally, despite being primarily a key management scheme, the LEAP+ mechanism [83], 
supports the use of authenticated acknowledgement packets.  
 
Discussion 
The work of Karlof et al. [76] does not take secured networks into account. They made this an 
important assumption when they said, ―because sensor networks use wireless 
communications, we must assume that radio links are insecure.‖ They also state a number of 
other assumptions that equally disregard the possibility that a sensor network can be secured. 
The reasons why this assumption was made in 2003 are understandable, but ironically, it was 
Karlof et al. who published TinySec [2] a year later, effectively proving their own assumption 
wrong. 
 
If a security mechanism existed that would provide a combination of the security features 
provided by TinySec, and SIGF and if it was operating on secure hardware, then each routing 
attack described by Karlof et al. is impossible. Table 1 provides a summary of each known 
attack, the vulnerability it targets, how it can be prevented and which security mechanisms are 
not vulnerable to this attack. 
 
Attack Requires ability to Prevented by Offered by 
spoofed, altered, or  
replayed 
routing information 
inject messages 
alter messages 
replay messages 
authentication 
integrity 
freshness 
 
 
TinySec 
MiniSec 
SenSec 
 
 
 
selective forwarding 
 
 
node compromise 
or node injection 
 
hardware security 
or authentication sinkhole / black hole 
sibyl attack 
wormholes authentication 
HELLO floods unauthenticated 
broadcast 
broadcast 
authentication 
acknowledgement 
spoofing 
unauthenticated ACKs ACK authentication SIGF 
 
 
Table 1: Routing attacks, their requirements and how they can be prevented. 
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An interesting observation can be made; all that is required to protect a wireless sensor 
network from all routing attacks is to secure all communication, including acknowledgement 
packets, with a security system that would provide authentication, integrity and freshness. As 
long as that stands true, and as long as hardware remains secure, routing cannot be 
compromised. 
 
Implications 
None of the current data-transportation layer security system provides authenticated 
acknowledgements. Potential developers who want resilient routing are able to select from 
three data transportation security mechanisms but they would have to use SIGF in order to 
protect acknowledgements, there is no alternative. 
 
This research aims to provide a mechanism that would offer total protection of all messages 
including acknowledgements, broadcast messages and normal messages, regardless of the 
layer they originate. That solution would completely protect the network from all known 
routing attacks. 
 
 
2.3.4 Other work 
 
This subsection lists some indirectly related work for completeness and as a basis of argument 
for subsequent sections. This work is important but it is not directly comparable to this 
research. Therefore, no critical evaluation or any further analysis is made here. 
 
Hardware security 
The area of hardware security has little connection with computer science but it interests this 
research since the proposed solution does not tackle hardware security problems. 
 
There is great debate on whether hardware is secure or not and great antithesis in the claims of 
research papers in the literature. Some articles describe a number of microprocessor attacks 
while also advising countermeasures [90, 107]. There are also software-based solutions to the 
problem [108].  
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On the other hand, the microprocessor manufacturer Atmel [70] claims that the ATmega128L 
microprocessor is secure [46]. This microprocessor is used in many sensor nodes, including 
the MICA2 node.  
 
Nevertheless, a significant research interest towards solving this problem is observed. In 
addition to sensor networks, other microprocessors are rapidly becoming secure and are used 
in everyday life, like for example in Credit Cards. Security of such applications is very 
important.  
 
Denial of Service 
As explained in the threat model, it is difficult to defend against brutal DoS attacks and thus 
current research is focused on reducing the implications of such attacks. Most approaches 
consider DoS attacks that affect some parts of the network and propose detecting and 
procedures to minimize attack impact. All these solutions work under a number of 
assumptions that might not be applicable to all sensor networks. 
 
Gu et al. in [109] propose a system to detect a search-and-destroy DoS attack if nodes are 
equipped with a means to detect that they are about to be destroyed, e.g. accelerometers. 
When such an attack is detected, an alarm can be sent to signal to neighbouring nodes that it is 
under attack. Other nodes can take evasive action.  
 
Another DoS detection system uses game theory to detect when nodes behave maliciously 
[110]. The methodology uses a set of parameters and a method to assign reputation to nodes. 
The network isolates malicious nodes if their reputation declines. The authors model and 
evaluate the methodology to determine a node‟s reputation. 
 
Points of failure 
Wireless sensor networks are systems subject to the usual weakest-link and single point of 
failure problems. Some of the physical or virtual components of the network might fail more 
easily or might cause disproportionate damage. There is research work that attempts to 
evaluate such threats at specific locations on the network. 
 
Examples include the work of Deng et al. [81] which proposes and evaluates options available 
to protect the security of the base station which is presented as a single point of failure. The 
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authors propose and evaluate three mechanisms that introduce a degree of difficulty in 
identifying the location of the base station: multipath routing to multiple base stations, 
confusion and encryption of the identification fields and relocation of the base station. 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
This section acts as a summary of what was presented in the literature review. The section 
starts by defining a set of baseline requirements, a presentation of what is expected from this 
research. This section also explains the aims of the basic requirements and the expected 
benefits of meeting them. This section concludes by presenting the associated challenges.  
 
 
2.4.1 Baseline requirements 
 
All existing approaches suffer from problems that range from unrealistic assumptions to 
insufficient security provision. A more modern solution that will benefit from the latest 
research and technological advance is required. 
 
Please note, not all the requirements and aims presented in this subsection were met in the 
final solution. Some of them were met only under certain conditions. This subsection is only a 
guideline of this project‟s intentions. Please read Chapter 6 for evaluation of the final design. 
 
Key management requirement 
A key management mechanism that would be designed under the assumption that hardware 
cannot be tampered needs to be provided. The mechanism should: 
 provide different keys for small groups of nodes  
 store at most as many keys as distinct communication endpoints 
 frequently change the keys preferably after each time a key is used 
 keep its state secret and not leak information that would assist in cryptanalysis 
 
A key management mechanism as such would provide strong semantic security that would 
not rely on initialisation vectors which are potentially unsafe  [111]. 
 
In addition to being a security risk, current systems transmit IVs over the radio. TinySec 
transmits 2 bytes, and SenSec transmits three bytes. The described key management would 
not need to transmit IVs then the energy required to transmit the IVs would be saved.  
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Routing security requirement 
A security mechanism that would primarily protect data transportation but will also prevent 
most routing attacks needs to be provided. This requirement can be achieved by 
authenticating every communication without any exceptions, including acknowledgement 
packets. 
 
Protecting the acknowledgement messages is a complex task and it is expected to require 
additional radio transmission. On the other hand, it would enable the developers of each 
network to choose a routing protocol that fits best for their network characteristics. Currently, 
their only option is to use SIGF but it might not be the most energy efficient routing protocol 
for all types of networks. Potentially, the energy gains from selecting an appropriate routing 
protocol will be much greater than the small energy loses that will be required for 
authenticated acknowledgements. 
 
Cryptographic strength requirement 
In order to achieve the acceptable [71-73] level of security provision, 128-bits encryption 
strength is required. The requirement must be fulfilled using an encryption function that was 
natively designed to provide this level of complexity. The solution should also provide a 
similar level of authentication and integrity. 
 
Additional requirements 
The mechanism should be: 
 similarly or less energy demanding than existing proposals 
 easy to deploy, not require changes in existing application code 
 demonstrated on code partially or as a complete mechanism 
 based on open and well known standards and provided free of charge 
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2.4.2 Aims 
 
Security aims 
The baseline requirements aim to elevate the security provision of the proposed mechanism 
by providing: 
 means for authentication and trust establishment 
 an evolving security state 
 semantic security and weak freshness  without security risks 
 resilience against the effectiveness of some cryptanalytic attacks  
 protection against known routing attacks 
 acceptable level of cryptographic strength for all related components 
 
Energy performance aims 
The longevity of the network will be improved by supplying more efficient mechanisms for: 
 key management 
 provision of weak freshness 
 provision of semantic security 
 an overall more efficient design 
 
Other aims 
The following should be achieved: 
1. The integrated key management will allow evaluation the security mechanism as an 
comprehensive system 
2. Authenticated acknowledgements will enable the base station to obtain health status 
reports of multiple nodes by simply sending one packet 
3. The ease of use requirements will make the mechanism attractive to existing 
installations, increasing the potential for adaptation 
4. A direction to open protocols allows comparisons with other mechanisms , promotes 
the advancement of knowledge and achieves low cost of ownership 
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2.4.3 Research Challenges 
 
Comprehensive authentication 
Provision of authenticated acknowledgements is rarely seen in WSNs but it is common in 
other types of networks. It is easy to authenticate forward going messages but it is energy 
consuming to assure the sender that the receiver has received its message.  
 
Significant radio overhead will probably be introduced by this requirement and the necessary 
energy savings must be found on other components in order to satisfy the requirements. 
 
Strong encryption 
Another challenge is the provision of 128-bit strong encryption under the limited nature of 
sensor devices. Selecting such an encryption function is not a straightforward process.  
 
An adequately performing cipher has to be selected after considering a number of criteria. 
Important criteria include the computational overhead, the block size, memory requirements 
and the security of the cipher. Additional criteria will be set in the relevant chapter
8
. 
 
Satisfaction of conflicting requirements 
The defined solid requirement on better security with similar energy efficiency describes two 
conflicting requirements. Provision of an appropriate solution is an important research 
challenge.  
 
This research attempts to solve this problem by using carefully selected components and a 
better design. If successful, the solution will form the primary contribution to knowledge.  
  
                                                 
8
 See Chapter 3. 
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Innovative key management 
The key management proposal promises many benefits but it has to remain relatively simple 
and very energy efficient. It has to be simultaneously energy efficient, rich in features and 
operate without radio overhead.  
 
Other systems satisfy some of the SecRose requirements but there is no evidence of anything 
similar to this proposal in the literature. The closest match is SPINS [29], which does not 
introduce radio overhead but satisfies only a fraction of SecRose‟s aims.  
 
Key management design and implementation will be a unique research and engineering 
challenge and that it will complement existing knowledge. 
 
 
2.4.4 Summary 
 
Main requirements 
The baseline requirements are provided: 
 provide an acceptable level of overall security 
 protect against currently available attacks 
 operate consuming equal or less energy than other solutions 
 allow ease of adaption and deployment with minimal costs 
 
General aim 
We aim to develop, document and implement a replacement for current data-transportation 
layer security mechanisms. The proposed system will have to perform equally or better than 
existing solutions, regardless of the basis of comparison. 
 
Main challenges 
 design the unique key management system in accordance to conflicting requirements 
 provide complete protection of every communication, including acknowledgements 
 select a suitable encryption function that offers the required level of encryption 
strength 
 provide a secure, efficient and easy to deploy overall design  
 
 
55 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
System requirements 
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3. System requirements 
 
This chapter defines security, energy efficiency and non-functional requirements for the 
proposed mechanism. The rationale underlining the selection of each requirement and the 
consequent benefits or drawbacks are discussed. 
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3.1 Basic security requirements 
 
This section determines basic security characteristics of SecRose. As discussed in the 
literature review, there are a number of security requirements [29, 112] and possible threats 
[76-78] to wireless sensor networks. Each requirement and its protection it offers against 
threats is discussed.  
 
 
3.1.1 Confidentiality 
 
Requirement 
SecRose must provide the accepted level of confidentiality, specified to 128 bits key length, 
for all information payload data when a packet is transmitted to the radio medium. 
 
No limitations are set as to what additional packet information might be protected. It is 
desirable for SecRose to obscure by encryption or other means as much packet information as 
possible, as long as the act does not pose additional energy overhead. 
 
Rationale 
As discussed before, sensor networks need to be protected by a security level that is equal to 
other computer systems. The current acceptable confidentiality complexity level requires 128-
bit long encryption keys. 
 
3.1.2 Authentication and integrity 
 
Requirement 
SecRose must guarantee that all information present to any received packet, including 
acknowledgement packets, is legitimate information that originated from the claimed sender, 
and was delivered intact to the receiver. 
 
Acceptable level of confidence for this guarantee is defined as that which exceeds the energy 
or lifetime capabilities of high-end sensor networks. A potential authentication or integrity 
breach attack must cause the network to deplete its energy resources or take longer than the 
lifetime of the network to succeed.  
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This guarantee may be provided in any way and is not limited to a Message Authentication 
Code (MAC). Packet fields may not be included in the MAC if the design guarantees that 
MAC validation will fail when authentication or integrity of these fields is breached. 
 
Rationale 
The authentication and integrity requirement aims to protect the network from a range of 
attacks, including; injection of bogus or altered packets, injection of broadcast and ACK 
packets, injection of attacker-controlled nodes and malicious packet replays. These attacks 
can introduce serious implications in the network‟s routing and the validity of reported 
measurements, allowing the attacker to completely destroy, alter or cause confusion to the 
network. 
 
 
The level of confidence provided by authentication and integrity is a trade off with efficiency. 
Therefore, the confidence of the guarantee is defined pragmatically; the attack would be 
meaningless if it depletes the network‟s resources or if it cannot succeed in time. This is 
adequate provision that would guarantee authentication and integrity while consuming the 
least possible resources.  
 
 
3.1.3 Freshness 
 
Requirement 
SecRose must provide weak freshness; a means to determine whether a packet is definitely 
not a replay of previously broadcast packets. Nodes should be able to designate packets as 
fresh or as undetermined. For packets that are determined as fresh, the level of confidence 
must be equal to the authentication and integrity guarantee. 
 
SecRose is not required to provide information on the exact time elapsed between 
transmission and reception of a packet.  
  
59 
 
Rationale 
Provision of a weak freshness guarantee is required by most applications as it prevents some 
routing attacks and reporting of false information. Strong freshness, which is not required by 
all applications, involves inclusion of a timestamp on packets thus allowing the application to 
know exactly when a packet was initially transmitted. Strong freshness is not required by all 
applications or for every packet. Provision of either type of freshness is an energy-demanding 
requirement. 
 
SecRose is required to provide weak freshness for all accepted packets and indirectly allow 
the provision of strong freshness to applications that demand it.  
 
In conjunction with the key management mechanism
9
, the weak freshness provision will be 
implemented without any additional energy overhead and will be secure for attackers with 
realistic computational abilities.  
 
Applications that require strong freshness may include timing information on the packets and 
then rely on the authentication and integrity requirements for secure delivery of this 
information.  
  
                                                 
9
 Discussed in 3.3.1. 
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3.2 Additional security requirements 
 
This section clarifies some security issues and describes what is required to solve them. These 
requirements are distinct from basic requirements as they are influenced or derived by a 
number of factors. 
 
 
3.2.1 Regarding routing security 
 
Requirements 
SecRose must meet its basic security requirements for all communication between sensor 
nodes. This requirement is not limited to application packets but it also includes routing 
packets and transportation control packets, like acknowledgement packets.  
 
SecRose is not a routing protocol and routing functionality is not required, but its compliance 
with existing routing protocols must be evaluated. 
 
Rationale 
By meeting this requirement, SecRose will effectively seal the system from known routing 
attacks, as presented in 2.2.2 and in references [76-78]. 
 
Compliance with existing routing protocols is essential to enable the developers of WSNs 
freedom of choice on selecting between various routing protocols. SecRose is expected to 
enrich the list of usable routing protocols. 
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3.2.2 Availability 
 
Requirement 
The design of SecRose must contribute to the overall availability of a sensor network by not 
introducing weaknesses that would enable asymmetric DoS attacks and by not introducing 
single points of failure. With the exception of routing, SecRose is not required to protect, 
detect or prevent threats to availability. 
 
Rationale 
Sensor networks are prone to a number of availability threats. Most of these attacks are 
tackled by their own research fields and are therefore outside the scope of SecRose. The 
essence of the availability requirement for SecRose is not to introduce additional weaknesses 
that would make availability attacks easier. 
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3.2.3 Regarding security by design 
 
Requirement 
SecRose is required follow the principles of security by design. SecRose will have to be an 
open mechanism and the design will be available for everyone to examine and improve. 
 
Rationale 
Security protocols should be based on a secure design. SecRose should follow this principle. 
Obviously, this does not refer to the run-time cryptographic state, e.g. the secret key, but on 
the design of the mechanism itself. 
 
3.2.3 Hardware 
 
Requirement 
SecRose is required to ignore potential hardware security problems. SecRose will assume that 
its hardware is trusted and secure.  
 
Rationale 
SecRose aims to be based on pragmatic assumptions. The assumption that hardware is not 
secure has been disputed and attempts to overcome this assumed problem introduce 
significant resource utilisation overheads. SecRose will belong to the group of solutions that 
do not attempt to solve this problem and act as a lighter alternative in networks where 
hardware security is assumed. 
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3.3 Operation and efficiency requirements 
 
3.3.1 Key management mechanism 
 
Requirement 
SecRose must include a key management mechanism. The ideal target of the mechanism 
would be to alter every cryptographic key after it has been used once to encrypt a message. 
Deviations due to operational conditions are allowed. Key management will enable a number 
of other described requirements to be achieved.  
 
Key management must synchronise without transmitting information over the radio. When 
communication of a packet occurs, key management will change keys using a secret value, 
derived by the last packet content. Knowledge of the used key will be required in order to 
derive a new key. Over time, each communication pair will evolve its own state, derived from 
the contents of communicated packets. 
 
Fail-over mechanisms must be utilised to ensure successful synchronisation and continuous 
communication in case of accidental or deliberate radio interference that would cause packets 
not to be communicated properly. This is the case where deviations from the ideal target are 
allowed. 
 
Rationale 
The key management system will serve as a core component with efficiency and security 
objectives. It will provide an efficient platform to achieve a number of requirements that 
would normally require radio overhead but it would only introduce computational and 
memory overhead. Key changes will achieve semantic security, by changing at least one part 
of the cryptographic input and if the changes are frequent then weak freshness can be 
provided as well. 
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3.3.2 Efficiency requirements 
 
Requirement 
SecRose is required to perform equally or better than TinySec[2] when average values of the 
following metrics are compared; 
 energy consumption overhead 
 introduced latency 
 memory requirements 
 
In addition, SecRose must indicate, via a theoretical evaluation, that it would also match or 
outperform the efficiency of other mechanisms found in the literature, such as [21, 30, 93-94].  
 
Rationale 
Security in WSNs is constrained by the limitations of the devices. SecRose plans to impose no 
additional overhead than other solutions while it will improve the security provision and 
efficiency. This requirement must be met in order for SecRose to achieve its objectives. 
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3.4 Other requirements 
This section describes requirements related to assist with the successful selection, installation, 
maintenance and future updates of SecRose. The requirement for a proof-of-concept is also 
discussed. 
 
3.4.1 Essential deployment requirements 
 
This subsection defines a set of requirements that aim to increase the marketability of 
SecRose to future implementers.  
 
Rationale 
Changes to existing systems require planning, time, cost and effort. The allocation of human 
resources and the associated costs of such process would deter sensor network owners that 
want to deploy a more secure mechanism.  
 
The requirements in this subsection complement each other in order to facilitate rapid and 
easy migration from to a secured network. They also give an advantage to SecRose since 
alternatives require changes in the applications
10
. 
 
Finally, the customisation requirement is given for those sensor networks that require higher 
security and have to commit to the associated problems of adapting a security mechanism. 
 
Please note that SecRose is not required to be backwards compatible with other security 
mechanisms. The requirement assumes that the networks under update are operating with 
TinyOS in its original form. 
 
  
                                                 
10
 For example, TinyOS does not tackle freshness at all, it leaves the problem to the application 
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Backwards compatibility 
SecRose must replace the existing transportation mechanism of a WSN in a manner that is 
completely transparent to higher layers. SecRose must accept exactly the same input and 
provide exactly the same output as the TinyOS operating system. By no means should an 
application have to be re-programmed in order to accommodate the introduction of SecRose.  
 
Preconfigured distribution 
SecRose‟s distribution package must assist sensor network operators that have minimal 
experience with security systems to secure their network easily and rapidly.  
 
SecRose should readily provide a level of security to every sensor network within which is 
deployed, without requiring complicated configuration. Thus, it must ship preconfigured with 
sensible parameters that would allow secure operation for most applications.  
 
Please note that the pre-configuration options described here will be used for all direct 
comparisons in Chapter 6.  
 
Customisation 
Some sensor network applications demand higher security. Should these networks decide to 
adapt SecRose, they would have to plan before they deploy it on their network. SecRose must 
be fine-tuneable to allow their requirements to be accommodated. 
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3.4.2 Other requirements and desirables 
 
This subsection covers the important requirement of providing a proof of concept 
demonstration for SecRose. It also discusses low importance, low priority and out of scope 
requirements that would be nice to achieve in SecRose but cannot be provided by this 
research project. They are documented in order to direct a design with future targets in mind. 
 
Proof of concept 
SecRose must come with a proof of concept implementation that would cover communication 
between two nodes. This demonstrative implementation will be used for evaluation of 
SecRose. It must be complete enough to allow for a fair comparison but it may not be 
developed beyond this point. 
 
Scalability 
SecRose‟s design should not pose fundamental limitations that will prevent future 
developments from scaling SecRose up to use it in larger networks. This will allow SecRose 
to scale up and function on larger or different networks. 
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Chapter 4 
 
SecRose Specification and Design 
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4. SecRose Specification and Design 
 
This chapter describes the SecRose data-transportation layer security mechanism. Algorithmic 
and systematic descriptions are provided. Section 4.1 defines the protocol and describes how 
it operates to achieve secure communication. Section 4.2 gives a systematic explanation of 
system, its components and their interactions in order to facilitate the protocol. Rationale of 
the various decisions is given in section 4.2. 
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4.1 Algorithmic description 
 
This section gives a plain specification of the SecRose protocol and its operation without 
discussing rationale or other matters extensively. The section begins by defining the 
assumptions and some concepts and then specifies the protocol‟s operation step-by-step. 
 
 
4.1.1 Specification of concepts 
 
Assumptions 
SecRose assumes a network consisting of a few hundred nodes. The nodes run on hardware 
similar to the MICA2[48] sensor node; 8MHz processor, 4KB application memory, 128KB 
runtime memory, 512KB permanent storage memory and 38.4Kbps radio communication 
capability. The nodes are running the TinyOS operating system [31].  
 
Nodes use tamper-resistant microprocessors such as the ATMega128 microprocessor found in 
MICA2 nodes. Thus, in case a node is captured, the attacker is unable to extract data from the 
sensor, as specified in the microprocessors technical manual [46]. 
 
All nodes are loaded with a 96-bit long random string before their deployment. This will be 
used by SecRose‟s key management as the initial key. In addition, they are loaded with a 32-
bit long random string, which will be the initial value of the counter. 
Packet categorisation 
The communication patterns within a sensor network will be categorised for better allocation 
of energy resources. Applications may use any communication direction or pattern but 
SecRose designates three distinct communication types, which are based on the flow of data. 
SecRose distinguishes and categorises the following communication types: (a) node to node, 
(b) node to base station and (c) base station to everyone. SecRose introduces one packet type 
for each communication pattern. 
 
All packets are illustrated in Figure 2. SecRose retains and communicates the type, group and 
data fields as specified by TinyOS [31] in order to achieve full compatibility with the OS. 
The packet management mechanism of SecRose will transparently alter the length, source, 
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destination and MAC fields. Utilisation of the appropriate packet type, depending on the 
destination address, will be forced by SecRose for all communications. Higher layers of the 
communication stack need not be aware of SecRose‟s operation. All changes will be applied 
to outgoing packets at SecRose‟s level while changed incoming packets will be reverted 
before those are passed to higher layers.  
 
Length Type Group Data MAC 
1 1 1 0…29 4 
 
Broadcast packet 
 
Len Dest. ACK code 
1 1…2 4 
 
Acknowledgement packet 
 
Length Source Dest. Type Group Data MAC 
1 2 2 1 1 0…29 4 
 
Long packet 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 
 
Normal packet 
Length Source Type Group Data MAC 
1 2 1 1 0…29 4 
 
 
protected by the MAC 
 
encrypted and protected 
Numbers indicate field byte length 
x 
z 
 
Figure 2: SecRose packets, their fields and their security features 
Numbers express the field‟s size in bytes 
 
SecRose defines a flag-based packet designation method, which allows for identification of 
the packet type. The 2-bit flag will be overloaded in the most significant bits of the packet‟s 
length, making it the first piece of information on a packet. This will allow nodes to make 
swift decisions while packets are being received. Nodes may quickly decide to accept or reject 
a packet, saving the radio reception energy. For accepted packets, the flag defines the 
expected packet fields and their length, allowing for proper reception regardless of packet 
type.  
 
SecRose will use a packet of type normal for communication from any node to the base 
station. Normal packets have no destination address in the packet‟s fields. The address of the 
base station will be regarded as the default destination of all normal packets. This 
optimisation is effectively replacing the 16-byte destination address with the flag, which 
introduces zero radio overhead. SecRose chose to utilise this optimisation on normal packets 
on the assumption that the most frequent communication will originate from the nodes and be 
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destined to the base station. This assumption is based on the ultimate purpose of sensor 
networks; to deliver information to the base station [1]. 
 
For point-to-point communication between any pair of nodes in the network, SecRose will use 
a long packet. This type of packet retains all the original packet fields of TinyOS and does not 
provide any efficiency savings. Long packets can also be used by the base station to 
communicate with a specific node. 
 
The third packet is the broadcast packet, which can only be used by the base station. It allows 
the base station to reach the whole network in an efficient and secure way. Nodes that receive 
broadcast packets are required to forward them once, maximising the potential reach of the 
packet. The broadcast packet does not include a source or a destination address; they can 
only originate from the base station and are destined to everyone. 
 
Finally, SecRose defines a fourth packet, the control packet, which is a general-purpose 
packet for controlling SecRose‟s operation. Currently control packets are only needed to 
facilitate acknowledgements of reception and thus they will only be mentioned as 
acknowledgement packets in this document. However, the format of the packet is flexible. 
Therefore, this packet might facilitate other control commands in future versions of SecRose.  
 
Acknowledgements will be sent by the receivers to the senders in cases where normal and 
control packets are received without any errors. Broadcast packets will not be associated with 
an acknowledgement. 
 
Key management 
SecRose defines a key management system aiming to minimise reuse of the same 
cryptographic key. The system represents the network as a set of communication pairs. Each 
communication pair has its own pair key, which is derived from a preloaded initial key.  
 
The initial key is stored in the pairs during deployment and can be common for all the pairs. 
Even a broadcast communication is treated as a pair, with the base station on one side and the 
whole network on the other side of the pair.  
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Pair keys are derived using the initial key and a counter value. The initial key is 96 bits and 
the counter is 32 bits. SecRose advances the counter value after each communication, 
achieving creation of new pair keys. Counters will not be monotonically advanced. Instead, 
the exact update value will be determined by unused meta-bytes of the authentication 
component. The actual value that will be used to increase the counter is called the counter 
update value. 
 
Key management will mix the initial key with the counter as shown in Figure 3. The process 
involves slicing the counter update value and then adding the bits to the blocks of the key. 
This functionality will slightly increase the diffusion of the counter‟s value in the key. The 
mixing process is only a complement to the cipher‟s diffusion properties. 
 
It is not absolutely required to change keys after each communication. SecRose defines a 
failover mechanism, which allows for continuation of communication should packets or their 
acknowledgements fail to be delivered. SecRose will store two counters to facilitate failover: 
the backup counter and the active counter. It will also store the counter update value. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: mixing of the initial key with the counter 
 
 
Key management exception for broadcast packets 
Broadcast packets are a special case that poses conflicting requirements. It is infeasible to 
facilitate the full key management features for broadcast packets, without increasing the 
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hardware capabilities of the base station. These packets will not trigger acknowledgements 
and will therefore not benefit from the failover mechanism.  
 
The base station, which is the only node allowed to send broadcast packets, will faithfully 
advance its broadcast key after each broadcast communication to preserve freshness and the 
other properties of SecRose. 
 
The lack of acknowledgement elevates the provided freshness and semantic security but 
introduces a potential attack on availability. This topic will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Authentication and integrity 
SecRose defines the use of a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to provide authentication 
and integrity. The code will be transmitted with every packet. 
 
The MAC will be calculated using the encryption function as specified by the CMAC [99] 
recommendation. The MAC will be calculated by utilising all packet fields and it will be 
appended to the end of the packet. According to the CMAC specification, the output value 
will depend on the key and the input data. As long as they remain constant, the CMAC 
method will always produce the same output.  
 
The CMAC method outputs an 8-byte string, equal to the block size of the encryption 
function. The first four output bytes will become the MAC code and they will be transmitted 
with the packet. The rest will be utilised as meta-bytes, which is reproducible at both 
communication ends but is not transmitted with the packet.  
 
The receiver will calculate the MAC code using the same input as the sender used. If the 
codes match then the packet is validated, the encryption key can be changed and the 
acknowledgement packet can be sent. 
 
The fifth output byte, which is the first meta-byte, will be utilised by key management and 
will become the counter update value. The sixth and seventh byte will be sent back to the 
receiver, acting as an authenticated acknowledgement value. 
 
75 
 
The authenticated acknowledgement will guarantee to the sender that the receiver has updated 
their pair key. As a side effect, acknowledgements also guarantee that the packet has been 
received but the lack of an acknowledgement does not indicate the opposite. 
 
Encryption 
SecRose will use the XTEA [113] in block mode with 8 cipher cycles. Efficiency 
modifications in XTEA‟s code are allowed as long as the mathematical function remains the 
same. The number of cipher cycles might be increased to accommodate increased security 
needs. SecRose will use MAC stealing and selective encryption of the type and group packet 
fields to achieve efficiency gains. These techniques are similar to the ciphertext stealing 
technique proposed by [114]. 
 
 
4.1.2 SecRose operation: outgoing packets 
 
Packets are passed to SecRose from the higher layers of the TinyOS. When this event 
happens, SecRose will execute the following steps. This subsection does not apply to 
acknowledgement packets. These will be discussed later in their own subsection. 
 
Preparation 
Each potential destination is associated with an appropriate packet type and consequently 
related to a flag. Therefore, both the packet type and the flag can be determined by the 
destination, as shown in the following resolution table: 
 
If the destination is … The flag will be … 
The base station (usually 0) 0 
The broadcast address (usually 65535) 1 
Any other address 2 
 
After determination, the flag‟s value will be overloaded to the two most significant bits of the 
packet‟s length.  
 
Then the MAC code will be calculated; the packet will be passed to the authentication 
function and the 8-byte MAC code will be added to the packet‟s data. 
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Then the packet will be passed to the encryption function to encrypt it. Encryption might 
include any of the following efficiency features: padding, MAC stealing or inclusion of the 
group and type. The actual case depends on the packet‟s data size. 
 
Packet transmission 
After preparation, the packet is ready to be transmitted. SecRose transmits the packet fields 
described in the packet categorisation definition and illustrated in Figure 2. For reasons that 
will be explained later, only 4 of the 8 MAC bytes are transmitted. 
 
Post tasks 
During transmission, a copy of the packet is transferred to the receiver but the original 
packet‟s data remain in the sender‟s memory as well. These data will be passed to key 
management, which will undertake the following steps. 
 
For normal and long packets, the value of byte 5 will become the counter update value but it 
will not be utilised yet, it will only be saved to a temporary memory location. Bytes number 6 
and 7 will also be saved for future use. These form the authenticated acknowledgement value. 
No keys will be changed unless a valid acknowledgement is received. 
 
All values will be stored in a memory location identifiable by the receiver‟s node ID. Should 
the receiver be the broadcast address then a special ID will be used. 
 
Broadcast packets will not utilise acknowledgements. Key management will immediately 
increase the active counter by adding the 5
th
 MAC byte to it.  
 
At this stage, the sender can continue with other tasks while it waits for the acknowledgement 
packet to be received. 
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4.1.3 Operation: incoming packets 
 
All data transmitted over the radio are passed, byte-by-byte, to SecRose from the lower layers 
of the TinyOS. SecRose will detect when a packet preamble is received, and will begin the 
packet reception sequence as specified here. 
 
Type determination and appropriate reception 
The first byte is the length of the packet and it includes the overloaded flag. The first two bits 
of the length are the flag. SecRose will examine these bits to determine the packet‟s type. It 
will also remove these bits from the length, allowing it to take its normal value, representing 
the actual data length. 
 
Packet rejection or forwarding might happen at this stage. Assuming that neither of these 
happens, the receiver will use the flag, which characterises the packet type, to determine 
which packet fields it should expect. For normal packets, the destination will be set to the 
base station‟s ID. For broadcast packets, the destination will be set to the broadcast address 
and the source will be set to the base station ID.  
 
Then the receiver will continue to receive the bytes of the packet in accordance to what 
should be expected by this packet type. Upon reception of the MAC, packet reception has 
concluded. 
 
Decryption and validation 
In the next stage, SecRose will pass the packet to the encryption function in order to decrypt 
it. The process will take any efficiency features that were selected during encryption into 
account.  
 
When decryption concludes, an attempt to validate the MAC commences. The packet will be 
passed to the authentication component and the actual MAC of the received data will be 
calculated and checked against the received MAC. 
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If MAC validation succeeds; 
1. the packet is accepted and passed to the higher layers of the operating system 
2. key management will be informed to update the counter value 
3. an acknowledgement will be sent, unless the packet was a broadcast packet 
 
If validation fails, the failover mechanism is invoked. SecRose will ask key management to 
revert to the backup key. Then the decryption and MAC validation will be repeated. If the 
secondary validation succeeds then the packet will be accepted but an acknowledgement 
packet will not be sent. Should secondary validation fail as well, then SecRose cannot process 
this packet and it has to be rejected. 
 
 
4.1.4 Operation: authenticated acknowledgement transmission and reception 
 
SecRose defines a way to exchange authenticated acknowledgements. The method is 
computationally efficient but consumes significant radio energy. The additional energy cost is 
introduced by the transmission of the preamble of the acknowledgement packet. 
 
Acknowledgements are sent when the transmission and reception process is carried out 
smoothly and without any problems. Acknowledgements are not sent if MAC validation fails. 
 
Concept 
During packet transmission, a copy of the 6
th
 and 7
th
 MAC bytes was kept by the node in its 
memory. In the receiver, the same bytes are also calculated during the packet validation 
process when the MAC of the received packet was calculated as well. Therefore, both nodes 
have access to these bytes. 
 
These bytes are the acknowledgement value. The receiver transmits them back to the sender 
inside an acknowledgement packet. The sender receives them and matches them against its 
previously stored data. 
 
When the received acknowledgement value matches the expected acknowledgement value, 
the sender is confident that the receiver has successfully received its message and has changed 
its key accordingly. 
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Exchange of acknowledgements 
Acknowledgement packets will be exchanged using the normal packet transmission process of 
any packet. Acknowledgements are initiated within SecRose and its flag is pre-set to value 
„3‟. 
 
This flag will be detected by packet management and by transmission/reception control. At 
the preparation stage, the normal flag and type identification will be bypassed. In addition, 
instead of a MAC calculation, the packet will be populated with the authentication data. The 
transmission/reception stage will also be adapted to exchange them. The real differences are 
the validation method and the post-tasks.  
 
Post tasks 
Acknowledgement validation will happen as described in the concept. The process will be 
handled by the key management mechanism, which has stored the acknowledgement 
authentication data. The authentication component will not be invoked.  
 
Upon detection of a valid acknowledgement, the key management will add the previously 
stored counter update value to the active counter. Before doing so, a backup copy of the active 
counter must be kept, in case the failover mechanism needs to be invoked. 
 
At this stage, the pair has exchanged a packet and has successfully advanced the 
cryptographic pair key that it uses. 
 
Acknowledgement table size and security limits 
The number of values that the acknowledgement table can hold is configurable by the 
developer. The actual value should be chosen after accounting for the expected packet 
transmission rates. SecRose recommends a default of 10, which should be suitable for all 
applications. The value expresses how many packets will be in the waiting stage for their 
acknowledgement to be received.  
 
SecRose will keep track of how many packets are awaiting acknowledgement and how many 
invalid acknowledgements have been received. If a valid acknowledgement is received then 
the invalid counter is reset. If the number of invalid acknowledgements equals the number of 
80 
 
awaiting acknowledgements then the whole acknowledgement table is wiped and counting 
resets. 
 
 
4.1.5 Operation: intermediate nodes 
 
Packets are often exchanged over a number of intermediate nodes (hops). SecRose provides 
facilities for these nodes to determine their role as receivers, forwarders or terminators of a 
packet. This functionality needs collaboration with an appropriate routing protocol. 
 
Path position discovery 
The destination of a SecRose packet is always discoverable. Long packets have it written on 
the appropriate packet field, which is never encrypted. Normal and broadcast packets contain 
an appropriate flag, which can be analysed to determine the packet‟s destination.  
 
After determining the destination, nodes can consult their routing table to determine their 
position within the route of a packet. 
 
Forwarding  
Nodes that form parts of a route should forward every packet without attempting to decrypt or 
validate it. Since sensor networks are half-duplex, the nodes have to receive the whole packet 
and then send it again. 
 
Under normal circumstances, all nodes must forward all broadcast packets. Some exceptions 
might stand for specific routing protocols or applications. The exact behaviour is neither 
defined nor affected by SecRose and it is therefore out of the scope of the SecRose proposal. 
 
Rejection  
Nodes that are not in the route of a packet might reject it. Packets can be rejected as early as 
after reception of the flag. The flag allows destination determination for normal packets. For 
long packets, the nodes have to wait until reception of the destination field has concluded. 
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4.1.6 Operation: diagrams 
 
Pair key advancement and state preservation sequence 
Figure 4 illustrates how key management maintains the state of the pair key in accordance 
with events that might happen during communication.  
 
The first packet is transmitted and received without any errors. Both ends advance their keys 
to K2.  
 
The next packet is secured using K2 but the packet arrives altered to the receiver. Therefore, 
MAC validation fails and the receiver does not pass the packet to higher layers. K2 continues 
to be the active key. 
 
In the third packet, the sender uses K2 again to send SP3 and this time the packet arrives 
correctly. The receiver successfully changes the key to K3 but the acknowledgement delivery 
is erroneous, preventing partial recovery. Consequently, the sender does not change to K3. 
 
In the fourth packet shows partial recovery: SP4 arrives correctly and the receiver reverts from 
K3 back to K2. However, this is a case where acknowledgement should not be transmitted. 
Therefore, there is no change in the sender. 
 
The final packet demonstrates full recovery. The sender is obliged to reuse K2 for a fourth 
time to send SP5, which arrives without problems. The acknowledgement is also successful 
and thus both nodes advance to K3. 
 
Despite two consequent communication errors, SecRose manages to maintain pair key 
synchronisation by reusing K2 four times. 
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Figure 4: pair key advancement and state preservation sequence 
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4.2 System design 
 
This section provides the systematic description of the SecRose mechanism. The components 
and subcomponents of the system are described. Initially, an overall system description is 
given and then detailed information for each component is discussed. Some of the 
components are designed by a method selected among various options. For these components, 
the evaluation and selection process is discussed.  
 
Notes 
This is the design of the system, not the design of the proof-of-concept implementation, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. Components are shown clearly here but, due to the structure of 
TinyOS, it is impossible or inefficient to retain the design clarity in actual code. 
 
This section makes extensive use of coloured diagrams. The colours in the diagrams provide 
important information. All the diagrams include legends in which the meaning of colours is 
explained. 
 
 
4.2.1 System overview 
 
SecRose consists of four fundamental components: encryption, key management, 
authentication and the control component. All components interface with each other at various 
operation points and the control component interfaces with the rest of the TinyOS system. 
This subsection gives a systematic description of the components, the interactions between 
them and with TinyOS. A high-level illustration of the system is provided in Figure 5. 
 
Control component 
The control component is responsible for (a) interfacing of the SecRose mechanism with other 
layers, (b) coordinating the other SecRose components to achieve secure packet 
communication. This is the key component of the system. The control component hosts a 
number of subcomponents, including the packet management subcomponent, which is 
responsible for packet categorisation, reception and transmission.  
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Encryption component 
The encryption component utilises a cryptographic algorithm to provide encryption services 
to any component that needs it. The component accepts data bytes and a key as input. After 
execution, the function returns the encrypted data. The component also facilitates efficiency 
subcomponents. 
 
Key management component 
The key management component, or mechanism, is primarily responsible for maintaining, 
altering and providing cryptographic keys. The goal of the component is to alter the key used 
to send a packet after the event has completed. The mechanism keeps a state of the key for 
each communication pair and provides the control component with functionality to manage 
this state. 
 
Authentication component 
The authentication component is responsible for providing and validating a Message 
Authentication Code (MAC). The code can be used to both authenticate data and validate 
their integrity.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: position of SecRose in TinyOS  
and the possible internal interactions of fundamental SecRose components. 
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4.2.2 Encryption component 
 
Interfaces and their operation 
The encryption component accepts four requests: 
1. Encrypt packet with appropriate stealing 
2. Decrypt packet while accounting for stealing 
3. Encrypt stream of bytes 
4. Decrypt stream of bytes 
The control component uses the first two requests while the authentication component uses 
the raw encryption of data streams. In the cases where whole packets are handled, the 
component requests appropriate keys from the key management component. The component 
provides a MAC and ciphertext stealing method to reduce radio overhead for small payloads.  
 
The primary subcomponent is the encryption function itself, which for reasons discussed 
below, is the XXTEA[113] encryption algorithm.  
 
Cipher selection criteria 
A number of selection criteria have been examined in order to select an appropriate cipher for 
use with SecRose. Three basic criteria were defined; resource utilisation, cryptanalytic 
reputation, non-proprietary and compatible with the GNU licence. In addition, the cipher had 
to support the basic requirement of at least 128-bit key lengths and had to be a stream cipher. 
The rationale behind these criteria is discussed below. 
 
Resource utilisation was the most important criterion. The final requirement is determined as 
a composite of the computational difficulty of cryptographic operations, the memory needed 
to function and the minimum block size. The block size is important for the small sensor 
network packets as it saves radio overhead. The advantages are greater if ciphertext stealing is 
in place.  
 
Secondly, the selected encryption function had to be reputable in the cryptographic 
community as resilient to cryptanalysis and as a cipher with strong cryptographic properties. 
This criterion automatically disqualifies new ciphers, as they are considered immature.  
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Finally, the cipher has to be free of any patents or other restrictions that would either 
introduce additional costs to the deployment of SecRose or be incompatible with GNU 
General Public Licence (GPL) [115]. This requirement is forced by legal restrictions 
surrounding the licence. The GPL requires software updates of GPL products to be released 
under the GPL licence as well. Since SecRose can legally be regarded as an update for 
TinyOS, which is GNU-licensed, it has to be GPL as well. Any cipher with licence 
restrictions that disallow that is automatically disqualified.  
 
The additional criteria are set by the requirements and the technical limitations of WSNs. The 
cipher had to support at least 128-bit keys, a basic requirement, but longer keys are not 
prohibited.  
 
Stream ciphers were not considered due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the packet-based 
information is essentially information in blocks and thus block ciphers are more suitable for 
sensor networks. Secondly, block ciphers are a better fit for SecRose itself as they can be used 
for both encryption and authentication. Thirdly, stream ciphers require use of an initialisation 
vector to operate securely, which would ultimately affect their radio energy demands. Finally, 
block ciphers tend to be more mature and utilised than other types of ciphers. 
 
Candidates and initial evaluation 
The initial criterion for considering a cipher was to support 128-bits key length. There are a 
number of ciphers that satisfy this; RC4 [116], RC5 [117], RC6 [118], Twofish [119], 
Blowfish [120], Triple-DES [121], Rijndael (AES) [122], TEA [123], XTEA and XXTEA 
[113]. However, most of are either worse than AES or suffer by some other problem.  
 
The Blowfish cipher was replaced by Twofish, RC4 and RC5 were succeeded by RC6, and 
TEA was corrected by XTEA/XXTEA. All these replacements are attempts to address either 
suggested or proven problems with the ciphers. Unfortunately, there is no replacement for the 
problematic Triple-DES which is considered to have an effective key length of 80-bits [71]. 
 
At this stage, the remaining ciphers are Twofish, RC6, Rijndael and XTEA/XXTEA. The first 
three were contenders in the AES competition, which concluded that the best cipher is 
Rijndael. Therefore, Rijndael, which then is known as AES, is the most reputable and a better 
cipher than the other AES competitors are, and there is no reason to dispute that. 
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After the preliminary evaluation and given the problems described, the remaining algorithms 
are XTEA/XXTEA and AES. These were examined for their performance and resource 
utilisation in the final evaluation. 
 
Final evaluation and selection 
There is no published direct comparison of the computational requirements of the final 
candidates. However, a relative but inconclusive comparison between TEA variants and AES 
can be derived from references [96, 124-128]. With the exception of AES, all TEA variants 
outperform other ciphers. On the other hand, AES requires less computational resources while 
XXTEA has a smaller memory footprint [96, 126].  
 
However, reference [126] does not account for ciphertext stealing or the increased cycles that 
XXTEA uses when data input is small or research showing that 8 cycles are enough [129]. 
Eight XXTEA cycles will definitely outperform AES by a factor of at least two, without 
considering ciphertext stealing and block-size radio overhead. 
 
For these reasons, the XXTEA encryption algorithm will be selected for SecRose and AES 
should be considered the next viable alternative should XXTEA be proven insecure. 
 
SecRose will use XXTEA without the gradual reduction of cycles. The cycles of the cipher 
will be permanently set to eight, which is proposed by the current maintainer of TEA and is 
claimed to be secure for most applications [129]. Additional cycles might be added by sensor 
network developers who demand higher security margins. 
 
Alternative ciphers 
Although XXTEA was selected and highly recommended for SecRose, the secure design of 
the system is not limited to this particular encryption function. Use of any block cipher would 
not affect the security of the SecRose protocol but some changes to the system will be 
required.  
 
The modular design of the system components allows for relatively easy transition to other 
ciphers. Updates on the code will be required on the stealing subcomponent, since it is 
optimised for the characteristics of XXTEA. 
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However, any changes will require appropriate efficiency evaluation, since the various ciphers 
utilise resources differently. 
 
Component interactions 
The encryption component provides four interfaces, which might be utilised by other 
components. Possible interactions are illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: the subcomponents of the encryption component and their interfaces 
 
 
Stealing subcomponent 
Block ciphers require data input in blocks of a specified size, which is usually a multiple of 8. 
In cases where the actual data are not an exact multiple of eight, the data have to either be 
padded with a known value or ciphertext stealing has to be applied [4, 122]. 
 
SecRose uses a stealing subcomponent to achieve maximum efficiency. Although the method 
is inspired by the ciphertext stealing, it operates pre-emptively, before any encryption 
happens, and it primarily relies in the 4-byte MAC and the 4-Byte block size of XXTEA. The 
method operates more efficiently than traditional stealing solutions, as it does not require 
additional iterations of the encryption cipher.  
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SecRose steals selectively from the MAC field, the type field or the group field of the packet. 
The stealing subcomponent allows SecRose to refrain from using any padded data for packets 
carrying more than 1-byte data payload. 
 
In addition to efficiency gains, the stealing subcomponent complements the computational 
complexity of transmitted encrypted and authenticated packets, effectively increasing the 
computational effort required to conduct a brute force attack. However, the exact 
cryptographic gains vary in accordance to the packet‟s payload and their true impact was not 
precisely analysed. Nevertheless, it remains a complementary feature that is achieved with 
minimal impact to energy requirements. 
 
Operation of the stealing subcomponent 
Generic stealing subcomponents follow a simple strategy; encrypt the “first” blocks and then 
encrypt the “last” block. Initially, the subcomponent encrypts as many full blocks as possible, 
given an arbitrary input size. This leaves few bytes that are not enough to form a full block 
unencrypted. These bytes are complemented with some part of the already encrypted bytes, as 
many as required to form a full block. Then encrypt this “last” block. The process is 
illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: the principle of ciphertext stealing 
 
SecRose improves this technique by treating the whole packet‟s data as an array of possible 
inputs to the encryption function while only the encryption of the data field is required. 
SecRose may include bytes from other packet fields in order to complete the last block. The 
selection happens before the encryption and the cipher is only called once, after complete 
blocks have been formed. Since there is no double encryption, the method consumes 50% less 
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computational resources than a typical ciphertext stealing subcomponent. The field selection 
process consumes insignificant resources. 
 
The design of the SecRose stealing subcomponent is illustrated in Figure 8. The whole packet 
is the input. The process begins by stealing the MAC; if the last block of the data field is not a 
complete block, SecRose will add as many parts of the MAC as required to complete it. An 
example of the effect on a long packet with two bytes data payload is given in Figure 9. 
 
Since both the block size of TEA and the MAC are 4 bytes, the MAC stealing method would 
be sufficient to complete any block. However, the minimum block size of TEA is 8 bytes. 
Therefore, packets with less than 4 bytes payload cannot be securely completed with MAC 
stealing only. In these cases, SecRose will selectively add as many bytes from the other fields 
of the packet as needed. In the extreme case when a packet‟s payload is 1 byte, SecRose will 
also add a padding byte, increasing the ciphertext. Table 2 illustrates the various scenarios for 
the first 13 bytes of data payload.  
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Figure 8: the stealing subcomponent of SecRose 
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Figure 9: example of stealing applied to a long packet with two bytes data payload 
 
 
 
 
 
Bytes stolen from Total input 
to the 
encryption 
Payload MAC Type Group Pad 
1 4 1 1 1 8 
2 4 1 1 0 8 
3 4 1 0 0 8 
4 4 0 0 0 8 
5 3 0 0 0 8 
6 2 0 0 0 8 
7 1 0 0 0 8 
8 0 0 0 0 8 
9 3 0 0 0 12 
10 2 0 0 0 12 
11 1 0 0 0 12 
12 0 0 0 0 12 
13 3 0 0 0 12 
 
Table 2: packet field utilisation by the stealing subcomponent.  
All numbers express Bytes. 
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4.2.3 Key management component 
 
Interfaces 
The component can accept requests for a key to be provided or be informed about packet 
events by the control component. Both operations require a packet to be inputted. Although 
the key services interface does not directly interact with the authentication component, it does 
rely on information that has been calculated by it. 
 
The control component uses an interface to inform key management when a packet event has 
happened. The possible packet events are: 
1. A packet has been sent 
2. A packet with a valid MAC has been received 
3. A packet with an invalid MAC has been received 
4. An acknowledgement packet has been received 
 
Key management keeps an active counter and a backup counter. An active counter can be 
utilised to create a final key, which is sometimes referred to as the active key. If the backup 
counter is utilised the key is called the backup key.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: key management: interfaces, interactions and subcomponents 
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State information storage 
The component keeps two tables; the counter table, which stores pair counters and the 
acknowledgement table, which stores acknowledgement values. The authentication 
component calculates update values and content for both tables and provides it to key 
management as part of the packet‟s data. The key management applies the information to the 
tables. 
 
Keys are composite; they consist of a 96-bit initial key and a 32-bit counter. The counter table 
stores two counter values, active and backup, and the counter update value. These values are 
mixed with the initial key, which is uniform and preloaded onto all nodes. This way a unique, 
128-bit final key is created. 
 
The pair ID is stored, on both the acknowledgement and the counter table. On the counter 
table, the pair ID acts as the index of the table and allows the component to find and 
manipulate the values of the counters. On the acknowledgement table, the index is the 
authentication value and it is used to determine the pair ID associated with this an 
acknowledgement packet. 
 
Key management requires 13 bytes of storage for every communication pair present in the 
counter table, in order to store active and backup counters. In addition, 32 bits of temporary 
storage for each communication are required until the acknowledgement is received. 
 
Operation 
Providing keys involves determination of the packet type and its destination. Based on the 
destination information the component consults its counter table to retrieve the active 
counter, mix it with the initial key and provide the final key for this particular destination. 
 
When a packet is sent, the counter update value is stored in the counter table. When the 
acknowledgement is received and validated, the counter update value will be retrieved from 
the counter table and added to the active counter. Backups of the old values are also kept. 
Broadcast packets are exceptions to this process as they are not associated with 
acknowledgements. In this case, the key management component will immediately add the 
counter update value to the active counter. 
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When a validated packet is received, key management makes a permanent update on the 
counter table, noting the new active counter and backing up the existing active counter. The 
process will be repeated when the next valid packet is received and the backup counter will be 
completely overwritten then.  
 
However, if the next received packet does not contain a valid MAC, the system can revert to 
the backup counter to allow the control packet to try MAC validation again. If this fails then 
communication in this pair is deemed broken, as the other end can send packets but it cannot 
receive the acknowledgements. 
 
Finally, the acknowledgement table limits the maximum invalid acknowledgements it can 
receive to be no more than the amount of acknowledgements it awaits. If the maximum value 
is reached, the acknowledgement table is wiped. This limit is imposed for security reasons but 
it does not affect the normal operation of SecRose. 
 
Note that for each communication pair, there is only one memory slot for the backup counter. 
Each time a valid acknowledgement or a valid packet is received, this slot is overwritten. 
 
Evolving communication pairs 
The key management system creates evolving communication pairs between the nodes of the 
network. The pairs are called “evolving” because they are constantly changing after each 
communication. This functionality allows the key management component to achieve 
powerful security characteristics like semantic security, weak freshness, authentication and 
integrity. In addition, it reduces the available cryptanalytic options and discourages node-
capturing attacks
11
. 
 
The authentication component relies on the evolving keys to guarantee the identity of sending 
nodes to their receivers. 
 
The subcomponent provides failover in case packets or their acknowledgements cannot be 
received by one end of the pair. The mechanism reverts from the currently active counter to 
the currently backup counter. Inevitably, this leads to the possibility that the same key might 
be reused. 
                                                 
11
 The security characteristics of the key management component will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Ideally, a system should never reuse keys in any case, under any condition but this 
requirement cannot be efficiently accommodated in a sensor network where repetitions of 
packets or acknowledgements are energy demanding. 
 
Note that there are no actual backup keys stored in the system. The system holds backup 
values of the counters. The backup key is a final key that is created after the old counter has 
been restored. 
 
Method rationale 
Key management systems aim to agree a symmetric communication key between two 
communication points. Other solutions include public key infrastructure (PKI) systems like 
SSL [130]. 
 
The PKI solutions are much more effective than the described key management. They are able 
to provide randomised cryptographic keys, instead of the mathematically related keys that 
SecRose provides. In addition, the current key management is based on a pre-deployed shared 
key, which can become a security liability. However, sensor networks cannot support PKI 
solutions, as they demand too much communication, computation and storage resources. 
 
The proposed method saves the few bytes introduced by other solutions for semantic security 
but it potentially consumes many more bytes in the preamble of the acknowledgement 
packets. This overhead is accepted as a side effect for the provision of the methods security 
properties. 
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Subcomponent diagrams 
Figure 11 illustrates the process of retrieving the counter and mixing with the initial key. The 
process starts by an external component, shown in red, which is requesting a key. The whole 
packet is passed to the component as input. The component will then determine the 
destination by reading the destination address or the flag and consequently determine the 
pair‟s ID. Then the active counter value will be retrieved from the counter table and mixed 
with the initial key, which resides in memory. Then key management can deliver the final key 
to the external component that requested it. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: key request process 
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Figure 12 illustrates the post-transmission tasks for the key management component. The 
control component informs key management that a packet has been sent and it passes the 
packet to key management. The packet‟s data contains the flag, the destination address, and 
the full 8-byte MAC. Key management determines the packet type and acts accordingly. If the 
packet was as broadcast packet, it will advance the counter immediately after saving a backup 
of the active counter value. For all other packets, it will only store a temporary value and the 
acknowledgement value. Both values are included in the packet‟s data, in the 8-byte output of 
the authentication component. When the acknowledgement is received, the temporarily stored 
counter advance value will be used. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: key management tasks after packet transmission 
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Figure 13 illustrates the process on the key management component after the reception of a 
valid acknowledgement. The control component informs the key management that an 
acknowledgement has been received and it passes the packet on. The packet contains two 
bytes of acknowledgement value, which is used as the index to query the acknowledgement 
table. When a match is found, the component can retrieve the pair ID, since the 
acknowledgement value acts as the index of the table. The component then retrieves the active 
counter value and the counter advance value, which is used to advance the counter. The next 
packet for this pair will use the new counter. 
 
In case the received acknowledgement value is not found in the acknowledgement table, the 
component does not do anything. Note that if a value is found then the component will also 
remove it from the acknowledgement table. This activity is not shown in the diagram. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: process after acknowledgement reception 
Figure 14 illustrates the key management activities after a valid packet has been received. The 
process is initiated by the control component and the whole packet is passed to key 
management. The packet‟s data contain the destination and the full 8-byte MAC as calculated 
by the authentication component. Key management examines the destination to determine the 
pair‟s ID. After that is found, it will initially create a backup of the active counter. Then it will 
read the 5
th
 MAC byte to determine the counter advance value and use it to advance the active 
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counter. The new active counter is finally saved on the counter table. The next packet for this 
pair will use the new counter. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: process after packet reception 
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Figure 15 illustrates how key management reverts to the backup counter after request of the 
control component. The control component should attempt packet validation using the backup 
key if it received a packet that cannot be validated normally. In order to do so it asks the key 
management to revert its currently active counter to the saved backup. The effect of the 
process is permanent and affects all future packets. The simple diagram explains this process.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: revert to backup counter 
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4.2.4 Authentication and integrity 
 
Interfaces and their operation 
This component interfaces with all the other components in various ways. Its primary 
functionality is to provide Message Authentication Codes (MAC) of outgoing packets and to 
validate the MACs of incoming packets. In order to achieve this functionality the component 
requests keys from the key management component and encryption services from the 
encryption component. In addition, the authentication component provides key update and 
acknowledgement values to key management after processing a packet. The component uses 
the CMAC [99] specification to calculate MACs. 
 
The component relies on the key management component to provide authentication and trust. 
In particular, the authentication component guarantees that the sending node is a node that 
possesses the pair key while the evolving communication pairs guarantee that other nodes do 
not use the same keys. 
 
In order to calculate a MAC the component requires provision of the related packet by the 
control component. Then it requests the active key from key management in order to request 
encryption services correctly. The MAC is then calculated and a string of eight signature 
bytes is produced. This stream is unique to distinctive input.  
 
The first four of these bytes will act as the MAC of the packet. The fifth byte is the counter 
increase value and the sixth and seventh bytes will be used for the acknowledgement value. 
All the information is appended to the packet for utilisation of the control and key 
management components. The 8
th
 byte is currently not used by SecRose. 
 
A packet that has been altered in transit results in a different input to the MAC component of 
the receiving node. Since the resulting string of bytes is unique to each distinctive input, 
altered bytes will cause MAC validation to fail. Therefore, the authentication component 
guarantees packet integrity as a side effect. 
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The CMAC process 
The CMAC [99] specification generates a message authentication code by invoking the 
encryption function to (a) derive three keys and (b) reduce the input text into the size of a 
cipher block by sequentially encrypting it. The command that facilitates this process is 
sometimes called the MAC function. The CMAC specification guarantees the creation of a 
MAC that is as secure as the encryption function used.  
 
Collision probability and confidence 
MACs are associated with a collision probability, or otherwise they provide guarantees with a 
confidence level. A 32-byte MAC facilitates 2
32
 distinctive outputs. The MAC guarantees that 
a received packet is authentic and intact with a probability of error equal to 1 in 2
32
. 
 
Therefore, a collision will occur, on average, after 2
31
 calculations that involved equal unique 
inputs. An attacker might attempt to send 2
31
 packets with a random MAC in order to forge 
authentication or integrity. The smallest possible packet is a broadcast packet with 0 data 
payload, which equals to a total of 7 bytes, without counting the preamble. A node powered 
by a typical AA battery will cease to operate before 2
16
 such packets are received [69]. The 4-
byte MAC provides confidence that greatly exceeds the capabilities of the sensor nodes. 
 
Selection rationale 
There are two ways to provide digital signatures: use a cryptographic hash function or use a 
block cipher to generate them. The later method is selected primarily because it allows for 
code-reuse and subsequently provides better code size optimisation. Using a block cipher, 
there are only three options to generate MACs; CBC-MAC [131], OCB [100] and CMAC 
[99]. 
 
CBC-MAC is secure only for fixed-length messages and is therefore not recommended. The 
OCB mode of operation for block ciphers could be a promising solution but the security of 
this method is unclear. 
 
CMAC is the secure successor of CBC-MAC and it is recommended by NIST [132] for all 
applications. Therefore, the CMAC mode is selected for the current version of SecRose. 
 
104 
 
Further evaluation and possibly redesign of authentication and key management is required to 
accommodate OCB in SecRose. Future work might evaluate and possibly use OCB in 
SecRose. This topic will be further discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
Component interface diagram 
Figure 16 illustrates the steps required to calculate a packet‟s MAC. The packet is the input. 
The process is initiated by the control component while it requires interaction with every 
other component. The general method is to derive three keys and feeding of the packet‟s data 
to the CMAC calculation function for sequential encryptions. MAC validation is illustrated in 
Figure 17 and it is simply a MAC generation and a comparison.  
 
 
 
Figure 16: MAC generation process 
 
 
 
Figure 17: MAC validation process 
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4.2.5 Control component 
 
Interfaces and operation 
The control component interfaces with TinyOS and every other SecRose component in order 
to coordinate secure communication.  
 
When the higher layers of TinyOS wish to send a packet, they pass it to the control 
component. The packet‟s contents are then built and processed to facilitate packet 
management, encryption and authentication. This process is done by requesting the related 
services of other SecRose components. Finally, the packet is passed to the lower TinyOS 
layers for transmission. 
 
Packets are received by the lower layers of the TinyOS and are then passed to the control 
component. The component then decrypts and validates the packet. Valid packets are passed 
to the higher layers of TinyOS.  
 
Note that packet data is a superset, which includes the packet fields and other information. 
Some of the packet data are not transmitted. 
 
Packet management 
The packet management system is an important subcomponent. It facilitates the three basic 
packet types: normal, broadcast and long packets. It also recognises and handles 
acknowledgement packets. Every packet has to be processed by packet management before 
any other action takes place.  
 
Outgoing packets are given a flag value, depending on communication type. For incoming 
packets, the flag is examined and the actual destination address is derived from the flag. 
Outgoing packets are then passed back to the control component to continue the operations. 
Incoming packets continue to be handled by packet management until their reception is 
completed. 
 
Packet management has to coordinate the actual transmission and reception because 
transmitted packet fields depend on packet type. Outgoing packets are given back to the 
packet management component when the other components have finished processing and the 
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packet is ready for transmission. Only the relevant packet fields are selected from the packet 
data for transmission. 
 
The flags that are utilised by the packet management can be used for additional efficiency 
savings by facilitating early rejection of unwanted packets. The rejection happens in this 
component. 
 
Outgoing packets 
After packet management has processed the packet, the control component requests a MAC to 
be calculated by the authentication component. When this concludes, the packet is sent to the 
encryption component to encrypt it. 
 
The packet is then passed back to packet management for transmission and when that finishes 
the control component informs the key management system that a packet transmission event 
has concluded. Finally, the control component is ready to process the next packet. 
 
Incoming packets 
When a packet arrives from lower layers, it is initially processed by the packet management 
subcomponent. The finalised packet is passed to the control component and the encryption 
component is invoked to decrypt the contents of the packet. Then the packet is passed to the 
authentication component to validate the authenticity and integrity of the packet. An 
acknowledgement packet is sent if the validation succeeds. 
 
If validation fails, the control component asks the key management system to revert to the 
backup pair key and repeats the decryption and validation steps again. An acknowledgement 
packet is not transmitted in this case. 
 
Acknowledgement packets 
Authenticated acknowledgement packets are sent when packets are received and validated 
with the first attempt. The process is straightforward and invokes the control component and 
the packet management subcomponent only.  
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Acknowledgement packets do not contain any data and thus the encryption component is not 
invoked. The authentication component is not needed either, since it has already processed the 
received packet and has produced the required authentication data. 
 
The control component feeds packet management with the acknowledgement packet data and 
the acknowledgement packet is generated on the fly by the field selection of packet 
management. 
 
As it has been discussed already, there are cases where acknowledgement packets are not 
transmitted. This behaviour is a consequence of the original intentions of the 
acknowledgement packets and the subsequent system design.  
 
The aim of acknowledgement packets is to maintain pair key state, not to confirm proper 
reception of a packet. Packet reception is a side effect of the acknowledgements. With the 
current SecRose operation specification, transmission of acknowledgement packets, when the 
initial MAC validation has failed, would result in loss of synchronisation. 
  
If a receiver is required to use the backup key to validate a packet, it makes a permanent 
change in the counter table, promoting the backup counter to active counter. The system is 
not in ideal state but it is operational because the two active counters are synchronised. 
Transmission and reception of acknowledgement at this point would cause the sender to 
advance its active counter using the counter update value. It will therefore cause complete 
loss of synchronisation, since no counter will be synchronised after that.  
 
SecRose intentionally operates in this way to avoid using energy-expensive 
acknowledgements when the key cannot be easily updated. It might be that both 
communication ends have calculated the counter update value and can therefore update the 
active key. However, the sender would have to acknowledge the initial acknowledgement in 
order to let the receiver know that it received that acknowledgement.  
 
That would be an unnecessarily energy-expensive and complicated process with little benefit. 
Consider that the acknowledgement of the acknowledgment would also have to be 
acknowledged and so on. This research did not find a solution to this problem and thus 
SecRose is required to allow some key reuse to happen. 
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The SecRose proposal might be different from the usual but it is still consistent with the 
TinyOS acknowledgements. TinyOS includes a data-link layer acknowledgement mechanism, 
in which neighbouring nodes report that they have received the outgoing transmission. It does 
not give any information about what happened in the rest of the hops until the final receiver.  
 
SecRose‟s acknowledgement operates in the transportation layer, informing the sender that 
the final receiver has received the acknowledgement or that some kind of error had occurred. 
Further work in SecRose might improve it to give acknowledgements with specific errors but 
they need to be carefully considered in terms of energy consumption. 
 
 
4.2.6 Diagrams of system operation 
 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 illustrates the steps and the system interactions initiated by the 
control component in order to achieve packet communication. The figures illustrate the 
process in the sender and the receiver covering every activity: packet transmission, reception, 
validation, sending of acknowledgement and the reception of it. Arrows indicate flow of data, 
logic or both. The colour of the boxes indicates the component in which the step is carried 
out.  
 
The colour of the arrow represents the kind of flow. When the data of a packet is carried along 
in the system‟s logic, a black arrow is used. After transmission, the packet is copied on the 
receiving end but the packet‟s data remain in the sender as well, so the logic flow continues to 
complete the post-transmission tasks. The same applies after passing the packet to higher 
layers and before transmission of the acknowledgement. The actual transmission of data over 
the radio is indicated with a red arrow. 
 
Orange coloured two-sided arrows indicate system component interactions. These are 
request/reply type of interactions and they are associated with data exchange between the 
components as well. A one-sided orange arrow represents an “informative” message between 
components. It is only present in Figure 19 when the control component informs key 
management that a packet with a valid MAC has been received.  
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The boxes describe the steps of the flow and their colour represents the components in which 
a step is taking place. This diagram focuses on the communication, which is coordinated by 
the control component, represented in purple.  
 
All the other components are considered “external” and are illustrated with a red box. For 
clarity reasons, most interactions between external components are either not shown at all or 
simplified. 
 
 
Figure 18: transmission of packets and reception of acknowledgements by the sender. 
See Figure 19 for detailed receiver process. 
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Figure 19: reception of packets, validation and transmission of acknowledgements. 
Packets arrive from the sender, which is further illustrated in Figure 18. 
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4.3 Summary 
 
4.3.1 Simple design, simple operation 
Simplicity is a key quality of SecRose, which allows it to achieve both the security and 
energy efficiency targets. The same simplicity is adapted at every part of the design, from the 
way the cipher is coded to the MAC stealing mechanism and the acknowledgement 
validation. 
 
Simplicity of operation 
The basic operation of the SecRose mechanism is very simple and it can be described in a few 
lines: 
 Sender: authenticate, encrypt, transmit, note future key, note bits of the un-transmitted 
MAC, wait for acknowledgement 
 Receiver: receive, validate, decrypt, update key, send back bits of the un-transmitted 
MAC as an acknowledgement 
 Sender: receive acknowledgement, validate, update key 
The rest of SecRose has to do with the security level and the performance. The main unique 
security features of SecRose are visible; there is no other proposal that provides either 
authenticated acknowledgements or key management. 
 
Clarity of design 
SecRose consists of four, relatively small, components: 
 Encryption; provides 128-bit encryption and the stealing techniques 
 Authentication; provides digital signatures for packets 
 Key management; changes the used keys as frequently as possible 
 Control; controls the sequence of events and interfaces with other components 
The existence of SecRose is invisible to the rest of TinyOS. The control component is 
implemented in the data transportation layer, mimicking the functionality of the part it 
replaces.  
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Relationship with existing proposals 
TinySec was the only security mechanism for the data transportation layer of sensor networks 
when this research commenced. Inevitably, some of the TinySec features were good enough 
to not need changing and thus SecRose has retained some of TinySec‟s features.  
 
Some of the TinySec features remain largely unchanged. For example, SecRose retains the 4-
Byte MAC, and the CBC mode to calculate it, as it is deemed sufficient for most of the 
applications.  
 
MiniSec was developed, probably in parallel with SecRose, as an alternative to TinySec. 
SecRose does not adapt any features introduced by MiniSec but the proposals share the data 
overloading technique. However, the idea is used it on different data; SecRose uses an 
overloaded flag while MiniSec overloads the counter part of the IV.  
 
SenSec is an attempt to improve TinySec and build on this platform. It does not provide 
important new features other than the increased key size and the one-pass encryption and 
authentication method using a cipher in OCB mode. SecRose does not relate to SenSec any 
more than it relates to TinySec. 
 
 
4.3.2 Innovative features 
 
Innovations in security 
SecRose provides unique security features designed to elevate the overall security provision. 
SecRose‟s main security contributions are: 
 128-bit encryption strength supported natively 
 Key management with frequent key changes 
 Authenticated acknowledgements 
Each of these features addresses an important security issue. The 128-bit security is the least 
acceptable strength. The key changes provide freshness and semantic security in an alternative 
way and the authenticated acknowledgements enable many routing protocols to function 
securely. 
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Innovations in energy efficiency 
SecRose includes important energy features like: 
 three packet types to fit communication patterns better 
 utilisation of data overloading 
 unique ciphertext stealing implementation 
 key synchronisation by meta-information with no radio data exchange 
 
 
4.3.3 Chapter conclusion 
 
SecRose provides a simple, secure and efficient design, which retains good security features 
of other proposals while it solves problems that have not been addressed in the past. 
 
The implementation of these features on code is discussed in the next chapter while the 
evaluation of the security provision and energy requirements is presented in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Implementation 
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5. Implementation 
 
The implementation of SecRose in the TinyOS Operating System is discussed in this chapter. 
Technical information on TinyOS and its relationship with SecRose is given in the first 
subsection. The second subsection discusses the algorithms used to produce the code, 
pseudocode of the whole implementation and some examples of actual code. The final 
subsection illustrates the running of the application in TOSSIM and Avrora. 
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5.1 TinyOS and SecRose 
 
5.1.1 Description of TinyOS 
 
The TinyOS Operating System 
TinyOS is a miniature operating system designed for use in sensor networks and other 
embedded systems written in the nesC programming language [31, 53, 64]. TinyOS is a 
flexible, application-specific operating system, which follows a component-based, event-
driven model. 
 
The system is built from a set of reusable components that are assembled into an application-
specific executable, capable of running in a sensor board. Instead of multithreading, TinyOS 
provides an event-driven concurrency model, which utilises components that interface with 
each other.  
 
Component model of TinyOS 
Every TinyOS program is a graph of components, which interact together using three 
computational abstractions: commands, events and tasks. The programming model of nesC 
provides component creation and access in the form of services, which are called interfaces. 
An application connects components using a wiring specification, which defines which 
components will be used by the application. This mechanism excludes the components that 
are not required from the executable.  
 
Commands are requests for a component to perform some service. When the operation 
concludes, an event informs the commanding component of its success or failure. Commands 
and events might also post a task to be executed at a convenient time by the operating 
system‟s scheduler. Both hardware and software resources are abstracted by TinyOS as 
components. The component system manages the underlying software and hardware 
interfacing at low level while the application is only waiting for an event to inform it that the 
command has finished.  
 
Each component defines a number of interfaces that it provides or uses. The interfaces specify 
how the component may interact with other components. Interfaces contain both commands 
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and events. A command is a function implemented by an interface provider while an event is a 
function implemented by its user 
 
Components can be modules or configurations. Modules contain the actual code of the 
component while configurations connect this component’s code together with other 
components. The connection process is called wiring. Via this process, a configuration might 
wire a number of components, which in turn may be configurations that wire more 
components resulting to the creation of a tree of components. The tree is then called a 
supercomponent and in that case, the module of the component in the base of the tree is 
controlling the tree. Essentially, applications are supercomponents. 
 
 
5.1.2 Operation of TinyOS 
 
Programming and execution model of TinyOS 
TinyOS itself and the applications that run on it are written in nesC; an event-driven dialect of 
C. NesC is a dialect of C, it is no different from C other than in the way that functions and 
libraries are defined and linked. As opposed to C, there is no linking in nesC. The linking 
process is replaced by the wiring of components. 
 
TinyOS provides a scheduler, or execution model, which coordinates simultaneous commands 
and events that run between the components. The scheduler also manages energy 
consumption, puts hardware components into sleep mode and other housekeeping tasks. The 
scheduler allows for real-time task execution and for low priority execution. 
 
NesC and the scheduler are designed to solve a number of engineering issues regarding event-
driven execution. The system for example can detect data races statically. The execution 
model consists of run-to-completion tasks for computation and asynchronous interrupt 
handlers signalled by the hardware. The scheduler might execute tasks in any order but it 
must obey the run-to-completion requirement.  
 
Simulators 
Due to the nature of wireless sensor networks, development of complex applications might be 
a difficult process requiring expensive hardware [60-61]. A number of development tools and 
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methodologies have been proposed to assist the process and minimise the development 
constraints. 
 
The most important are the simulation tools. They consist of software that attempts to 
represent the behaviour of the sensor hardware on a personal computer. They create instances 
of virtual hardware and deploy them on a virtual network. The development of SecRose used 
the TOSSIM [62] and Avrora [63] simulators and the avr-gcc compiler [133] and the 
associated debugging modes and tools.  
 
TOSSIM [62] is the pc simulator that comes with TinyOS as a tool for development and 
testing using a desktop computer. It works by abstracting the hardware-specific functions, e.g. 
the memory, into C functions with similar input and output. TOSSIM is able to produce a pc 
executable, which simulates the WSN when run, allowing the sensor network applications to 
be run as if they were normal executables for the pc architecture.  
 
Avrora [63] uses a different, slower but highly accurate approach to simulate sensor networks. 
Its authors describe it as an instruction-level sensor network simulator, which runs the actual 
microcontroller programs in a simulated environment. Avrora implements an event queue 
[134] to coordinate events. This preserves the accuracy and correctness of the simulator. In 
addition, it utilises a radio synchronisation technique, which allows the nodes to communicate 
with precision timing.  
 
 
5.1.3 Communication model and SecRose’s position 
 
Communication facilities of TinyOS 
TinyOS provides a networking architecture, implemented as a combination of communication 
components. These components define how packets are requested by the application, 
constructed by the operating system and handed to the hardware radio component for 
transmitting.  
 
The communication facilities of TinyOS are much lighter and they look different from 
traditional communication protocols and specifications. However, it is apparent that the 
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design has been influenced by (a) the OSI model [66], (b) the TCP/IP protocols[9, 135] and 
(c) the 802.11 MAC protocols [67]. 
 
TinyOS uses a layering model but since it is extremely lightweight, some of the OSI 
definitions are missing and others are combined. One or more components are used to achieve 
the computational tasks involved. The following layers can be distinguished: 
 Application layer, expressed by the application 
 Transport layer, multiple components achieve the functionality of generating and pre-
processing a packet with its headers and data. Key components are; 
o AMStandard, initially generates a packet with its header and data 
o MicaHighSpeedRadioM, for mica2 nodes, is responsible for sending the 
packet to lower layers on a byte-by-byte basis 
 Network layer, also facilitated in a number of components, most importantly; 
o ChannelMonC, responsible for monitoring the channel for idleness and/or 
transmissions 
o SpiByteFifoC, is responsible for sending the packet to the hardware in a 
bit-by-bit stream 
Note that there is no physical layer. Medium access is controlled by the transport layer and the 
network layer is responsible for the actual data transmission. 
 
TinyOS packets are defined to have the following fields:  
 
Destination Type Length Group Data CRC 
2 1 1 1 0...29 2 
 
The numbers express size in bytes. The Type field, sometimes referred to as AM, is 
equivalent to the TCP port field, the Group field is intended to allow clustering or other type 
of node grouping. The data contain the packet‟s data payload, which ranges from 0 to 29 
bytes. The exact size of the payload is defined in the length field. Note the lack of a source 
address.  
 
The acknowledgement packet is a simple stream of four identical bytes, which operates in the 
physical layer, and is sent by every node that happens to receive any packet. 
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SecRose in relation with TinyOS 
SecRose updates the transportation-layer components of TinyOS and it is therefore facilitated 
in the MicaHighSpeedRadioM component. It also introduces and interfaces with a new 
nesC component, called SecRose.  
 
The MicaHighSpeedRadioM component accepts outgoing packets from the 
AMStandard component and sends them to radio via the SpiByteFifoC component. 
Incoming packets are intercepted by ChannelMonC and are sent to 
MicaHighSpeedRadioM as well.  
 
SecRose‟s implementation replaces the most significant parts of MicaHighSpeedRadioM 
and communicates with SecRose for additional functionality. The control component of 
SecRose
12
 is primarily implemented in MicaHighSpeedRadioM while all the other 
components reside in SecRoseM. 
  
                                                 
12
 Described in Section 4 
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5.2 Algorithms, code and pseudocode 
 
Files 
The nesC component SecRoseM provides a series of SecRose-specific commands, which are 
used either internally by this component or by the MicaHighSpeedRadioM component. 
These commands are self-contained and can be described individually. This section describes 
those self-contained SecRose commands. They are defined in file SecRose.nc and 
implemented in file SecRoseM.nc. 
 
Notes 
Most commands described in this section do not return anything. The implementation of 
SecRose is based on passing pointers, instead of passing data. Commands manipulate the data 
pointed by the pointer and return control to their parent command, which then utilises the 
data. This is practice is more efficient and consistent with the rest of TinyOS and allowed by 
its race protection and by the AVR microprocessors. 
 
In the cases where actual code is provided, effort is made to reduce its size. The actual code is 
retained in the appendix. 
 
This section contains integer values expressed with alphanumeric constants, like for example 
TRUE, FALSE, PKT_SENT and many others. These are automatically generated using C-
style enumerated list like:  
enum { TRUE, FALSE } 
Such code can be placed in header files or other a globally scoped location and the pre-
processor will automatically assign integer 0 to TRUE and integer 1 to FALSE. The enum{} 
definition can enumerate many items. 
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5.2.1 Encryption component 
 
Commands 
The encryption component, as described in Chapter 4, is implemented in code using four 
commands: 
- bteaCipher() – the implementation of XXTEA 
- packetEncDec() – called by the control component when it requires encryption of 
a packet with stealing 
- stealEncDec() – called by packetEncDec(), facilitates stealing 
 
XXTEA for TinyOS – bteaCipher() 
The XXTEA [136] implementation for TinyOS and other AVR microprocessors is provided. 
This code differs from other published versions. The MC constant is hardcoded, the cycles are 
fixed to 8 and the n-1 is calculated only once, instead of once for every cycle. The code for 
decryption is not provided here since it is the exact reverse of encryption.  
 
Input 
vl – the pointer to the plaintext data 
n – the length of the data 
k – a pointer to the key 
Code 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
async command void SecRose.bteaCipher(uint32_t* vl, int32_t n, uint32_t* k) { 
uint32_t z, y=vl[0], sum=0, e, DELTA=0x9e3779b9; 
uint8_t n_minus_one; uint32_t p, q; 
 
n_minus_one = n-1; q = 8; z = vl[n_minus_one]; 
while (q-- > 0) { 
sum += DELTA; e = (sum >> 2) & 3; 
for (p=0; p<n_minus_one; p++) { 
y = vl[p+1]; 
z = vl[p] += (z>>5^y<<2) + (y>>3^z<<4) ^ (sum^y) + (k[p&3^e]^z); 
} 
y = vl[0]; 
z = vl[n_minus_one] += (z>>5^y<<2) + (y>>3^z<<4) ^ (sum^y) + (k[p&3^e]^z); 
 } 
} 
 
Remarks 
Line 1; illustrates one of the main differences of nesC and C. The line declares an 
asynchronous command with void output named bteaCipher, which resides in the 
SecRose component. The rest of the code is essentially C code. 
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Lines 2, 3 and 5; declare and assign values to temporary variables and constants.  
 
Line 6; the XXTEA cycle starts. Since q=8 it will be run 8 times. 
 
Packet encryption or decryption – packetEncDec() and stealEncDec() 
The commands packetEncDec() and StealEncDec() are part of the encryption 
component. packetEncDec() is called by the control component when packet encryption 
service is required. It accepts a packet‟s data as input, and asks the key management 
component to provide a key. Then the command StealEncDec() is called to examine the 
payload size, decide and apply any efficiency optimisations.  
 
This pair of commands could have been one command but they are left as two commands to 
allow for easier transition to different ciphers and different stealing methods. The current code 
splits other tasks from the actual encryption task. However, the process given below describes 
both commands as a uniform process. 
 
Input 
data – a pointer to a packet struct 
action – a Boolean. Can be set to ENCRYPT or DECRYPT to define the desired 
action 
 
Process 
1. If data->length is zero then exit. 
2. Determine the destination from the flag and the data->addr field 
3. Request the pair key from key management, assign it to array fkey[] 
4. Declare array v[], populate it with the whole array data->data[] 
5. If the last block of v[] is not a full block13 then add up to four bytes from data-
>mac[] to v[] in order to make it complete. Note how many bytes were added 
6. If the last block is still not full; add data->type to v[]. Note the action 
7. If the last block is still not full; add data->group to v[]. Note the action 
8. If the last block is still not full; pad v[] with zero. Note the action 
9. Encrypt or decrypt v[] according to what the action variable was 
                                                 
13
 The “full block is considered to be 4-bytes long in this case. See Remarks. 
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10. Take data->length bytes from v[] and place them on data->data[] 
11. If data->type was stolen, take a byte from v[] and add it to data->type 
12. If data->group was stolen, take a byte from v[] and add it to data->type 
13. If padding byte was used, take the last byte of v[] and add it to the end of data-
>data[] 
 
Remarks 
Line 1 and 9; Padding will only occur in packets with 1 byte payload only. The complete 8-
byte block is formed by; 1 data byte, 4 MAC bytes, 1 type byte, 1 group byte and 1 pad byte. 
Packets with zero data payload are obviously not encrypted since there is nothing to encrypt. 
 
Lines 2 and 3; on reality packetEncDec() ends in line 2 and StealEncDec() starts in 
line 3 
 
 
5.2.2 Authentication component 
 
Commands 
The authentication component, as described in Chapter 4, is implemented in code using four 
commands: 
- calcMAC() – accepts a packet and calculates its MAC code, called by the control 
component 
- validateMAC() – accepts a packet, calculates the MAC of it and compares the 
result with the MAC written on the packet 
 
Mac calculation – calcMAC() 
The command that implements the CMAC specification is algorithmically described here. 
This command is the vital subcomponent of the authentication component.  
 
Input 
data –  a pointer to a packet struct 
node – the true source/destination node (data might lack this information) 
action – a Boolean set to true if the packet is outgoing. 
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Process 
1. Request the pair key from key management, assign it to array fkey[] 
2. Declare array v[] add data->data[], data->source, data->type and data-
>group to it (these are all the available fields of the packet) 
3. Declare array kbuffer[]. Populate it with the encrypted output a string of eight 
zeroes. 
4. Note if the most significant bit (MSB) of kbuffer[] is 0 
5. Shift the whole kbuffer[] one bit to the left 
6. Declare array kalpha[], copy kbuffer[] to kalpha[], shift it 1 bit left 
7. If the MSB of kbuffer[] was not 0, then XOR kalpha[] with 0x1b  
8. Declare array kbeta[], copy kalpha[] to kbeta[], shift it 1 bit left 
9. If the MSB of kbuffer[] was not 0, then XOR kbeta[] with 0x1b 
10. If the last block14 of v[] is a full block then XOR it with kalpha[] 
11. Else append 1 set bit after the last bit of v[] 
12. XOR the last block of v[] with kbeta[] 
13. XOR a string of 0‟s with the first block of v[], place the result in kbuffer[] 
14. XOR the next block of v[] with kbuffer[], place the result in kbuffer[] 
15. Encrypt kbuffer[] using key fkey[] 
16. Repeat steps 14, 15 for all blocks of v[] 
17. Copy the first four bytes of kbuffer[] to data->mac[] 
18. Copy the next byte of kbuffer[] to data->count_value15 
19. For outgoing packets, copy the next two bytes to data->ack_value[] 
20. Else copy them to data->ack[] 
 
Remarks 
The block is considered 8-bytes long. kbuffer[], kalpha[] and kbeta[] are all 8-
byte long arrays. A “block” in the CMAC specification refers to a string of bytes equal in 
length to the minimum block size of the cipher. XXTEA‟s block size is 4 bytes but the 
minimum input size cannot be less than 8 bytes. The CMAC process is invoking the cipher 
with the minimum input. Therefore, the minimum block size for this case is 8 bytes.  
                                                 
14
 The “full block” is considered to be 8 bytes long in this case. See Remarks. 
15
 This is going to be the counter update value. 
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The process uses the data on fkey[] to create two more keys which are stored in 
kalpha[] and kbeta[]. Their creation depends on the input‟s size in relation to the block 
size. 
 
kbuffer[] is a temporary array which SecRose uses to store output and process it later. 
 
MAC Validation – validateMAC() 
The command validateMAC() accepts a received packet as input and validates the Mac 
written on it against the MAC that can be calculated by the received packet fields.  
Input 
data –  a pointer to a packet struct 
 
Process  
1. Create a copy of the data->mac[] as received, place it in mac_tmp[] 
2. Call calcMAC(), with data as input, to calculate the received MAC. The result 
will be placed in data->mac[] as normal 
3. Compare data->mac[] with mac_tmp[] 
4. Return TRUE or FALSE accordingly 
 
 
5.2.3 Key management 
 
Commands 
The key management component, as described in Chapter 4, is implemented in code using 
four commands: 
- mixKey() – obtains the counter from the counter table and mixes it with the initial 
key. Called by any component that requires the key of a pair 
- counterHandle() – handles the counter table, provides the three SecRose system 
interfaces that relate to the counter table. Also calls the ackTable() command in 
order to consult the acknowledgement table 
- ackTable() – handles the acknowledgement table, called by counterHandle() 
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Structure of the counter table 
The counter table is represented as an array of struct with the following fields: 
 
Definition: 
 
typedef struct ROSE_counter 
{ 
  uint32_t active;  
  uint32_t backup;  
  uint8_t temp; 
} ROSE_counter;  
 
The active field stores the active counter, the field backup stores the backup counter and field 
temp, which is only 8 bits, stores the counter update value. The initialisation adds 1 to the 
total number of nodes to reserve a place for the broadcast pair. 
 
After initialisation, the table is accessible as an array of structs via commands like: 
 
counter[node].temp = cur_counter; 
 
The node variable represents the node number. For a node sitting on one side of a pair, the ID 
of the other node is effectively the ID of the pair. 
 
Structure of the acknowledgement table 
The acknowledgement table is represented as an array of structs with the following fields: 
 
typedef struct ROSE_acks 
{ 
  uint16_t addr;   /* 2 DESTINATION addr */ 
  uint8_t ack[2];   // 2 needed in all packets 
} ROSE_acks; 
 
The field addr stores the destination address to which the packet went. This is also equal to 
the pair ID, as discussed before. The array ack[] stores the two uint8_t integers which are 
provided by the authentication component and represent the acknowledgement value of the 
packet.  
 
After initialisation, the table is accessible as an array of structs, like the counter table. 
However, there is no known index, like the node‟s number, as in the counter table. The array 
has to be parsed and the value stored in ack[] is checked against the received 
acknowledgement value in order to relate it with a node id (stored in the add field). 
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Key requests - mixKey() 
Key requests from the encryption and the authentication components are handled by 
command mixKey() which retrieves the active counter from the counter table and mixes it 
with the initial key.  
 
For the requirements of this proof-of-concept, the 96-bits initial key is hardcoded into the 
memory. A temporary placeholder for the final key is also defined as fkey[]. Both arrays 
are global and are defined with a random value. 
 
The command accepts the destination of the node as input. The clear systemic design 
represents this command as an interface that should accept the packet as input. Precisely 
applying this to code would have resulted in unnecessary performance loss since the 
destination is readily known in all cases where this command is called. 
 
Handling of the counter table – counterHandle() 
The four interfaces defined in Section 4 are all implemented in command 
counterHandle(). 
 
Input 
data – a pointer to a packet struct 
action – an integer representing the action 
 
Process if action is PKT_SENT (system interface ―Packet sent‖) 
1. Determine the value of the flag and put it in variable flag  
2. If flag = 0 then set variable node = 0 
3. If flag = 1 then do the following, otherwise go to step x 
4. Set variable node equal to the maximum number of nodes (SECROSE_MAX_NODES) 
5. Retrieve active counter and copy it to the backup counter: 
counter[node].backup = counter[node].active; 
6.  Retrieve active counter and add the counter update value to it16: 
counter[node].active += cur_counter; 
7. Set: counter[node].temp = cur_counter; 
                                                 
16
 The value is determined by the Authentication component in step 18 of command calcMAC(). 
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8. Call ackTable() with input the data packet struct, action set to ADD_VALUE and 
the node variable 
 
Process if action is PKT_RECV or CNT_REVERT (system interfaces ―Packet received‖ and 
―Invalid packet received‖) 
1. Examine the value of data->addr. If it is the broadcast address set node = 
SECROSE_MAX_NODES. Otherwise set node = data->source 
2. If the action is PKT_RECV then back-up and increase the active counter (as in the steps 5 
and 6 of the PKT_SENT process) 
3. If action is CNT_REVERT then copy the backup counter to the active counter: 
counter[node].active = counter[node].backup; 
 
Process if action is ACK_TEST_START (system interface ―Acknowledgement received‖) 
1. Loop around acks[] until a value that matches data->mac[] is found in 
acks[].ack[]. 
2. If a match is found then: 
a.  increase the active counter by the temporary counter value17:  
counter[node].active += counter[node].temp; 
b. Call ackTable() with input the data packet struct, action set to 
REMOVE_VALUE and the node variable which contains the position in the 
acks[] table where the received acknowledgement value was discovered 
 
Remarks 
Step 2b passes the discovered position to the ackTable() command to save from repeating 
the search. 
 
Handling of the acknowledgement table – counterHandle() 
The command is called by the counterHandle() command. The command branches 
depending on the value of the action input, which can be ADD_VALUE or 
REMOVE_VALUE. The command uses the global variable num_acks, which stores the 
total number of acknowledgement values that the sender expects.  
 
                                                 
17
 Stored in the temp field in step 7 of the PKT_SENT action. 
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Input 
data – a pointer to a packet struct 
action – an integer representing the action 
node – the node/pair ID under handling 
 
Process if action is ADD_VALUE 
The concept is to push the whole array one place to the right, like a LIFO table. 
1. Increase variable num_acks by 1 
2. If num_acks has reached its maximum value then decrease it by one. This will cause the 
older acknowledgement value to be overwritten  
3. Loop around the whole array and shift it one place to the left so that all the fields in 
acks[0] will be copied in acks[1] and so on. The location acks[0] will be freed 
and the location acks[SECROSE_MAX_ACK] will be overwritten if it exists 
4. Add the values of data->ack_value[] to acks[0].ack[] and the value of node 
to acks[0].addr 
 
Process if action is REMOVE_VALUE 
The concept is to push the parts of the array that are on the right of the discovered 
acknowledgement value one place to the left. Decrease num_acks by 1 
1. Start at the position node and copy the fields of position node+1 
2. Repeat step 2 until the end of the table is reached 
 
Remarks 
Under normal operation, the position of the acknowledgement value of the last sent packet is 
in acks[0] and thus discovered immediately by counterHandle() 
 
 
5.2.4 Flag manipulation 
 
The following commands are used by any system component and any command that needs 
flag handling or querying. They facilitate reading, writing and deleting of the flag on the 
length field of the packet. 
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Determine flag from whole packet - findFlag() 
Accepts a packet‟s data as input, reads the data->addr field and determines what the flag 
should be for this destination address. This command is suitable for flag determination of 
outgoing packets, needed at various stages of the mechanism. 
 
Read flag from length only – readFlag() 
Accepts the length field of a packet and determines the flag by examining size of the field. 
This command is used by the control component to understand the packet type immediately 
after receiving the length – the first field of the packet. 
 
Determine and write – writeFlag() 
This command is similar to findFlag() but it also facilitates overloading of the flag in the 
packet‟s length field. In case the packet is an acknowledgement, the flag cannot be read by the 
addr field but it was pre-set by the control component. The function will write the 
acknowledgement flag on the length regardless. 
 
Determine and extract the flag - fixFlag() 
The command examines the length of the inputted packet, determines the flag and then deletes 
it from the length field.  
 
 
5.2.5 Control component 
 
Files 
The component MicaHighSpeedRadioM is the TinyOS component that facilitates the 
transportation layer. SecRose‟s control component is implemented in this file. The component 
calls commands from the SecRoseM component. The component is defined in file 
MicaHighSpeedRadio.nc and implemented in file MicaHighSpeedRadioM.nc. 
 
Notes 
This subsection discusses the PC version of the component. SecRose was also implemented 
for the MICA2 architecture. There are minor differences in the component names and the 
overall flow of control between different architectures but the concept ideas remain the same.  
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The component is based on events and thus there are time delays in the execution of the flow. 
 
The position of the events, tasks and commands in the file does not match the position of their 
explanation in this subsection. The subsection groups packet sending tasks and packet 
reception tasks. The file does not follow any particular grouping, since the order does not 
matter. 
 
This description does not include radio-timing tasks, which are irrelevant to SecRose. 
 
Global variables 
SecRose defines a number of temporary global variables for this component. The important 
ones are described here: 
 
States 
There are two variables regarding states in this component. The variable state controls the 
various stages where the sending or receiving process is. The variable send_state 
determines whether an outgoing packet is being processed by MicaHighSpeedRadioM. 
This is used to deny higher layers from sending subsequent packets until the current packet 
finishes. 
 
Other variables 
- next_data contains the next byte, to be transmitted shortly 
- data contains the byte that was just received 
- rec_ptr is the pointer to the received packet‟s data struct 
- send_ptr is the pointer to the outgoing packet‟s data struct 
 
Interfaces 
This component uses and provides many interfaces. Some of the provided interfaces are 
important to SecRose. They are defined on other components but implemented in 
MicaHighSpeedRadioM under the SecRose design specification. These are: 
 
BareSendMsg (defined with the name Send) – the interface to send packets, SecRose 
implements the command Send.send() which is triggered when higher layers want to 
send a packet. 
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SpiByteFifo – the interface that controls this component with the radio component 
 
SecRose (defined with the name rose) – the SecRoseM component described in the 
previous subsection 
 
Pseudocode structure of dataReady() 
The command dataReady() is both complicated and important. It is common to both 
sending and receiving packets. The exact action is controlled by the state variable. The 
command is called by the SpiByteFifo component continuously, after 8 bits could have 
been received or sent, regardless if they actually did. In receiving mode, the command is 
called with the received byte as the value of the data variable. In sending mode, the data 
variable is set to 0. 
 
The structure of the SpiByteFifo.dataReady() command is as follows; 
 
event result_t SpiByteFifo.dataReady(uint8_t data) { 
  if(state == TRANSMITTING_START) { ... } 
  else if(state == TRANSMITTING){ ... } 
  else if(state == RX_STATE) { ... } 
  else if(state == SENDING_STRENGTH_PULSE){ ... } 
  else if(state == REC_STRENGTH_PULSE) { ... }     
  return 1;  
} 
 
Depending on the state, a different process is initiated. This subsection has grouped the 
distinct processes of sending and receiving and it will only describe the relevant branch of 
SpiByteFifo.dataReady() for each one. 
 
Outgoing packet 
When a packet arrives from the higher layers, it triggers the command Send.send(). Then 
the process of sending a packet initiated, involving various events, tasks and commands. The 
input to the process is the pointer to the packet‟s data, which is stored in variable send_ptr. 
The process explanation follows. 
 
Process of command Send.send() 
1. Check if there is not another packet in the process of being sent. If yes then return FAIL 
and exit. 
2. Set state = SEND_WAITING 
3. Set the source of the packet (send_ptr->addr) to the ID of the local node 
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4. Calculate the MAC or the ACK of the packet (depending on type) by calling 
rose.calcMAC() or rose.calcACK() 
5. Encrypt the packet by calling rose.packetEncDec() with action ENCRYPT 
6. Determine the exact size of the packet‟s fields, and the total number of bytes in the packet 
note the values for use later 
7. Write the flag on packet‟s length by calling rose.writeFlag() 
8. For normal packets, set the destination field to the ID of the local node18 
9. Call ChannelMon.macDelay() and exit 
 
The command ChannelMon.macDelay() is listening to the radio medium for a gap in 
transmission. The command is implemented in another component but when a gap is found it 
triggers the event ChannelMon.idleDetect(), which is implemented in 
MicaHighSpeedRadioM.  
 
Process of ChannelMon.idleDetect() 
1. If state is SEND_WAITING, do the following; 
2. Set variable rx_count = 0 
3. Set send_state = IDLE_STATE 
4. Set state = TRANSMITTING_START 
5. Call SpiByteFifo.send() to send the first byte of the preamble 
 
The command SpiByteFifo.send() accepts one byte input and sends it to the radio. The 
command is implemented in another component but when it completes its task it triggers the 
event SpiByteFifo.dataReady() which is implemented in 
MicaHighSpeedRadioM. That means that the event SpiByteFifo.dataReady(), 
described in the following lines, will be triggered a number of times, at least once after 
SpiByteFifo.dataReady() is called and concluded. 
 
Transmission process of SpiByteFifo.dataReady() 
1. If state is TRANSMITTING_START, follow the steps to send the preamble 
a. Send the next preamble byte by calling SpiByte.Fifo.send() 
                                                 
18
 Normal packets do not need a destination address; their destination is the base station. However, they do need 
a source address. SecRose sends the source address in place of the destination address. Swaping of address in the 
packet‟s data struct simplifies the code. 
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b. Note how many preamble bytes have been sent 
c. If all preamble bytes have been sent 
i. set next_data to the first byte of send_ptr 
ii. Set state = TRANSMITTING 
2. If state = TRANSMITTING, follow the steps to send the packet‟s bytes 
a. Send next_data by calling SpiByte.Fifo.send(next_data) 
b. If there is more bytes, set next_data to the next packet byte19 
c. Otherwise set state = SENDING_STRENGTH_PULSE 
3. If state = SENDING_STRENGTH_PULSE and follow the steps to send the signal 
strength bytes: 
a. Send two signal strength bytes one-by-one by setting them to next_data and 
then calling SpiByte.Fifo.send(next_data) 
b. Set state = IDLE_STATE 
c. Call SpiByteFifo.idle() 
d. Call ChannelMon.startSymbolSearch()20 
e. Trigger event packetSent() 
 
Process of event packetSend() 
1. Set send_State = IDLE and state = IDLE 
2. Inform higher layers about the packet send event 
3. Call rose.counterHandle(send_ptr, PKT_SENT) 
 
Incoming packet 
When at its normal state, the radio component listens to the channel for packet preambles. 
When a preambles is found it triggers the event ChannelMon.startSymDetect(), 
which is implemented in MicaHighSpeedRadioM.  
 
Process of ChannelMon.startSymDetect() 
1. Set state = RX_STATE 
2. Reset temporary variables to default values 
 
                                                 
19
 Uses the information about the total size of packet‟s fields, as determined in step 7 of Send.send(). 
20
 The command ChannelMon.startSymbolSearch() returns the radio component to its normal state. 
SecRose‟s control flow continues at event packetSent(). 
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At this stage, SecRose is ready to receive the bytes of the packet. All bytes “appear” in the 
MicaHighSpeedRadioM component as triggers of the SpiByteFifo.dataReady () 
event. The reception and triggering is implemented in the SpiByteFifo component. 
SpiByteFifo.dataReady() in the MicaHighSpeedRadioM component is triggered 
every 8 radio bits.  
 
The reception process of SpiByteFifo.dataReady() is executed when state = 
RX_STATE and it is as follows; 
 
Reception process of SpiByteFifo.dataReady() 
1. If this is the first byte then 
a. Place the received byte at the beginning of rec_ptr 
b. Call rose.readFlag() to determine the flag 
c. Call rose.fixFlag() to extract the flag 
d. Determine packet‟s faith; accept/forward/reject21 
e. Determine the exact packet fields size note for later use 
2. If it was not the first byte and not the last byte 
a. Determine the location that the next received byte should be placed in rec_ptr 
and place it there
22
 
b. Place the received byte at the next location 
3. If it was the last byte, initially execute the following tasks  
a. For normal packets, swap destination address with source address. Then set source 
address to the address of the base station 
b. For broadcast packets, set destination address to the broadcast address. Then set 
source address to the address of the base station 
c. For acknowledgement packets 
i. Call rose.counterHandle() with action ACK_TEST_START to 
check the validity of the acknowledgement 
ii. Set state = REC_STRENGTH_PULSE 
iii. exit 
                                                 
21
 The rest of the process assumes that the packet is accepted. SecRose des not currently implement forwarding 
or rejection. 
22
 Uses the information about the exact fields size, noted in step 1a. 
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4. Then execute the decryption and validation tasks (for all packets except 
acknowledgements) 
a. Create a copy of the packet as received 
b. Decrypt packet 
c. Call rose.validateMAC() to validate the MAC 
d. If the MAC is not valid, do the following 
i. Call rose.counterHandle() with action CNT_REVERT to revert 
the counter to the backup counter 
ii. Decrypt the copy of the packet 
iii. Call rose.validateMAC() to validate the copy of the packet with the 
new counter 
iv. If mac_valid is now TRUE then keep the copy of packet and discard the 
original 
e. If the MAC was valid then note it down in order to send an ACK later 
5. Set state = REC_STRENGTH_PULSE 
 
Process of SpiByteFifo.dataReady() when state = REC_STRENGTH_PULSE 
1. Trigger event packetReceived() 
2. Set state = RX_DONE_STATE 
3. Call SpiByteFifo.idle() to set radio state to idle 
 
Process of packetReceived() 
1. Call ChannelMon.startSymbolSearch()23 
2. If the received packet was an acknowledgement packet then do nothing 
3. Otherwise do the following 
a. Inform higher layers about a packet reception event 
b. Call rose.counterHandle() with action PKT_RECV 
c. Create an acknowledgement packet, call TrueSend.send() to send it  
                                                 
23
 The command ChannelMon.startSymbolSearch() returns the radio component to its normal state. SecRose‟s 
control flow continues at event packetSent(). 
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Chapter 6 
 
Evaluation 
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6. Evaluation 
This chapter evaluates the security provision and the performance of SecRose while it 
compares it with the existing proposals. 
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6.1 Evaluation of security provision 
This subsection presents attacks on potential vulnerabilities of each security requirement and 
documented methods of conducting them. The operation and effectiveness of the provided 
countermeasures is then discussed and evaluated.  
 
This subsection begins by discussing how the threat model is perceived in SecRose and how it 
relates to the requirements for confidentiality, authentication and freshness. Possible attacks 
are also discussed. 
 
The provision for each of the requirements is analysed in subsection 6.1.2-6.1.4 while 6.1.5 
discusses the additional security requirements. The correctness of the implementation of 
XXTEA and CMAC is also demonstrated briefly. 
 
The subsection concludes with an evaluation of SecRose against other solutions. 
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6.1.1 The threat model again 
 
This subsection relates the threat model, presented in the literature review, with SecRose‟s 
basic security requirements of confidentiality, authentication and integrity, freshness and 
availability. Vulnerabilities to each of the basic security requirements lead to a number of 
attacks documented in the literature but the attack nomenclature is inconsistent. In order to 
preserve consistency, this document refers to attacks by the name of the requirement in which 
they exploit vulnerability.  
 
This subsection gives a short description of the attacks on the threat model, explains how they 
are perceived by SecRose‟s security requirements and relates them to the relevant 
requirement. The alternative attack names for known attacks in each sub-subsection are 
provided where applicable. 
 
Attacks on confidentiality 
Attacks on confidentiality, also known as eavesdropping attacks, lead to revelation of the 
plaintext input, usually after retrieval of the encryption key. Attacks on confidentiality that 
target the computational complexity of the encryption function are generally known as 
cryptanalytic attacks. 
 
Resilience against cryptanalytic attacks is provided by the theoretical level of complexity, 
which is directly related with the length of the key, and by the mathematical perfection of the 
cipher. Every cryptanalytic attack is associated with some level of difficulty. The aim of the 
cipher is to provide an infeasible level of computationally difficulty, which should be greater 
than the perceived computational ability of the attackers  [3].  
 
Known-ciphertext attacks 
The attacker has access to the encrypted output of the cipher but the input, key and plaintext, 
are unknown. The attack aims to reveal the plaintexts, the key or partial information about the 
plaintexts. This attack is rarely used nowadays as modern ciphers are specifically designed 
against it, making it exceptionally difficult to conduct the attack. 
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Known-plaintext attacks 
This is a widely used attack but its possibility on sensor networks depends on the kind of 
application that runs. The attacker must have knowledge of both the encrypted output and the 
plaintext input, while the key is the only unknown variable. The attacker then conducts an 
exhaustive search of all the keys in order to find the one that created this combination of 
input/output. The complexity of this attack is equal with the length of the key. The size of the 
key affects the number of required matching attempts and therefore the required time before 
the attack concludes. This attack is popularly known as the brute-force attack. 
 
Chosen-plaintext attacks 
The attacker can “query” the cipher with specific ciphertexts of their own choice and obtain a 
number of outputs that relate to the chosen inputs. If the cipher is not mathematically perfect, 
the attacker might then utilise some computation in order to obtain information about the key, 
reducing the theoretical complexity of the cipher. If the attack can be conducted with 
relatively low computation, then the attack is successful for the attacker and the cipher is 
considered insecure. 
 
Related-key attacks 
This attack requires the attacker to obtain two or more ciphertexts encrypted with different 
keys that are unknown to the attacker but share a known mathematical relationship. Similar to 
the Chosen-plaintext attack, the attacker might exploit weaknesses of insecure ciphers to 
reduce the theoretical complexity and reveal the used keys in a relatively easy way. 
 
Semantic security 
This attack requires the attacker to obtain enough ciphertexts that can be related with known 
or predicted plaintexts. After an initial observation period, the attacker can deduce plaintexts, 
or information about them, without knowing anything else than the resulting ciphertexts.  
 
The attack is possible when there is a predictable relation between all given plaintexts and all 
resulting ciphertexts [29]. The use of a symmetric cipher normally enables this attack, unless 
the system introduces a non-constraint bit of information to the ciphertext.  
 
Advantages of this attack include that it does not require any significant computational effort 
to be conducted and does not allow the security system to detect that it is under attack.  
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Semantic security is considered important to Public-Key Cryptography but there is no 
documentation regarding its importance in sensor networks or in other symmetric-key 
cryptosystems. The usefulness and feasibility of such attacks in sensor networks is highly 
dependent on the level of variability on the data that the sensor network reports. 
 
Attacks on authentication and integrity 
Attacks on the authentication and integrity of the system aim to forge malicious data or nodes 
that are then inserted into the network. If a system is vulnerable to these attacks, then a 
number of routing attacks is possible and under certain conditions, the cryptographic key 
might be revealed. The system is protected by the time complexity required for these attacks 
to happen. The time complexity property refers to the number of randomised attempts 
required before the attack succeeds. The computational complexity is insignificant if the 
attacker is equipped with a modern computer. 
 
The resource-constrained nature of sensor networks allows a relatively small number of data 
that to be transferred before depleting the energy resources. In addition, data can only be 
transferred at a relatively slow rate. Protection that requires resources or time that exceeds the 
capabilities of WSNs is considered sufficient. Injection attacks are dangerous for any security 
mechanism and are particularly dangerous for the key management component of SecRose.  
 
A successful packet injection or alteration attack allows the attacker to manipulate the routing 
protocol enabling a number of routing attacks. Currently documented attacks are; selective 
forwarding, sinkhole, black hole, wormhole and Sybil attacks [76]. In addition, the attacker 
might force illegitimate messages to be delivered to the base station. 
 
An acknowledgement injection attack allows for acknowledgement spoofing; making a node 
appear healthy while it might have been destroyed or compromised [76]. In addition, due to 
the way SecRose‟s key management operates, such attack would lead to key de-
synchronisation and thus communication failure. 
 
An attacker who is capable of systematic packet injection has essentially managed to 
represent herself as a node injected in the network. Such an achievement enables the 
wormhole attack and practically renders the cryptographic functionality meaningless. In 
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addition, if the attacker can record all possible keys that allow packet injection, she might be 
able to work out the initial key. 
 
Specifically for SecRose, packet injection attacks might lead to failure of subsequent 
communication. If an attacker manages to inject a broadcast packet then the receivers will 
change the key to a new value, which might be unknown to the base station. Therefore, the 
pair key will be de-synchronised and the receivers will be unable to receive further, 
legitimate, broadcast packets. The same problem is possible for normal or long packets but 
only if two or more packets are injected subsequently. Otherwise, the failover mechanism of 
the key management component can desynchronise the pair. 
 
Attacks on freshness 
These attacks involve recording of legitimate valid packets and replaying them later, at a time 
convenient to the attacker. The attacks aim to report falsified information to the base station 
or to fiddle with the routing information.  
 
Apart from the routing attacks described in [76], there are no other documented attacks that 
exploit freshness vulnerabilities. However, the importance of preventing information replays 
is considered in every proposed data-transportation layer security mechanism [2, 21, 29-30].  
 
A typical attack is described with an attacker who is able to replay packets with a powerful 
transmitter and has recorded the network‟s activity under “normal” conditions. When the 
sensor networks‟ sensing capabilities are truly needed, the attacker replays the “normal” pre-
recorded packets with a strong transmitter, which is able to shadow the node‟s transmitters in 
order to prevent the network from reporting the real event. 
 
There are two kinds of freshness. Weak freshness guarantees that messages are not replays but 
does not give any information on the time elapsed between transmission and reception of a 
packet. Strong freshness includes time information and it can confidently guarantee not only 
that a packet is not a replay but also that it is actually a recently transmitted packet.  
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6.1.2 Provision of confidentiality 
 
Provision for known-plaintext attacks  
Protection against a known-plaintext attack relies on the theoretical complexity provided by 
the cipher, which is directly related with the length of the key. The current agreed key length 
that would provide sufficient security is at least 128-bits [72]. This is also considered secure 
by references [4, 71]. SecRose utilises XXTEA to provide keys of that length. Longer keys 
would currently be an unnecessary waste of resources in a resource-deprived sensor network.  
 
The 128-bits key length provides enough computational complexity to retain the secrecy of 
the encrypted data for the next 50-100 years [4, 72]. In addition, the cipher can operate in 
DES-style modes, allowing for longer keys to be used in the future if required, in similar 
fashion as in Triple-DES [129]. 
 
Provision for other cryptanalytic attacks 
Other, more sophisticated, cryptanalytic attacks involve exploitation of fundamental cipher 
vulnerability in order to decrease the computational complexity of exhaustive search attacks. 
The mathematical integrity of the cryptographic cipher is responsible for protection against 
these attacks. 
 
As a modern cipher, XXTEA is considered resilient against chosen-plaintext, known-
ciphertext and related-key attacks. Even if these attacks are allowed by the rest of the SecRose 
system, the cipher does not have any known mathematical imperfections that would allow 
reduction of the computational complexity and thus are meaningless. Additional discussion on 
the security of the cipher follows. 
 
Security of TEA 
The security of a cipher against cryptanalytic attacks is a theoretical task, which cannot be 
tested practically. The security of TEA and its successors has been analysed thoroughly, since 
it was first published in 1995. Various problems were found with the first TEA and were 
promptly corrected. XTEA and XXTEA are currently considered secure. A summary of all 
the cryptanalytic work in XTEA and XXTEA is presented in reference [129]. 
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All TEA variants demonstrate strong diffusion and confusion and they are surprisingly simple 
[129]. In addition, it was demonstrated that TEA resists various cryptanalytic attacks and 
differential cryptanalysis. The simplicity of the algorithm itself adds credibility to the cipher, 
since it is easy to analyse it mathematically.  
 
Provision of semantic security 
Semantic security is provided in SecRose by the frequent key changes introduced by the key 
management component. Even if the same ciphertext is input for two communications, a 
different key will be used and that change will be reflected in the resulting ciphertext. 
 
However, semantic security is provided only if the previous communication was successful 
and an acknowledgement was received. An attacker who wishes to attack the semantic 
security of SecRose will initially have to block acknowledgements. This pre-requisite allows 
SecRose to detect that an attacker is present, depriving the attacker from the ability to remain 
undetected. Therefore, the attack is available to attackers but detectable and less significant. 
 
Note that the above attack is not possible for broadcast packets, which always advance their 
counter after every transmission. SecRose can transmit up to 2
32
 broadcast packets without 
reuse of the same key. According to calculations, which will be discussed in 6.1.3, this 
amount of packets cannot be transmitted in typical sensor networks and therefore broadcast 
packets benefit from permanent and unconditional semantic security.  
 
SecRose already keeps track of how many acknowledgements are in waiting, and this 
information could be passed to applications that can utilise it, via the packet‟s data struct. 
However, the facility to report on missing acknowledgements is not implemented in the 
proof-of-concept demonstration.  
 
SecRose has chosen to provide semantic security via a mechanism that differs from the other 
proposals, which utilise an Initialisation Vector (IV). This choice is further discussed in 6.1.6. 
 
Time complexity attack on TEA 
A 2010 publication, in a non-scientific, non-peer-reviewed medium, claims to have reduced 
the time complexity of XXTEA under certain conditions [137]. The attack is a chosen-
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plaintext attack requiring 2
35
 queries when applied to 6 XXTEA cycles. The time complexity 
increases to 2
59
 chosen plaintexts for 32 XXTEA cycles.  
 
Our thesis regarding this claim is that SecRose is not vulnerable to these attacks, since the 
time complexity is always greater than the time complexity introduced by the size of a 
packet‟s MAC. As will be discussed in 6.1.2, it is impossible for an attacker to make 235 
queries on a typical sensor network. 
 
Prof. S.J. Shepherd, the author of [129] and unofficial maintainer of TEA, and has dismissed 
the validity of this attack in a personal communication. Prof. Shepherd has repeated the views 
expressed on his paper; XXTEA is safe for all practical purposes. 
 
Relation with requirements 
The requirement of 128-bit long security has been met by utilising a secure cipher, which 
natively supports this key length.  
 
Correctness of the implementation  
Due to the asymptotic nature of exhaustive searches, the operation of the cipher cannot be 
tested conclusively. However, some experiments have been conducted to test the cipher. The 
experiment is set up so that node 0 is the attacker and node 1 is the node under attack. Node 0 
knows part of the key and attempts to find the rest of the key by sequentially searching all 
combinations. 
 
For the first experiment, the following key is loaded to node 0 (in hex format): 
 
32A3D709 2A83F848 D2F6F4B3 AB211500 
 
This is a randomly selected value except that the last 8 bits are set to zero. Node 0 will 
pretend to be the base station and attempt to send broadcast packets to node 1. The node 
increases its key monotonically. Node 1 is loaded with the following key: 
 
32A3D709 2A83F848 D2F6F4B3 AB2115FF 
 
This is the same value except that the last 8 bits are set to one. Node 1 should reject the first 
255 packets and accept the 256
th
. Otherwise, the cipher has produced the same ciphertext 
from a combination of different plaintext and key. Discovery of the key will be tested by 
determining when a matching MAC is found and the packet is accepted. 
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The test was run on a modified code that would send the packets and (a) report when a MAC 
is found, (b) report the number of sent packets, (c) report the used key and (d) exit the 
simulation. The simulator outputted the following: 
 
 
 
Evidently, all the objectives of the experiment were satisfied but further experiments were run 
to validate that the findings are not a product of chance. The experiment was repeated by 
using the non-randomly set bits at the ends of the remaining 32-bit chunks of the key: 
 
Experiment Node Key 
2 0 32A3D700 2A83F848 D2F6F4B3 AB211509 
1 32A3D7FF 2A83F848 D2F6F4B3 AB211509 
3 0 32A3D709 2A83F800 D2F6F4B3 AB211548 
1 32A3D709 2A83F8FF D2F6F4B3 AB211548 
4 0 32A3D709 2A83F848 D2F6F400 AB2115B3 
1 32A3D709 2A83F848 D2F6F4FF AB2115B3 
 
Node 0 was set to increase the relevant part of the key monotonically, for example, in attempt 
2 it increased 2A83F800 to 2A83F801, then 2A83F802 and so on. After running the 
experiments, the simulator produced the following output: 
 
Experiment 2 
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Experiment 3 
 
 
 
Experiment 4 
 
 
 
It is observed that Node 0 was always able to find the expected key after exactly 256 tries and 
remained completely consistent with the theoretical expectations.  
 
 
6.1.3 Provision of authentication and integrity 
 
Conditions for packet injection attacks 
In order to inject normal, broadcast or long packets on the network, an attacker needs to 
guess a valid MAC, associated with the packet content. Attackers are able to attempt that by 
transmitting a packet with a seemingly random MAC and hope that the MAC was validated 
by chance. The theoretical probability of this happening is discussed. 
 
The specified SecRose MAC length is 4 bytes and there are therefore 2
32
 possible MACs. 
Therefore, any MAC, even those that are randomly generated, would have a 1 in 2
32
 chance of 
matching a MAC that is generated by actual input and proper procedure. When this happens, a 
MAC collision is found. On average, a collision is found after n = 2
31
 packets are exchanged. 
 
SecRose can protect a network as long as this number of packets is not received. This level of 
complexity is selected in accordance with the requirements for the authentication component. 
The requirements state that the mechanism has to provide complex enough authentication to 
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render such attacks useless by forcing them to deplete energy resources in order to be 
successful. As will be discussed, reception of 2
31
 packets would require greater resources than 
what is available on sensor nodes, therefore making the node to cease to operate due to lack of 
available energy. 
 
The utilisation of available energy resources needs to be calculated in practical terms in order 
to determine if the system can satisfy the security requirements. Assuming total energy E is 
required to carry out an attack on a node with capacity C, the system is secure as long as E > 
C. Failing to meet this condition means that the node‟s energy resource is drained out before 
the attack concludes.  
 
Assuming packet length L, energy e is required to transfer one bit and total packets n need to 
be transferred, then the required total energy E to receive the packets is E = L*e*n. Therefore, 
the system is secure as long as [E = L*e*n] > C. 
 
It has already been discussed that n = 2
31
. The real-terms value of the other variables can also 
be found in the literature or drawn by SecRose‟s design: 
 SecRose‟s minimum packet size L = 152b24 
 the required reception energy e = 2028nJ/b (nanojoules per bit) [69]  
 the node is provided25 with capacity C = 30,000J (joules) [138] 
Under these conditions, E = L*e*n = 152 * (2028 * 10
-9
) * (2
31
) = 661974J, which is about 22 
times than C and therefore the system is considered secure. Further calculations indicate that 
the energy resources will be depleted after about 2
26.5
 packets are transmitted. The above 
calculations do not account for the computational energy that is additionally required to 
validate the packets. 
 
In addition to energy constraints, there are time constraints as well. For example, a MICA2 
node communicates at 38.4Kbps and it can therefore receive about 253 packets per second. 
Without accounting for medium access delays, the 2
31
 packets required before a collision is 
found would take 98 days.  
 
                                                 
24
 As defined in SecRose‟s design, the minimum length of broadcast packet with 0 data payload is 7 bytes. There 
is also a 12-byte preamble defined in TinyOS for every packet. A total of 19B = 152b. 
25
 There is little published information on the exact capacity of commercial batteries. The 30,000 Joule figure for 
two AA batteries is a very generous estimation derived by a number of sources in addition to the referred article. 
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Therefore, even if unlimited power supply is assumed, the 4-Byte MAC can still provide 
some protection. However, the current configuration of SecRose, including the length of the 
MAC, is optimised for nodes with a limited power source. If a network enjoys unlimited 
energy resources then SecRose can be configured to use a 5-Byte MAC, which would 
increase time complexity by a factor of 256, resulting in time complexity of 68 years before a 
packet is injected. 
 
A diagram of how a packet injection attack might be conducted is given in Figure 20. The 
attack begins with the attacker sending a packet containing a MAC calculated using the key 
K1. As this will probably fail, the attacker continues sending packets with MACs calculated 
with various keys, until a match is found with Kn. In this case, the receiver will update its 
active counter. Note that even MACs that are selected randomly could in fact have been 
calculated using a key. Therefore, the diagram notates all MAC as to have been calculated 
with some hypothetical key. 
 
 
Figure 20: sequence diagram of packet injection attacks.  
The attacker keeps sending invalid packets until packet encrypted with Kn is sent. 
 
Conditions for acknowledgement injection attacks 
SecRose‟s authenticated acknowledgements are protected by theoretical confidence 
guarantees and practical limitations. Acknowledgements contain two authenticated bytes and 
therefore there are 2
16
 distinct values. Forged acknowledgements can cause key de-
synchronisation and prevent subsequent communications. Since the 2
16
 complexity is not an 
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asymptotic value, SecRose does not rely on the complexity and it sets a limit to how many 
invalid acknowledgements it can receive. 
 
An attacker would be able to transmit all distinct 2
16
 acknowledgements without consuming 
significant energy. However, a sender can only receive as many invalid acknowledgements as 
many packets it has sent and waits for an acknowledgement. Therefore, the sender can receive 
a theoretical maximum of 10 acknowledgements, as this is the maximum size of the 
acknowledgement table
26
. 
 
This limitation prevents the attacker from managing key de-synchronisation using brute force 
but a chance of achieving the attack remains. For a 2
16
 complexity and a sender that is 
constantly expecting 10 acknowledgements, the attacker has a 10 in 2
16
 chance of success 
when she sends random acknowledgement values after a communication. Therefore, de-
synchronisation will occur after 3276.8 forged acknowledgements. 
 
In practice, the chance is even smaller because the acknowledgement table is rarely expected 
to reach its maximum size of 10. The actual size depends on various factors but it can be 
calculated that as long as the senders do not send more than one packet every second then the 
size of the table would remain 1. 
 
Conditions for node injection by packet injection 
Most of the documented routing attacks that require what is described as “node injection” 
could be conducted by just injecting one authorised packet on the network. The actual 
feasibility depends on the routing protocol and its resiliency. Therefore, SecRose‟s level of 
resiliency to node injection attacks equals the 1 in 2
32
 chance of managing a packet injection. 
 
Conditions for key de-synchronisation by sequential packet injection 
SecRose is susceptible to key de-synchronisation and communication disruption should the 
attacker manage to inject two packets with the same destination on the network. The worst-
case scenario is when these packets are broadcast packets, where the whole network will be 
affected. 
 
                                                 
26
 Discussed in 4.1.4. 
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Such an attack can happen with half the probability of injecting one packet, since any packet 
has the same probability, two packets are required and there is hypothetically no restriction on 
how many attempts are made. Therefore, an attacker has, on average, 1 in 2
32
 + 2
32
 = 2
33 
chance of succeeding on this attack. This value is asymptotic enough to claim that the level of 
provided security is acceptable.  
 
Such attack would require double the time or double the energy to succeed and upon 
completion would only affect the packet type used to launch it.  
 
Conditions for key revelation 
An attacker might conduct a coordinated attack, which aims to find and document all possible 
MAC collisions and the hypothetical keys that created them. The chances of succeeding are 
unrealistically low but this attack is discussed for completeness. 
 
To conduct this attack, the attacker has to know when a packet was successfully injected. 
Therefore, the attack cannot be conducted with a burst of broadcast packets transmitted 
without time interval. The attack has to allow nodes to respond and send an 
acknowledgement. According to the TinyOS specification, nodes respond with a medium 
access delay, which is always greater than 100 msec. Even if the actual transmission did not 
take any time at all, the attacker would only be able to send 10 packets per second. At this 
rate, it would take 6.8 years to transmit 2
31
 packets and manage to inject one. 
 
Even if this is not a problem, the attack cannot conclude until a great many packets are 
injected. Since a MAC is 32 bits and the minimum acknowledged packet is 72 bits, there are 
2
72
/2
32
 = 10
12
 possible collisions. The attacker has to collect about half of them to reach the 
average number of collected collisions before the initial key can be revealed. Under these 
conditions, it is assumed that SecRose is not vulnerable to this attack. 
 
Relation with requirements 
SecRose meets the authentication and integrity requirements. Indirect authentication was not 
needed as all packet fields are directly authenticated via the MAC. 
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Correctness of the implementation  
The protection against packet injection such attacks relies on the Authentication component, 
which in turn relies on the CMAC function and the encryption function. If the encryption 
function does not evenly diffuse key and plaintext then the CMAC function will not  provide 
a homogenous output and thus the probability of an attacker finding a valid MAC by testing 
random values will be greater than the theoretical 1 in 2
32
 that SecRose should provide. 
 
The full test of the MAC collision probability requires exchange of at least 2
31
 packets. Due to 
the limitations of medium access control, the full range of this experiment cannot be run by 
exchanging packets, as it would require 25 days to conclude. A number of smaller 
experiments were run to test the operation of both the CMAC and XXTEA simultaneously. 
The used keys were: 
 
Node 0: 32A3D709 2A83F848 D2F6F4B3 AB000000 
Node 1: 32A3D709 2A83F848 D2F6F4B3 ABffffFF 
 
Using these keys, the experiment should exchange 2
20
 packets. The experiment was run 
successfully and the expected output was produced. The output was: 
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6.1.4 Provision of freshness 
 
Operation of the freshness provision 
Freshness is provided to SecRose via the key management component. Each time a packet is 
successfully transmitted, the cryptographic state chances and attackers cannot learn any 
information about the new state, unless some other attack was successful. 
 
The new state designates a new “era” and the first packet that is exchanged in this era cannot 
be a replay of a packet exchanged in a previous era. If that packet was received in the past, 
then the state would have changed back then and the current era would not be operative under 
this state. 
 
The key change and state transition is illustrated in Figure 21. The attack begins with the 
attacker recoding a valid packet. The system progresses to a new era as the new key K2 is 
stored and will be used for the next communication. Later, the attacker replays the packet. 
This packet is not valid anymore since it was generated with K1 but now the received has 
advanced to K2. 
 
 
Figure 21: key changes and prevention of packet replays 
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Conditions and levels of provided freshness 
The freshness mechanism provides weak freshness upon the condition that the last packet was 
successfully exchanged and the key was properly advanced. Therefore, various packets might 
enjoy different levels of freshness. This provision is in accordance with the requirements. The 
advantages and disadvantages of the SecRose solution against other proposals will be further 
evaluated 6.1.8. 
 
Definitely fresh 
The first packet exchanged after a successful communication is weakly fresh, with probability 
of error equal to the probability of packet injection
27
, which equals 1 in 2
32
. This is equal to 
the probability of packet injection, since a replayed packet in these cases is no different from a 
randomly generated packet in a packet injection attempt. 
 
Broadcast packets are always definitely fresh, since they do not trigger acknowledgements 
and the broadcast key is always advanced. Effectively, each broadcast packet is the only 
packet that can be transmitted on a given era. 
 
Unknown status 
Subsequent packets transmitted in the same era, prior to key advancement have an 
undetermined freshness status. SecRose might loosely guarantee that these packets belong to 
this era but the system cannot tell if these packets are replays from the same era. Depending 
on the application, this might or may not introduce important consequences. 
 
Regarding strong freshness 
Inclusion of time information on a packet in order to provide strong freshness is not a 
requirement of SecRose and it is deemed an unnecessary resource-consuming feature since it 
is not required by every sensor network application
28
. Applications that require strong 
freshness are able to include timing information on their packet and rely on the rest of the 
security properties of SecRose for authenticated and confident delivery of this information. 
  
                                                 
27
 As discussed in 6.1.3. 
28
 As discussed in 2.2.1. 
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Relation with requirements 
SecRose meets the freshness requirements as expected. Packets can be determined as 
confidently fresh or undetermined. In addition, packets can be associated with an era. 
 
 
6.1.5 Additional security provision 
 
Destructive attacks 
Protection against destructive DoS attacks is out of the scope of SecRose and is therefore not 
provided. The following is discussed for completeness. These attacks have been discussed and 
addressed by other security research groups [109-110]. The typical sensor networks, which 
SecRose aims to operate at, are probably not suited to respond to such attacks and the 
SecRose mechanism is helpless in detecting or avoiding them. 
 
Sensor networks are particularly vulnerable to radio jamming Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. 
An attacker can use a powerful transmitter, which is able to transmit at much higher energies 
than a sensor node. Such transmitter is neither difficult to make nor expensive.  
 
In addition to radio attacks, the SecRose mechanism cannot detect or protect a sensor network 
from node destruction attacks. 
 
Asymmetric DoS attacks 
The requirements state that SecRose should not enable intelligent DoS attacks that an attacker 
can execute with little effort but would cause an asymmetrically great response from the 
sensor network, forcing it to consume high amounts of energy. To the best of our knowledge, 
this requirement has been met. 
 
Transmission of a small, randomly generated, invalid packet does cause the receiver to 
undergo the effort of MAC validation twice, but this response is essential to the correct 
operation of the failover mechanism and it is not a greatly asymmetric effort. Nevertheless, 
the completion of double validation consumes less time than the time required transmitting 
the malicious packet
29
. 
                                                 
29
 Further discussed and supported in 6.2.3. 
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The system design appears to have no loops. The failover mechanism is not repeating any 
packets and there are no acknowledgements to the acknowledgement. If such features were 
present, they might have allowed a malformed packet to cause an infinite loop on the system.  
 
Packets with incorrect length do not have an adverse effect on the energy consumed by the 
receiver either. Firstly, input validation is a task that should be done at code level. Secondly, 
the flag-based packet management system does not allow packets of greater than 64-bytes 
payload to be received. Any packet with a malicious 64-byte data payload will be perceived 
as a broadcast packet with 1-byte payload. Similarly, packets with 129-bytes payload are 
perceived as long packets with 1-byte payload. Finally, packets with 193 bytes payload cause 
even less energy damage as they are perceived as acknowledgement packets with 0-payload 
and their processing does not involve any encryption operation. 
 
Points of failure 
SecRose‟s design does not designate any node to be of additional importance to the sensor 
network and it therefore does not introduce any single points of hardware failure. Note that 
the base station of any sensor network is inherently a single point of failure [81] and this 
status is not affected by SecRose. 
 
In addition, SecRose does not appear to have any particular weakness in the design. It might 
be true that acknowledgement forging is easier than packet injection, but this attack is also the 
easiest to prevent as well. 
 
Node compromise 
Hardware security has been discussed in 2.3.2 and 2.3.5. The subsections conclude that 
SecRose should not aim to provide resiliency against node compromise attacks. Such research 
is primarily directed to electronic microprocessors and is not a research problem of our area. 
Therefore, SecRose should not be considered as a mechanism that provides protection against 
attack to hardware security. 
 
However, SecRose includes a key management mechanism, which demonstrates potential to 
prevent node compromise attacks in the future. Currently, each node keeps the initial key in 
order to be able to initiate creation of new pairs. An attacker who gains access to the initial 
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key can initiate communication with the whole network and thus the system is vulnerable to 
node compromise.  
 
A future version of SecRose, or an application built for SecRose, may implement a 
mechanism that would not require a pre-loaded initial key to be present on memory at all 
times. The existing control packet infrastructure
30
 may support the introduction of this feature. 
Combined with the existing variable cryptographic state, the feature would create 
functionality that is similar to other key distributions schemes [23]. 
 
Security of the changing keys 
It is stressed that the key management mechanism of SecRose does not provide additional 
cryptographic complexity, other than 128-bit key length provided by the cipher. Since the 
derived keys are mathematically related with their predecessors, ability to reveal one key 
grants access to all derived keys as well. For this reason, the computational complexity is not 
based in the changing keys feature. 
 
Guaranteed deliveries 
SecRose offers an authenticated guarantee of packet delivery via the authenticated 
acknowledgements. The guarantee is provided to the sender with 10 in 2
16
 probability of 
error. However, lack of acknowledgement does not necessarily mean lack of delivery. An 
acknowledgement might have simply been lost while in transit. Appropriate utilisation of this 
feature, e.g. retransmission of seemingly lost packets, is the responsibility of the application. 
This behaviour is backwards compatible with TinyOS. 
 
Security of broadcast packets 
Secure broadcast communication is very difficult to achieve efficiently in sensor networks 
[29]. Although SecRose provides secure broadcast packets, they are vulnerable to a DoS 
attack that might render them inoperable. The attack involves blocking some of the broadcast 
packets, which causes key de-synchronisation, and breakdown of further broadcast packets. 
Unfortunately, SecRose cannot guarantee the reliability of broadcast communication without 
compromising efficiency. 
 
                                                 
30
 Discussed in 4.1.1. 
160 
 
On the other hand, the provided level of security in broadcast packets is higher than in both 
normal and long packets. Since there are no acknowledgements, the base station will always 
advance the key after each transmission. This method guarantees unconditional semantic 
security, a sub-property of confidentiality, and weak freshness as it is not subject to the 
conditions introduced by the blocking of acknowledgements. 
 
As a conclusion, it is guaranteed that the nodes will receive a broadcast packet through secure 
transmission, but the base station is not guaranteed that its broadcast attempt will reach the 
nodes. The topic will be further discussed and compared with other proposals in the next 
subsection. 
 
This behaviour does not violate the availability requirements of SecRose and is consistent 
with other broadcast communication methods found in traditional computer networks, for 
example in the ARP [139] and ICMP [140] protocols. In these and many other cases, 
broadcast communication is a “cheap” mechanism of unreliably addressing multiple network 
nodes. 
 
Relation with requirements 
SecRose unconditionally meets the additional security requirements.   
 
 
6.1.6 Evaluation against other solutions 
 
Candidate alternatives 
This subsection evaluates and compares the security of SecRose against the similar TinySec, 
MiniSec and SenSec. The 802.15.4 (ZigBee) [10, 105] and ContikiSec [93], are also 
discussed despite the fact that they are intended for high-end sensor nodes and therefore 
dissimilar to SecRose. The more recent proposal, FlexiSec [94]  is critically evaluated as well. 
The SPINS [29] proposal was not accounted for since it seems partially complete and  
abandoned by its creators. 
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Confidentiality: ciphers and key lengths 
As discussed, the confidentiality provision is directly related with the length of the key and 
the mathematical integrity of the cryptographic cipher. The systems under evaluation use 
either XXTEA or SkipJack. Both ciphers are considered secure if used properly [129, 141]. 
 
In particular, the best-known cryptanalysis of SkipJack is only computationally beneficial if 
the cipher is used with 31 rounds. However, the design of SkipJack recommends a minimum 
of 32 rounds to be used and therefore the imperfection does not affect real-world proper 
implementations. It is certain that TinySec uses SkipJack with 32 rounds. However, it is only 
assumed that the same is true for MiniSec and SenSec as well. On the other hand, there is no 
known and peer-reviewed cryptanalysis on XXTEA. The only known possible vulnerability is 
yet to be validated. 
 
Therefore, the essential differences in regards with provision of confidentiality lie in the 
selected key length. SecRose uses a 128-bit key, which is natively supported by the cipher. 
TinySec and MiniSec use SkipJack in its 80-bit native mode while SenSec uses key whitening 
to operate SkipJack with a non-native key length, which is variable between 80-144 bits.  
 
When whitening is used, the effective complexity is 2
n+(m/p)
, where n is the key length, m is 
the block size and p is the number of known plaintexts [4]. Under these conditions, an 
attacker who acquires one plaintext in order to conduct a known-plaintext attack would face 
an effective computational complexity of 2
144
. However, this complexity is drastically 
reduced if the attacker can obtain more than one plaintexts. For example, if 10 plaintexts are 
known, then SenSec can only enjoy a complexity of 2
86.4
. The effective complexity reduction 
is less drastic after this point. 
 
In addition to the complexity problem, whitening, and especially its use with SkipJack is not a 
well-documented technique and therefore it is open to potential cryptanalytic attacks. If 
proven secure, it can also be applied to SecRose and increase its complexity to a variable 128-
160 bits. 
 
SecRose is the only protocol that provides an unconditional solution that adequately satisfies 
modern complexity requirements. For these reasons, SecRose provides better confidentiality 
than the alternative proposals.  
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Confidentiality: semantic security 
The alternative proposals utilise an Initialisation Vector (IV) to achieve semantic security. 
SecRose relies on its key management mechanism for the same task. These are significantly 
different approaches with different advantages and drawbacks.  
 
The IV approach appears to have the advantage of unconditional operation; it will always 
provide a level of semantic security. However, IVs offer their security on condition that the 
IV value will not be reused. All the proposals arrange their IVs so that they appear long 
enough but in reality, the truly variable parts are much shorter than presented. For example, 
TinySec uses an IV that appears to be 32-bits long but the authors admit that for a particular 
pair, IV reuse will happen after 2
16
 packets are exchanged. Similarly, SenSec will reuse its IV 
after 2
24
 packets. Unfortunately, the authors of MiniSec do not clearly state their IV 
variability. 
 
The proposals do not seem to have permanently tackled the problem of IV reuse and therefore 
their security is conditional. In addition, the IVs introduce a potential for vulnerabilities [111]. 
Since the IV is both transmitted in the clear and a part of the ciphertext input, it is essentially 
input data leaked to attackers, a piece of known-plaintext that is always available.  
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On the other hand, SecRose provides a 32-bit variable counter as part of the key. The 
counter‟s length is enough to prevent reuse but it only operates properly on the condition that 
packets and their acknowledgements are received. However, if attackers block the 
acknowledgements consistently, they reveal their presence to SecRose and therefore the 
attack is less serious as it loses the advantage of remaining passive.  
 
Other proposals can also detect when IV reuse will happen, since it can be tracked on their 
system configuration. Therefore, all proposals offer semantic security, which is based on a 
detectable condition.  
 
The true advantage of SecRose‟s approach is that the seriousness of the attack is reduced and 
that it does not introduce additional radio energy. For these reasons, SecRose provides a better 
overall performance, as far as semantic security is concerned. 
 
Authentication 
All proposals use a 4-Byte MAC, which provides the same probability of collision and 
therefore the same probability of packet and node injection. Differences exist in the way the 
MAC is calculated since SecRose, TinySec and MiniSec use two-pass CMAC authentication 
while SenSec uses a one-pass OCB authentication, which supposedly uses less energy but has 
no effect in the security of the MAC. 
 
Both modes appear to be secure and therefore the security of the authentication for all 
proposals is considered the same. 
 
Freshness 
There are different levels of freshness provided by different proposals. MiniSec provides 
weak freshness and guarantees that a packet is not a replay of a previously transmitted packet. 
However, MiniSec cannot determine the time elapsed between transmission and reception in 
any way. TinySec does not provide freshness, and the authors of SenSec do not even mention 
freshness in their paper. 
 
SecRose provides conditional weak freshness, which always gives some timing information. 
As explained, the key change mechanism clusters time in eras and SecRose can be confident 
about the freshness of the first packet transmitted in every era. For this first packet, SecRose 
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does not only guarantee its freshness, but can also guarantee that it could not have been 
originated at a previous era. It therefore provides some information on when the packet was 
transmitted. However, SecRose cannot guarantee that subsequent packets are not replays but 
it can still determine the era in which they were transmitted. 
 
While it is clear that for the first packet of an era SecRose is better than any other proposal, 
subsequent packets are problematic. MiniSec also uses an epoch-based system, which can 
guarantee the freshness of up to 256 packets on each epoch. Until that point, MiniSec 
performs better than SecRose and then it performs similarly.  
 
However, if attackers wish to block the freshness guarantee of SecRose, they cannot remain 
passive. The block of acknowledgements is a detectable situation. Thus, MiniSec offers a 
higher level of freshness only when a detectable attack is conducted. On the other hand, if the 
attacker wishes to remain passive, both protocols offer the same level of freshness. 
 
Each solution has its own advantages and both might be of equal importance but SecRose has 
opted for the conditional solution since it introduces zero energy overhead and potential 
Attacks on freshness generate a detectable condition. 
 
Secret state versus open state 
As evident by the evaluation of freshness and semantic security, SecRose has opted for a 
secret-state type of mechanism, which has certain advantages and drawbacks. The primary 
advantage of a secret state is that is leaves less room for potential attacks while the drawback 
is that some security features are conditional. However, this problem is less important since 
attacks can be detected.  
 
All proposals offer a fair level of semantic security and freshness, and they all operate 
conditionally. The essential difference between SecRose and the other proposals is that the 
conditions for correct operation differ. SecRose maintains its security as long as the attacker 
wishes to remain passive. Other proposals maintain their security for a number of packets. 
 
Additional advantages of the SecRose approach is that it leaks less information to attackers 
while it consumes less energy and always allows for detection of attacks. Future applications 
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will be able to make the most of SecRose, fully accommodate the detection capabilities and 
benefit from a full range of security features while consuming less energy. 
 
SecRose constitutes an alternative solution, providing the benefit of choice to the field and 
therefore making an important contribution. Security features that are currently “conditional” 
are due to SecRose‟s choice to provide a closed cryptographic state and offer the associated 
different advantages. 
 
Key management 
SecRose provides a limited key management mechanism in order to provide for its own 
functionality. The mechanism lacks some of the functionality provided by complete key 
management solutions but makes SecRose comprehensive and allows it to be evaluated as 
such. 
 
In addition, the key management mechanism of SecRose demonstrates great potential for 
future versions to update and achieve further increases in the security and efficiency of 
SecRose. 
 
Other proposals, like TinySec rely on external key management and are therefore functionally 
incomplete. 
 
Routing 
SecRose is the only proposal to provide authenticated acknowledgements. The provision 
introduces significant amount of radio energy but it is essential for both the security and 
integrity of the mechanism. The authenticated acknowledgements enable SecRose to secure 
all messages, including the routing messages and therefore allow it to provide a highly 
elevated level of security. 
 
SecRose‟s requirement is to secure all exchanged packets, including acknowledgements and 
therefore including all routing messages. SecRose enables sensor network developers to 
choose from any of the available routing protocols, which in turn could allow utilisation of 
energy-efficient routing that suits their network. 
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All other proposals are vulnerable to routing attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the 
acknowledgement. As described in [76], these attacks are all kinds of selective forwarding 
attacks; nodes that may or may not forward a packet while pretending that they did. Most of 
the existing routing protocols rely on the acknowledgement mechanism and are therefore are 
vulnerable to selective forwarding. Sensor networks that use any of the following routing 
protocols are vulnerable; TinyOS beaconing [64], Directed Diffusion [18], geographic routing 
protocols like GPSR [17], cost-efficient protocols like [142], clustering protocols [89, 143] 
and rumour routing [88]. 
 
The only protocols that are resilient to these attacks require special capabilities from the 
sensor node. For example, SIGF [106], which natively uses authenticated acknowledgements, 
requires location awareness while topology maintenance routing protocols, SPAN [25], GAF 
[87], CEC [144] and AFECA [145], are not intended for typical sensor networks. 
 
While it is true that other proposals increase the security and authenticity of outgoing 
messages, their failure to protect the acknowledgements is detrimental to the security of all 
typical networks. No sensor network that utilises typical, low power, low capability and cheap 
nodes, like an out-of-the-box MICA2 node, is secure against routing attacks, unless it uses 
SecRose. 
 
Delivery guarantee 
The packet delivery guarantee offered by SecRose is a unique feature provided by the 
authenticated acknowledgement mechanism. The feature makes selective DoS attacks on the 
radio medium easier to detect. There is currently no other proposal offering this additional 
functionality. 
 
In fact, every other proposal is vulnerable to attacks in this area. All proposals use a link-layer 
acknowledgement; the first forwarding node informs the sender that their packet is received. 
This acknowledgement is not authenticated; it is simply a stream of four specific bytes. No 
proposal provides any way of confidently determining what happened next and if the packet 
finally arrived to the destination.  
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Other proposals are vulnerable to acknowledgement injection  [76], selective forwarding and 
sinkhole attacks [76]. These attacks are not detectable but can cause disruption or total 
communication breakdown, depending on the routing protocol used. 
 
SecRose can detect such attacks and most importantly is not vulnerable to communication 
breakdown under any circumstance due to this problem. However, SecRose only utilises this 
feature for self-synchronisation. Actual exploitation of this feature and implementation of it as 
a complete transmission control mechanism, as the one found in TCP, is left to the 
application. 
 
Security of broadcast communication 
SecRose provides a special broadcast packet, which benefits from a higher level of 
confidentiality, authentication and freshness than the level offered by normal and long 
packets. On the other hand, this packet does not offer availability.  
 
Other proposals offer broadcast communication in the same way, and the same level of 
security, as with any other packet type. They are therefore not subject to the availability 
problems of SecRose but they are subject to attacks on confidentiality and freshness. 
 
Neither SecRose, nor the other proposals were designed to accommodate the property of 
availability and it is not in their requirements. The attack was discovered on SecRose because 
it was the only proposal evaluated against availability, despite the fact that it was not designed 
to provide the property. Whether availability attacks exist in other mechanism is unknown. 
 
On that basis, a comparison would only be fair if vulnerabilities on availability are excluded. 
Under this assumption, SecRose provides a much higher level of confidentiality, semantic 
security and freshness than the other proposals. 
 
As with other packet types, SecRose offers a different approach, which is subject to different 
conditions. 
 
Summary for TinySec, MiniSec and SenSec 
The following table presents a summary of the security properties of SecRose, TinySec, 
MiniSec and SenSec. The table is compiled by the information discussed up to now in this 
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subsection. Note that authentication complexity is not listed since it is the same for all 
proposals. 
 
 Effective 
key length 
Semantic 
security 
Freshness Key 
management 
Authenticated 
Acknowledgements 
State 
TinySec 80 Limited at 2
16
  
packets 
Not 
provided 
Not provided Not provided Open 
MiniSec 80 Limited to 2
8
  
packets/epoch 
Weak 
freshness 
Not provided Not provided Partly 
secret 
SenSec Theoretical:  
80-144  
Actual:  ≅85 
Limited at 2
24
  
packets 
Not 
provided 
Not provided Not provided Open 
SecRose 128 Unlimited, 
conditional 
Weak 
freshness 
Yes, limited Yes Secret 
 
Table 3: comparative summary of the provided security for each mechanism 
 
The table illustrates how SecRose provides equal or better security than the other proposals. 
The effective key length of SecRose remains consistent at 128-bits and while MiniSec might 
provide a better theoretical limit, it is not proven that this is either necessary or truly more 
secure. 
 
The semantic security of SecRose is not limited by reachable packet counts but it is 
conditional to whether the attacker wishes to remain passive or not. 
 
A similar condition applies for the freshness requirement when comparing SecRose with 
MiniSec. On the other hand, TinySec and SenSec do not provide freshness at all. 
 
SecRose provides a basic key management with potential for future radical improvements that 
could capitalise on the energy savings of other areas. Other proposals do not provide key 
management at all. 
 
Finally, SecRose keeps its security state secret and avoids potential, documented, risks 
associated with revealing part of the security state of secret key cryptography systems. 
 
Comparison with FlexiSec 
Reference [94], published in June 2009, describes the FlexiSec configurable link-layer 
security architecture. This is a recent work and thus it is evaluated separately. 
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FlexiSec recognises the importance of 128-bit computational complexity and the authors have 
evaluated XXTEA and AES as possible ciphers. The final solution is using AES at a speed 
optimised or a size optimised mode. This level of complexity is equal with SecRose. 
However, the SecRose evaluation has shown that AES uses more energy than XXTEA. 
 
For authentication, the authors propose the use of a MAC with a variable size between 4 and 8 
bytes. Our evaluation has proven that it is unnecessary to use MACs that are longer than 4 
bytes, unless the network benefits from an unlimited power source. In this case, SecRose is 
ready to use a 5-byte MAC, which would be sufficient for all realistic applications. To 
provide freshness, the authors use a technique similar to the technique used by MiniSec. 
FlexiSec does not provide authenticated acknowledgements or any form of key management 
either. 
 
It appears that the contribution of FlexiSec is on the provided flexibility only and that the 
mechanism does not provide any new features or solves any existing problems.  
 
Comparison with 802.15.14 and ContikiSec 
The IEEE 802.15.14 (ZigBee) [10, 105] standard is a generic, secure, communication protocol 
for small devices. The ContikiSec [93] is proposed as the security mechanism for the Contiki 
OS [57]. They are both suitable for sensor networks consisting of nodes with high-end 
capabilities, like the Imote2 [47].  
 
SecRose‟s assumption was that it operates in low-end devices like the MICA2 node and it is 
optimised for the requirements of such devices. A comparison of SecRose and 802.15.4 is 
presented for completeness only. 
 
The Imote2 benefits from features like a scalable processor capable of 416MHz and 250Kbps 
communication rate. SecRose was designed for nodes like the MICA2 node, which operates at 
4MHz and can communicate at 38.4Kbps. The Imote2 is more than ten times more capable 
than the MICA2 node and, obviously, there are similar differences in pricing and energy 
consumption. 
 
ContikiSec does not provide freshness, key management or authenticated acknowledgements. 
In addition, the mechanism operates via a random IV and thus it is considered to have an open 
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cryptographic state. For this reasons, ContikiSec is inferior to SecRose and will not be 
discussed further.  
 
On the other hand, the security of SecRose is directly comparable with 802.15.14 especially if 
the protocols are used in low-end devices. The following table compares the security of 
SecRose, 802.15.14 and ContikiSec: 
 
 SecRose 802.15.14 ContikiSec 
Key in bits (cipher) 128 (XXTEA) 128 (AES) 128 (AES) 
MAC length (Byte) 4 4/8/16 4 
Semantic security Unlimited, 
conditional 
Unlimited, 
Conditional 
Limited to  
2
16
 packets 
Freshness Weak freshness Weak freshness Not provided 
Key management Yes, limited Yes, full Not provided 
Authenticated 
Acknowledgements 
Yes Not provided Not provided 
State Secret Partly secret Open 
 
Table 4: comparison of the security provision of SecRose and 802.15.14 
 
As illustrated in Table 4, there are mainly three differences of SecRose with 802.15.14 (a) 
supports multiple MAC lengths, (b) provides a fully functional key management scheme with 
key provision authority and (c) does not support authenticated acknowledgements. 
 
As discussed in 6.1.3, the length of the MAC in SecRose is optimised for nodes that operate 
on finite power sources and communicate at low rates. The less confident authentication 
provided by SecRose is not a drawback but an optimisation choice for a low requirement 
design. Both SecRose and 802.15.4 provide authentication that is secure for their assumed 
operational environment. SecRose could have provided 8 or 16 bytes long MACs if that had 
been a requirement. 
 
However, SecRose does lack in the key management area, as it does not provide a scheme for 
key distribution. However, it does provide a limited key change mechanism, which might 
form the base for a complete key management scheme in the future. 
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On the other hand, 802.15.4 does not provide authenticated acknowledgements. In our 
opinion, this is a serious drawback for a generic, high-end security mechanism and it does not 
appear consistent with other provisions of the protocol. 
 
Our thesis is that although SecRose was never intended to contest with 802.15.4, the 
evaluation shows that the two mechanisms provide comparable security when used with low-
end sensor networks. 
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6.2 Performance evaluation 
 
This section discusses the performance of SecRose and compares it with TinySec. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to find working implementations of MiniSec, SenSec, SPINS 
and FlexiSec. These mechanisms are either abandoned by their research groups or not yet 
implemented. For this reason, our comparative results are limited to experiments between 
SecRose and TinySec. 
 
This section begins by a presentation of the energy requirements from CPU and Radio. Then 
the latency issues are addressed and the section concludes with comparisons of SecRose, 
TinySec and TinyOS.  
 
Notes on scale 
All figures have been scaled on the y-axis to improve the visible information. The scale is 
different for all figures and thus it is important to note the value range when reading the 
figures. 
 
 
6.2.1 Explanation of methodology 
 
Application for measurements 
In order to conduct the measurements of this section, a test program was created, which could 
be run on both the Avrora [63] and the TOSSIM [62] simulators. The program was adapted 
for each measurement type in a way that it would conduct a reflective simulation. Each 
subsection begins by describing how the measurement was taken. 
 
Effort has been made to standardise and minimise the impact of the external variables that 
would affect our measurements. All measurements were taken using two nodes and no routing 
protocol. This allows SecRose to be the only truly “variable” variable while measurements 
were taken. 
 
Attention has also been paid to the validity, integrity and consistency of measurements. When 
possible, the same application was used with only the simulation parameters changing. This 
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allows a wider picture to be built for the overall performance of the simulator. All results are 
directly copy-pasted from the simulator output to excel where the diagrams were created. This 
minimises possible errors in the illustrations. 
 
Validity of simulators 
Both TOSSIM and Avrora were used for double validation where possible but the presented 
results were generated with Avrora. Both simulators are highly respected for their accurate 
operation and validity of results. TOSSIM has been used by the majority of the research 
community and has been cited by many publications; including [1, 63, 146]. Avrora, on the 
other hand, enjoys less success, as it is more recent but it is used by sensor networks 
researchers [147-148]. 
 
The Avrora simulator is highly accurate and can provide energy usage analysis based on the 
energy model presented on [149]. Comparative results that demonstrate SecRose‟s 
performance against TinySec are deemed fair since any simulation inaccuracies would equally 
affect both mechanisms. 
 
 
6.2.2 Energy requirements 
 
Description of experiment 
The Avrora simulator can report the energy used by the CPU and the energy used by radio to 
execute a simulation. A sensor network application was created to run the experiments.  
 
The application sends one packet with a set data payload. Thirty applications, one for each of 
the 0…29 data payloads, for each packet type were created. 
 
Results: CPU energy requirements 
The following figures illustrate the CPU energy consumption. The x-axis represents the 
increasing data payload while the y-axis is the CPU energy consumption in Joules. The red 
line is for broadcast packets, the green line is for long packets and the purple line is for 
normal packets. The diagrams also illustrate the different CPU energy requirements for each 
packet type. 
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Figure 22 shows the CPU energy requirement for the transmitting node. The energy is 
increased in steps, which relate with either the block size of the cipher or the performance of 
TinyOS. For example, the difference of payload 5 and 6 is due to one additional call to the 
encryption cipher, which is initiated by the MAC component. The same is visible after every 
four bytes – the length of the cipher‟s minimum block size. The difference between payload 8 
and 9 is due to one additional block of data input on the block cipher due to the payload‟s 
size. 
 
On the other hand, the odd difference between 14 and 15, where 15 bytes payload consume 
less energy than 14 is an artefact of when TinyOS decides to put the radio on sleep. Note that 
radio consumes energy at both the CPU and the transmitter itself. 
 
Figure 23 shows the CPU energy requirement for the receiving node. In this Figure, TinyOS 
is less influential on the shape of the line and the actual differences SecRose‟s in data 
handling are more visible. 
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Figure 22: CPU energy requirements for a SecRose transmitter 
Values express energy in Joules (y), versus data payload in Bytes (x).  
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Figure 23: CPU energy requirements for a SecRose receiver.  
Values express energy in Joules (y), versus data payload in Bytes (x).  
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Results: radio energy requirements 
 
Figure 24 illustrates radio energy consumption. The x-axis represents the increasing data 
payload while the y-axis shows the energy consumed by the radio in Joules. The red line is for 
broadcast packets, the green line is for long packets and the purple line is for normal packets. 
The diagram illustrates the differences in radio energy consumption when sending various 
packet types. 
 
 
 
Figure 24: radio energy requirements for a SecRose transmitter. 
Values express energy in Joules (y), versus data payload in Bytes (x). 
Note that the transmitter energy does not include the acknowledgements. 
 
The difference between payload 0 and 1 is actually two bytes, since there is one added 
padding byte for payload 1. This is also the reason why payloads 1 and 2 appear the same. At 
payload 2, both bytes are useful information and there is no padded byte. 
 
The diagrams for reception energy are omitted since they do not provide significant 
information. Radio reception consumes the same listening energy regardless if set or unset 
bits are received. 
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6.2.3 Latency 
 
Description of experiment 
This experiment aims to prove that the latency introduced by SecRose, or any other 
mechanism, is not an important factor in the overall time required for an event to arrive from 
the sensor network to the base station. 
 
The Avrora simulator was used for this experiment since it keeps extremely accurate timing 
information of the simulated seconds. An application that sends one long packet with 29 bytes 
payload is used to run the latency measurements at various stages of packet reception and 
transmission.  
 
The experiment showed that 0.0244 seconds were required to process the packet, while 
0.2431 seconds were required to transmit it over the medium. Therefore, SecRose could 
prepare 9.9 packets for every packet it transmits.  
 
TinyOS does not implement a packet queue and so SecRose has time to prepare more packets 
than the radio can transmit. In addition, the TinyOS medium access introduces a delay 
between 100 and 163 milliseconds. In the minimum of 100 milliseconds, SecRose would have 
prepared 41.2 packets. Finally, SecRose can prepare one packet for as much time as required 
to send 5.2 bytes
31
. This is about 1/3 of the minimum packet length and thus SecRose would 
not have any problems sending bursts of 0-payload broadcast packets either. 
 
Results: acknowledgement 
The acknowledgement is transmitted and received separately as a packet. Its existence does 
not affect the sensor network application and therefore its delay is less important. The latency 
of the acknowledgement is not important for most WSN applications, as it is an internal 
SecRose feature that does not interfere with the rest of the application.  
 
                                                 
31
 A 29-byte long packet requires actual transmission of 52 bytes. 52 / 9.9 = 5.2. 
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Unless the sensor network sends bursts of packets very quickly, acknowledgement latency 
does not matter. However, bursts of packets might affect the frequency of key changes, since 
acknowledgements will not have time to arrive. 
 
Conclusion 
The results indicate that SecRose does not introduce significant latency in a sensor network. 
Considering that the medium access latency is at least 100 milliseconds and the longest 
SecRose packet is prepared, exchanged and validated in less than 25 milliseconds, any latency 
introduced by SecRose does not constitute more than 25% of the whole packet transmission 
process in any case. 
 
 
6.2.4 Memory 
 
Program sizes 
The following table compares SecRose, TinySec and TinyOS program sizes. The same 
simulation application is used in all cases. 
 
 Executable size (bytes) ASM lines 
SecRose 28868 6802 
TinySec 28362 7478 
TinyOS 28366 7477 
 
Table 5: executable size of various proposals 
 
Although there are small differences, all proposals are easily accommodated at the 128KB 
program flash memory of a typical sensor node like MICA2. 
 
Runtime memory 
The Avrora simulator reports that the runtime memory for all proposals peaks at 4351 bytes. 
The homogenous value, regardless of which proposal is measured, means that there are 
factors that affect the stack size other than the security mechanism. 
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Memory energy 
Since sensor networks use Flash memory, the percentage of it that is occupied is irrelevant to 
the energy consumption. Flash memory consumes the same energy for every stored bit 
regardless of whether this it set or unset. Therefore, this metric is irrelevant to SecRose. 
 
Conclusion 
SecRose and TinySec do not impose any significant limit to the operation of the sensor 
network if compared with TinyOS. Further evaluation of memory usage in regards to 
scalability is discussed in 6.3. 
 
 
6.2.5 Comparisons 
 
Methodology 
The same applications used for the discussed measurements were also used to measure the 
performance of TinySec and the plaintext TinyOS, for reference and further conclusions. To 
make differences more visible, the applications used for comparisons exchanged 1000 packets 
instead of 1. This reduced the influence of other tasks, like node boot-up, to the measurement 
results. Note that TinyOS does not transmit packets with zero data payload but SecRose and 
TinySec do. The 0-payload values for TinyOS are therefore out of scale in many of the figures 
and should be ignored. 
 
This subsection presents accumulative diagrams for both nodes in contrast with the other 
proposals. Since long packets constitute the least well performing packets of SecRose, they 
were selected in order to represent the worst-case scenario. Similarly, the TinySec-AE packet 
was selected, as the only packet that provides sufficient security to be comparable with 
SecRose.  
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Energy consumption: CPU 
Figure 25 illustrates the energy consumption of the CPU of the nodes. SecRose is represented 
in red, TinySec in green and TinyOS in blue. The advantage of SecRose in CPU consumption 
is clearly visible in this figure. 
 
The difference between SecRose and the insecure TinyOS can be explained by the optimised 
and streamlined code in the whole network stack, which SecRose replaces. These engineering 
solutions have not been referred to in the past since they are out of the scope of this document. 
 
The differences of SecRose with TinySec are mainly in the performance of the cipher and the 
stealing mechanism. TinySec uses padding to complete the first 8 bytes – one SkipJack block 
– therefore it appears to make the same effort for all the first 8 bytes. 
 
The conclusion from this figure is that SecRose is not only a security mechanism; it is a good 
replacement for the network stack of TinyOS. 
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Figure 25: CPU energy requirements for both nodes. 
 Values express energy in Joules (y), versus data payload in Bytes (x). 
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Energy consumption: radio 
Figure 26 illustrates the energy consumed by the radio. SecRose is represented in red, 
TinySec in green and TinyOS in blue. Note that the figure is accumulative of the energy 
consumed for both reception and transmission.  
 
 
 
Figure 26: radio energy requirements for both nodes. 
Values express energy in Joules (y), versus data payload in Bytes (x). 
 
The disadvantage of the authenticated acknowledgements is visible. SecRose is required to 
send 16 acknowledgement bytes for each packet it sends, while SecRose and TinyOS will 
only send 4.  
 
The operation of the stealing mechanism is also visible in the figure. TinySec‟s padding 
requires a whole block to be transmitted; regardless of how many of the data is useful 
information. 
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Energy consumption: total 
 
Figure 27 illustrates the total energy consumption. SecRose is represented in red, TinySec in 
green and TinyOS in blue.  
 
 
 
Figure 27: energy requirements for both CPU and radio. 
Values express energy in Joules (y), versus data payload in Bytes (x).. 
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Energy consumption: normalised 
Figure 28 is the same as  
Figure 27 but normalised to illustrate the differences in relation with TinyOS, which is 
presented as the 100% baseline. Note that this graph does not include packets of 0 bytes since 
TinyOS does not send these packets and thus it consumes significantly less energy.  
 
This figure illustrates energy consumption in relation with TinyOS for each different payload. 
For example, a packet with 14-bytes payload requires 0.08% more energy than TinyOS. The 
figure also illustrates that the difference between TinySec and SecRose is greater for small 
payloads.  
 
The figure highlights the exceptional performance of SecRose, which can even consume less 
energy than the unsecured TinyOS for payloads of up to 5 bytes. 
 
 
 
Figure 28: normalised energy requirements for both CPU and radio. 
Values express energy in Joules (y), versus data payload in Bytes (x).  
Note: 0-payload is not displayed. 
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Average performance differences 
The following figures illustrate the accumulative total of reported energy consumption for all 
packets, all data payloads and both nodes. Energy in Joules is indicated on the vertical axis. 
  
Figure 29: accumulative radio energy 
consumption for both nodes 
Figure 30: accumulative CPU energy 
consumption for both nodes 
  
  
Figure 31: accumulative energy 
consumption for both nodes 
Figure 32: normalised accumulative 
energy consumption for both nodes 
 
Figure 32 is the same data as Figure 31 normalised in relation with TinyOS, which is 
presented as the 100% baseline. On average, TinySec utilises 0.074% more energy than 
TinyOS while TinySec utilises 0.258% more. As with Figure 28, this figure does not include 
packets of 0-payload. 
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Impact of security on energy 
The results indicated that any differences between the proposals are minimal if compared with 
the energy of the rest of a sensor node. For example, consider the two extremes of the results; 
the difference between 1000 unsecured TinyOS packets with 1-byte data payload and equal 
number of TinySec-AE packets with 29 bytes payload. TinyOS would consume 2.076574791 
Joules while TinySec would require 2.096097628 Joules. TinySec requires only 0.94% more 
energy than TinyOS, when everything else is taken into consideration. 
 
 
6.2.6 Discussion 
 
Importance of efficiency 
SecRose appears to be more efficient than TinySec and it enables further energy savings via 
the routing choice freedom that it provides by its authenticated acknowledgements. However, 
SecRose is a security protocol and it must be evaluated as such. 
 
For these reasons, the actual energy performance figures are not important. After all, the 
differences are not great. As illustrated, the difference of SecRose with TinyOS is 0.074% 
while the difference of TinySec with TinyOS is 0.258%. 
 
Our thesis is that the 0.074% difference with TinyOS is not significant in any way compared 
with the advantages of security provision. In addition, SecRose introduces less energy 
overhead than TinySec. 
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6.3 Evaluation of non-functional requirements 
 
6.3.1 Essential deployment requirements 
 
Backwards compatibility 
SecRose has been developed as a replacement of the TinyOS network stack. As shown in 
other parts of this chapter, the replaced code performs better and achieves the security targets. 
 
As explained in Chapter 5, SecRose is perfectly compatible with existing applications that 
have been designed for TinyOS and TinySec. The only requirement is re-compilation of the 
application with SecRose‟s files and re-deployment. No change is required in the application 
code. However, the current code of SecRose is only a proof-of-concept. Additional 
engineering work is needed to make it fully usable in a real environment. 
 
SecRose introduces extra security features, which are optional and may be used by future 
applications. The existence of the features does not affect existing applications in any way. 
However, it is recommended that applications be updated to be able to communicate with 
SecRose better. 
 
Note that the alternative proposals are not fully compatible with TinyOS because they do not 
include the Group field in their packet. SecRose has retained the Group field and thus it can 
transparently operate with existing applications. 
 
Preconfigured distribution 
SecRose is pre-configured with appropriate security parameters that would allow it to operate 
efficiently and securely by operators who have little connection with the area of security. 
SecRose has pre-selected values like the cipher‟s cycle count etc and there is no need to 
manipulate them unless a specific requirement is present. 
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Customisation 
Sensor network operators who have specific security requirements can change the security 
level provided by SecRose dramatically. The code is written with appropriate constants, 
which reside on one header file, and can be changed at will. 
 
 
6.3.2 Other requirements and desirables 
 
Proof of concept 
SecRose‟s proof of concept was developed and it is presented in Chapter 5 of this document. 
The evaluation in this subsection is done using the proof-of-concept. 
 
Scalability 
As per the requirements, SecRose does not pose any fundamental difficulty in scaling it up for 
use in larger networks. Although the mechanism is currently optimised to work on small 
networks that do not require clustering, it is not difficult to substitute the role of the base 
station with a cluster head and continue using SecRose in a clustered, scalable environment. 
 
SecRose can scale up to large network sizes already. The state information required for each 
communication pair is 13 bytes
32
 on each node. The typical MICA2 node offers 128KB 
program memory, of which about 30KB is used by the program itself. SecRose can 
accommodate ≅7,000 pairs on the remaining memory. Additional scalability is also possible, 
depending on the application, if the 512KB serial flash memory can be used as well. The 
upper scalability limit is about 40,000 pairs, meaning that networks of 80,000 nodes would be 
operational. 
 
The current addressing scheme of TinyOS uses 16-bit address. Therefore, SecRose can cope 
with more nodes than TinyOS itself. Even if the serial flash memory is excluded, and 
assuming that nodes form pairs with only 10% of the rest of the network, SecRose can operate 
in networks with ≅70,000 nodes, still higher than TinyOS. 
 
                                                 
32
 Assuming 16-bit memory addressing, which is what is required to manage 512KB of memory. 
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However, all these calculations are indicative and real networks of such sizes, if they ever 
come to existence, should not use SecRose in an out-of-the-box basis. 
 
Free of charge 
SecRose is provided in an “as is” basis and free of any charges. This practice follows both 
ethical considerations and legal restrictions of the TinyOS licence upon which SecRose is 
based. In addition, care has been taken not to include any proprietary algorithm in SecRose, as 
that would cause legal problems and introduce royalty costs. 
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6.4 Summary 
 
This section is a generic summary for SecRose comparing where it stands against the other 
proposals. The presented information is compiled from all previous chapters. 
 
 
6.4.1 Critical security evaluation 
 
Identical features 
SecRose was developed after TinySec and it retained some of its features, as they were 
deemed adequate. The most important of these are the provided authentication guarantee and 
the assumption that hardware is secure. 
 
The level of authentication guarantee is equal in all proposals, a 4-Byte MAC. The differences 
are in the ways the MAC is produced, SecRose and TinySec uses the cipher in CBC mode 
under the CMAC [99] recommendation by NIST [132] while SenSec and MiniSec use one-
pass OCB by Rogaway et al. [100]. The two methods may provide different level of diffusion 
but any differences become much less important when a, relatively short, 4-Byte MAC is 
used. 
 
Therefore, the only important characteristic is the Mac‟s size. Since this is identical in all 
proposals, the error rate of authentication is also identical and equal to 1 in 2
32
. 
 
In regards to hardware, all proposals assume that their non-transmitted secrets can remain 
secret, or in other words, that they operate in secure hardware.  
 
Our thesis is that SecRose provides equal level of authentication as other proposals while it is 
designed to operate under the same assumptions. 
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Controversial features 
SecRose provides data confidentiality in a radically alternative way. That includes all aspects 
of confidentiality: encryption strength, semantic security and freshness. 
 
SecRose‟s 128-bit encryption is provided natively by a cipher designed and evaluated for this 
key length. In contrast, SenSec uses key whitening to provide a theoretical maximum of 144-
bits encryption strength. However, this level of security is (a) potentially unnecessary and (b) 
reduced radically if the attacker obtains more than one plaintext/ciphertext sets in a known-
plaintext cryptanalytic attack and (c) untested in SkipJack. On the other hand, TinySec and 
MiniSec do not provide an acceptable level of cryptographic strength.  
 
Our thesis is that the cryptographic strength provided by SecRose is better than the other 
proposals since it satisfies the acceptable level unconditionally. 
 
Data confidentiality is also about semantic security. SecRose provides semantic security in an 
alternative way, via its key management, which operates on a different condition than other 
proposals. Other proposals are limited by the number of exchanged packets while SecRose is 
unlimited but vulnerable to a detectable attack, making it less important and allowing a 
reaction by SecRose. 
 
On the other hand, the solution is provided by SecRose without leaking any cryptographic 
state data to the attackers. It is difficult to draw a conclusion on which method is potentially 
weaker, as the conditions are not formally comparable. 
 
A similar condition applies for freshness. Freshness is provided on SecRose and is effective 
under a different condition than MiniSec. SecRose‟s packets are all guaranteed to be weakly 
fresh as long as the attacker does not block acknowledgements, which is a detectable 
condition
33
. Note that TinySec and SenSec do not provide freshness at all. 
 
Our thesis is that SecRose uses alternative methods to provide semantic security and 
freshness. The solutions are characterised by different advantages and operate under different 
conditions. 
 
                                                 
33
 Broadcast packets are not subjected to this condition and are always fresh unconditionally. 
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Unique features 
SecRose provides authenticated acknowledgements, which is a feature unique to it and is not 
provided by any other proposal. This feature is very important since it secures various routing 
protocols, which are currently unusable in a secure environment due to their security 
weaknesses.  
 
In addition, this feature can be utilised by future applications and allow them to enjoy greater 
confidence that their message was received. If used appropriately, the feature can also provide 
trustworthy information on the health of the network. 
 
Our thesis is that authenticated acknowledgements are an important feature, which constitutes 
a significant contribution of SecRose. 
 
The second unique feature of SecRose is key management system and the way it preserves 
and synchronises its state, without leaking any information to attackers. It is desirable to keep 
the cryptographic state secret because there have been documented attacks on other 
cryptosystems that exploited problems like initialisation vectors [111].  
 
Our thesis is that SecRose‟s key management provides comparable security but demonstrates 
greater potential for future developments.  
 
 
6.4.2 Energy efficiency and non-functional requirements 
 
SecRose provides packet categorisation with three different types that optimise the 
communication patterns of sensor networks. The types are implemented using an overloaded 
flag to characterise them and different packet fields, enabling energy-efficient addressing 
using default source/destination fields where available. In addition, the flag enables early 
rejection of unwanted packets, allowing further energy savings.  
 
The whole packet type creation and categorisation is completely transparent to the application 
or the routing layers and fully compatible with existing applications.  
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Other proposals provide some categorisation between normal and broadcast communication 
but they do not provide the resolution of SecRose. In addition, no other proposal is fully 
compatible with all existing applications as they have not retained the Group field of TinyOS 
and thus they cannot operate in clustered applications, which work by partitioning the 
network in groups.  
 
SecRose provides a radically new ciphertext stealing implementation as well. The solution is 
evidently more efficient than typical ciphertext stealing, like the one used in TinySec. 
 
Finally, SecRose benefits from important engineering optimisations in the network stack of 
TinyOS, using much more efficient and streamlined code. All the parts of the code that 
consumed a significant portion of energy are heavily optimised in a per-line basis. The 
resulting code is much more efficient than the original TinyOS network stack and this is 
evident in the simulated results. 
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6.4.3 Final comparison 
 
The following table is a rough illustrative estimation of the security provision of each 
proposal using a generalised scoring system. This table is provided as a summary and 
overview only. In reality, many features are difficult to quantify and compare.  
 
To preserve fairness, the table is compiled supposing a worst-case scenario for SecRose and a 
best-case scenario for the other proposals, where the most impactful attack are launched 
against SecRose while the least impactful attacks are launched against the other proposals. 
Other advantages of SecRose‟s proposal have not been accounted either. 
 
The mechanisms score:  
 0 points for non-protection: the attack will succeed easily 
 1 point for inadequate protection: the attack is difficult but not impossible 
 2 points for limited or conditional protection; the attack may succeed 
 3 points for full protection: the attack is infeasible 
 4 points for more than adequate protection: the attack is infeasible and will remain so 
in the future 
 
 Confidentiality Authentication 
 
Weak 
Freshness 
Authenticated 
Acknowledgements 
Total 
Encryption 
strength 
Semantic 
security 
TinySec 1 3 3 0 0 7 
MiniSec 1 3 3 2 0 9 
SenSec 4 3 3 0 0 10 
SecRose 3 1 3 1 3 11 
 
Despite the worst-case assumption for SecRose, it appears to be the less vulnerable 
mechanism, primarily due to its authenticated acknowledgements. However, and most 
importantly, all mechanisms are still vulnerable under the right –for the attacker – conditions. 
Conclusively, more work is required to improve the security provision. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Future Work and Conclusion 
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7. Conclusion and Future Work  
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7.1 Conclusion 
 
SecRose is presented as an alternative to existing security mechanisms that operate in the data 
transportation layer. The mechanism benefits from a simple and efficient design, which 
provides for the basic security requirements of confidentiality, authentication and weak 
freshness.  
 
The mechanism provides unique features like authenticated acknowledgements and key 
management, alternative solutions to existing features, like secret cryptographic state, and 
improvements to existing features, like 128-bits encryption strength. The mechanism secures 
all communication and allows developers to utilise routing protocols that are currently 
insecure. The design follows different directions that existing proposals and is therefore 
subject to different conditions and limitations. 
 
SecRose introduces an average overhead of 0.074% compared with TinyOS while it is always 
more energy-efficient than the widely accepted TinySec proposal. SecRose requires less 
energy than TinyOS for packets with small data payloads. 
 
Our thesis is that SecRose offers a security solution, which provides better overall security, is 
subject to different limitations and introduces less energy overheads than similar solutions. 
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7.2 Future work 
 
7.2.1 Provision against current vulnerabilities 
 
SecRose is vulnerable to certain low-impact attacks, affecting freshness and semantic security 
that need to be addressed in the future. This is essential in order to provide a better and more 
complete security mechanism, which would not be vulnerable in any computationally feasible 
way. 
 
Freshness 
SecRose provides conditional freshness. The feature is based on correct operation of the 
acknowledgements and on the fact that the attacker cannot block them and remain passive. 
There are a few possibilities that would improve this situation but they would all affect at 
least the energy consumption. A method that would provide unconditional freshness without 
energy overheads is the ideal target. 
 
A straightforward solution would be to add an ordering counter, which would be transferred 
with the packet and advance with each sent packet. The counter can also be reset after each 
acknowledgement, since the key advances and a new era begins. However, the presence of the 
counter would consume radio energy and SecRose is already heavily influenced by the radio 
energy consumed by the acknowledgements. 
 
A different key mixing method would also provide better freshness. Key mixing is currently 
done in the same way every time. The mixing can change so that it would be determined by 
how many packets were transmitted since the last key update. That would work efficiently 
under normal conditions but would require multiple validation attempts if something goes 
wrong. An attacker could deliberately cause errors and possibly create an asymmetric DoS 
attack by causing the nodes to undergo multiple packet validations in vain. 
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Semantic security 
The ordering counter proposed above does not improve semantic security, unless the counter 
is included in the cryptographic input. On the other hand, if that happens then plaintext 
information is leaked to the attacker and this is unacceptable for SecRose. 
 
A possible solution would be to include a highly diffused and encrypted IV. A potential 
candidate for this kind of IV is the last meta-byte generated by the MAC of the previous 
communication. This is a potent feature but it needs careful consideration, design and 
evaluation. If possible then it would provide semantic security at the expense of little 
additional cryptographic effort and slightly higher memory requirements. 
 
 
7.1.2 Alternatives on authenticated acknowledgements 
 
Authenticated acknowledgements are a completely contradictive feature. They elevate the 
security provision greatly, but consume significant amounts of energy. This is the first version 
of SecRose and thus the first design of the authenticated acknowledgements. A number of 
ideas that would improve this feature are presented. 
 
Alter preambles 
Packet preambles are a set string of bytes used to designate the start of a packet. They are 12 
bytes long in the MICA2 nodes but theist size is not necessarily fixed. Improvements on the 
preambles are possible but further research on preambles is required. 
 
The size of the preamble can be greatly reduced if they are combined with cryptographically 
strong randomisation. Our research has proven that a 4-byte MAC is variable enough to 
authenticate a packet and thus there is no reason why a similarly sized stream of bytes could 
not authorise the start of a packet as well. However, the string has to be both randomised and 
uniformly known to the network.  
 
Alternatively, the size might be reducible without provision. Our research has not found 
justification on the current preamble size since the literature does not explain the criteria 
behind the selection of that size. On this basis, an academic study on the proper preamble size 
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might be required. However, this research is out of the scope of security and thus we were 
unable to conduct it in this context. 
 
If none of the above ideas is effective and preambles have to remain that long, then maybe 
SecRose can utilise them to provide additional features. For example, a preamble that is 
created via a cryptographic authenticated process might include an initialisation vector or an 
ordering counter. This option could improve freshness or semantic security or both.  
 
Multilevel solution 
SecRose could use a combination of link and network layer acknowledgements. Under normal 
conditions, nodes would use a short link-layer acknowledgement to designate that a packet 
was forwarded. If that does not happen, then the last node can send a long network-layer 
message similar to the “host unreachable” message of the IP protocol.  
 
In order for this technique to work securely, both messages need to be authenticated. This 
increases the length of the “short” message. The “short” message would be longer than 
TinyOS-style link-layer acknowledgements, as it would be required to include both a credible 
message and information on the ID of the originator.  
 
In addition, such system would introduce slightly more processing for all forwarding nodes. 
On the other hand, this potent feature might be the solution to the authenticated 
acknowledgement problem. The exact details regarding operation and energy consumption of 
this idea need to be evaluated. 
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7.2.3 Improvements on key management 
 
Key management incorporated with data transportation is also a new idea introduced by this 
version of SecRose. As with the authenticated acknowledgements, there might be room for 
improvement in this area as well. 
 
Better mixing 
As discussed, the current mixing is invariable. Better mixing might improve freshness but it 
should also be designed in a way to improve counter diffusion as well. The counter value is 
currently initialised to a random number to address this problem but since the counter update 
value is a limited 8-bit value, the mixing is not ideal. Design and evaluation is required to 
provide semantic security, freshness and better diffusion in the same time. 
 
Key update provision on key management 
Key management may benefit from a key provision protocol, which would allow the nodes to 
request a key from an authoritative node or the base station, in similar fashion as SSL. 
 
On the other hand, such functionality might be unnecessary for the data transportation layer. 
Effectively, if implemented, it would complete the key management mechanism. However, 
would that be useful enough to all applications to justify its energy expenses? 
 
 
7.2.4 Regarding energy and performance 
 
SecRose is already highly optimised and this is evident in the performance evaluation. Further 
optimisations might be possible after more engineering or research work. 
 
One-pass encryption and authentication 
The possibility of implementing OCB encryption and authentication in one-pass should be 
studied. The current mechanism uses more than one encryption interactions to encrypt and 
authenticate 8 bytes while an OCB style solution would be use only one interaction plus some 
additional processing 
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It is unknown what the impact of the additional processing is, compared to an encryption 
interaction. The security of OCB does not enjoy NIST recommendation status, as does the 
currently used CMAC, and therefore any such system should include a study on the security 
as well. 
 
Further software engineering work 
The proof-of-concept implementation does include optimisations in energy-demanding parts 
of the code but the rest of the implementation does not enjoy the same level of functionality. 
The related work should be conducted before SecRose is publicly released. 
 
 
7.2.5 Flexibility and customisation features 
 
Some features might be added to provide flexibility and a wider variety of options to match 
different sensor networks. 
 
Acknowledged broadcast 
Currently SecRose does not provide acknowledgements for broadcast packets as it was 
deemed unnecessary and energy consuming. The optional provision of these 
acknowledgements will improve the fitness of SecRose to some applications. 
 
However, proper introduction of the feature would require appropriate research before the 
design and careful evaluation of the outcome. Special attention must be given to the 
evaluation of the impact on security and energy consumption if the feature is provided. 
 
The semantic security and freshness advantages will be lost. The base station will require 
greater memory resources and there will be a significant impact in the energy requirements of 
the base station and its neighbouring nodes. 
 
Backward compatibility 
SecRose has retained the Group field of TinyOS in order to maintain backwards 
compatibility. We believe this feature should gradually be phased out and eventually replaced 
by other grouping mechanisms. 
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Making the feature optional is mainly an engineering challenge but the field is used by the 
stealing mechanism as well. Redesign of the stealing mechanism and subsequent evaluation 
of the effects is required. 
 
Longer MACs 
SecRose does not utilise one of the eight bytes of the MAC in any way. Our research has 
shown that utilisation of this byte will increase the security provision in networks that benefit 
by an unlimited power source. Functionality to use a 5-Byte MAC, when this is beneficial, 
would be a minor improvement in SecRose. 
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IMPLEMENTATION CODE 
 
The two important files of the proof-of-concept implementation are appended for reference 
and completeness reasons. The file that contains the control component is named 
CC1000RadioIntM.nc on the MICA2 implementation and MicaHighSpeedRadioM.nc for the 
pc target. The file listed here is the native MICA2 version since the code is better structured. 
The second important file is the SecRoseM.nc file, which contains every other component of 
SecRose. Note that some comments may be truncated. 
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File CC1000RadioIntM.ns 
 
// $Id: CC1000RadioIntM.nc,v 1.23.2.8 2003/08/26 22:33:30 philipb Exp $ 
includes crc; 
module CC1000RadioIntM { 
  provides { 
    interface StdControl; 
    interface BareSendMsg as Send; 
    interface ReceiveMsg as Receive; 
    command result_t EnableRSSI(); 
    command result_t DisableRSSI(); 
    command result_t SetListeningMode(uint8_t power); 
    command uint8_t GetListeningMode(); 
    command result_t SetTransmitMode(uint8_t power); 
    command uint8_t GetTransmitMode(); 
    interface RadioCoordinator as RadioSendCoordinator; 
    interface RadioCoordinator as RadioReceiveCoordinator; 
  } 
  uses { 
    interface PowerManagement; 
    interface StdControl as CC1000StdControl; 
    interface CC1000Control; 
    interface Random; 
    interface ADCControl; 
    interface ADC as RSSIADC; 
    interface SpiByteFifo; 
    interface StdControl as TimerControl; 
    interface Timer as WakeupTimer; 
    interface Leds; 
    interface SecRose as rose; 
    interface SendMsg as TrueSend;     
  } 
} 
implementation { 
  enum { 
    IDLE_STATE, 
    TX_STATE, 
    DISABLED_STATE, 
    POWER_DOWN_STATE, 
    PRETX_STATE, 
    SYNC_STATE, 
    RX_STATE, 
  }; 
 
  enum { 
    TXSTATE_WAIT, 
    TXSTATE_START, 
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    TXSTATE_PREAMBLE, 
    TXSTATE_SYNC, 
    TXSTATE_DATA, 
    TXSTATE_CRC, 
    TXSTATE_FLUSH, 
    TXSTATE_DONE 
  }; 
 
  enum { 
    SYNC_BYTE =  0x33, 
    NSYNC_BYTE = 0xcc, 
    SYNC_WORD =  0x33cc, 
    NSYNC_WORD = 0xcc33 
  }; 
 
  enum { 
    TX_HEAD, TX_DATA 
  }; 
   
 
  uint8_t RadioState; 
  uint8_t RadioTxState; 
  uint16_t txlength; 
  uint16_t rxlength; 
  TOS_MsgPtr txbufptr;  // pointer to transmit buffer 
  TOS_MsgPtr rxbufptr;  // pointer to receive buffer 
  TOS_Msg RxBuf; // save received messages 
  uint8_t NextTxByte; 
  uint8_t lplpower;        //  low power listening mode 
  uint8_t lplpowertx;      //  low power listening transmit mode 
  uint16_t preamblelen;    //  current length of the preamble 
  uint16_t PreambleCount;   //  found a valid preamble 
  uint8_t SOFCount; 
  union { 
    uint16_t W; 
    struct { 
      uint8_t LSB; 
      uint8_t MSB; 
    }; 
  } RxShiftBuf; 
  uint8_t RxBitOffset; // bit offset for spibus 
  int8_t RxByteCnt; // received byte counter 
  int8_t TxByteCnt; 
  uint16_t RSSISampleFreq; // in Bytes rcvd per sample 
  bool bInvertRxData; // data inverted 
  bool bTxPending; 
  bool bTxBusy; 
  bool bRSSIValid; 
  uint16_t usRSSIVal; 
  uint16_t usSquelchVal; 
209 
 
  int16_t sMacDelay;    // MAC delay for the next transmission 
  volatile uint16_t LocalAddr; 
   
  // Secrose variables: 
  uint8_t flag;     // the flag of the packet 
  bool ack_send = FALSE;   // packets that fail to be MAC'ed with primary key must not send ACKS. This var controls the process 
  struct TOS_Msg ack_ptr; 
  int j, k;      // temp 
  uint8_t rec_stop;     // when to stop receiving data 
  bool handle_flag = TRUE;   // to know if flag needs attention 
  bool handle_index = FALSE;   // to know when to "jump" the index of the recv ptr to a more apropriate pos 
  uint8_t header_len = SECROSE_HEADER_LENGTH; // total size of packet headers (source, dest etc), 56 by default 
  uint8_t max_data_len = TOSH_DATA_LENGTH; // maximum data length, 29 by default 
  uint8_t mac_len = SECROSE_MAC_LENGTH;  // length of the mac address, 4 by default 
  uint8_t actual_data_len = 0;   // length of data to be sent in the current packet (variable) 
  uint8_t stream_len = 7;   // length of actual stream = header_len+actual_data_len+mac_len 
  uint8_t partial_stream_len = 0;  // the first part of stream length = header_len+actual_data_len 
  uint8_t mac_tmp[SECROSE_MAC_LENGTH];  // for storing the mac 
  uint8_t mac_pos;    // for looping around the mac while storring 
  bool mac_valid;    // for checking the MAC 
  TOS_MsgPtr rxbufptr_copy;     // copy of pointer to receive buffer 
  char Byte;     // instead of localy redefining this variable for every byte, define it once. 
 
  // thsi has to be implemented, although we don't need it to do anything. It is triggered when an ACK is sent. 
  event result_t TrueSend.sendDone(TOS_MsgPtr m, result_t s) { return s; } 
 
  task void PacketRcvd() { 
    TOS_MsgPtr pBuf; 
 atomic {  
  if ( flag != 3 ) { 
   // do normal TinyOS tasks 
   atomic { 
    rxbufptr->time = 0; 
    pBuf = rxbufptr; 
    // EWMA to determin squelch values 
    usSquelchVal = (((5*rxbufptr->strength) + (3*usSquelchVal)) >> 3); 
   } 
   pBuf = signal Receive.receive((TOS_MsgPtr)pBuf); 
   atomic { 
    if (pBuf) 
    rxbufptr = pBuf; 
    rxbufptr->length = 0; 
    //RadioState = IDLE_STATE; 
   } 
   call SpiByteFifo.enableIntr(); 
  
   // SecRose tasks 
   if ( (rxbufptr->crc==1) && (ack_send) ) { 
    // update counter 
    call rose.counterHandle(rxbufptr, PKT_RECV); 
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    // send ACK only if the packet was not broadcast 
    if ( rxbufptr->flag != 1 ) { 
     ack_ptr.source = TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS; 
     ack_ptr.flag = 3; 
     call TrueSend.send(rxbufptr->source,0,&ack_ptr); 
    } 
   } 
  } 
     } // end atomic 
  } 
   
  task void PacketSent() { 
    TOS_MsgPtr pBuf; //store buf on stack  
 
    atomic { 
      txbufptr->time = 0; 
      pBuf = txbufptr; 
    } 
    signal Send.sendDone((TOS_MsgPtr)pBuf,SUCCESS); 
    atomic bTxBusy = FALSE; 
 
    // SEC-ROSE counter handling  
    // Call counterHandle() in order to store the counter value   
    if ( txbufptr->flag != 3 ) { 
   call rose.counterHandle(txbufptr, PKT_SENT); 
    }      
  } 
  command result_t StdControl.init() { 
    bool temp; 
 
    atomic { 
      RadioState = DISABLED_STATE; 
      RadioTxState = TXSTATE_PREAMBLE; 
      rxbufptr = &RxBuf; 
      rxbufptr->length = 0; 
      rxlength = MSG_DATA_SIZE-2; 
      RxBitOffset = 0; 
       
      PreambleCount = 0; 
      RSSISampleFreq = 0; 
      RxShiftBuf.W = 0; 
      bTxPending = FALSE; 
      bTxBusy = FALSE; 
      bRSSIValid = FALSE; 
      sMacDelay = -1; 
      usRSSIVal = -1; 
      lplpower = lplpowertx = 0; 
      usSquelchVal = PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_SquelchInit[lplpower]); 
    } 
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    call SpiByteFifo.initSlave(); // set spi bus to slave mode 
    call CC1000StdControl.init(); 
    call CC1000Control.SelectLock(0x9);  // Select MANCHESTER VIOLATION 
    temp = call CC1000Control.GetLOStatus();    //Do we need to invert Rcvd Data? 
    atomic bInvertRxData = temp; 
 
    call ADCControl.bindPort(TOS_ADC_CC_RSSI_PORT,TOSH_ACTUAL_CC_RSSI_PORT); 
    call ADCControl.init(); 
 
    call Random.init(); 
    call TimerControl.init(); 
 
    // don't enable SPI interrupts until the radio is running 
    //call SpiByteFifo.enableIntr(); // enable spi and spi interrupt 
  
    LocalAddr = TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS; 
 
    return SUCCESS; 
  } 
 
  command result_t EnableRSSI() {    return SUCCESS;  } 
  command result_t DisableRSSI() {    return SUCCESS;  } 
 
  command uint8_t GetTransmitMode() { 
    return lplpowertx; 
  } 
  command result_t SetTransmitMode(uint8_t power) { 
    result_t Result = SUCCESS; 
    if ((power >= CC1K_LPL_STATES) || (power == lplpowertx)) 
      return FAIL; 
 
    atomic { 
      // check if the radio is currently doing something 
      if ((!bTxPending) && ((RadioState == POWER_DOWN_STATE) ||  
       (RadioState == IDLE_STATE) || 
       (RadioState == DISABLED_STATE))) { 
 lplpowertx = power; 
 preamblelen = ((PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_PreambleLength[lplpowertx*2]) << 8) 
                       | PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_PreambleLength[(lplpowertx*2)+1])); 
  
      } 
      else { 
 Result = FAIL; 
      } 
    } 
    return Result; 
  } 
 
  command result_t SetListeningMode(uint8_t power) { 
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    result_t Result = SUCCESS; 
    // valid low power listening values are 0 to 3 
    // 0 is "always on" and 3 is lowest duty cycle 
    // 1 and 2 are in the middle 
    if ((power >= CC1K_LPL_STATES) || (power == lplpower)) 
      return FAIL; 
 
    atomic { 
      // check if the radio is currently doing something 
      if ((!bTxPending) && ((RadioState == POWER_DOWN_STATE) ||  
       (RadioState == IDLE_STATE) || 
       (RadioState == DISABLED_STATE))) { 
  
 // change receiving function in CC1000Radio 
 call WakeupTimer.stop(); 
 if (lplpower == lplpowertx) { 
   lplpowertx = power; 
 } 
 lplpower = power; 
  
 // if successful, change power here 
 if (RadioState == IDLE_STATE) { 
   //RadioState = DISABLED_STATE; 
   call StdControl.stop(); 
   call StdControl.start(); 
 } 
 if (RadioState == POWER_DOWN_STATE) { 
   //RadioState = DISABLED_STATE; 
   call StdControl.start(); 
   call PowerManagement.adjustPower(); 
 } 
      } 
      else { 
 Result = FAIL; 
      } 
    } 
    return Result; 
  } 
 
  command uint8_t GetListeningMode() { 
    return lplpower; 
  }  
 
  event result_t WakeupTimer.fired() { 
    uint8_t  oldRadioState; 
    uint16_t sleeptime; 
    bool bStayAwake; 
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    if (lplpower == 0) 
      return SUCCESS; 
 
    atomic { 
      oldRadioState = RadioState; 
      bStayAwake = bTxPending; 
    } 
 
    switch(oldRadioState) { 
    case IDLE_STATE: 
      sleeptime = ((PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_SleepTime[lplpower*2]) << 8) | 
     PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_SleepTime[(lplpower*2)+1])); 
      if (!bStayAwake) { 
        atomic RadioState = POWER_DOWN_STATE; 
        call WakeupTimer.start(TIMER_ONE_SHOT, sleeptime); 
        call CC1000StdControl.stop(); 
 call SpiByteFifo.disableIntr(); 
      } 
      else { 
        call WakeupTimer.start(TIMER_ONE_SHOT, CC1K_LPL_PACKET_TIME*2); 
      } 
      break; 
 
    case POWER_DOWN_STATE: 
      sleeptime = PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_SleepPreamble[lplpower]); 
      atomic RadioState = IDLE_STATE; 
      call CC1000StdControl.start(); 
      call CC1000Control.BIASOn(); 
      call SpiByteFifo.rxMode();  // SPI to miso 
      call CC1000Control.RxMode(); 
      call SpiByteFifo.enableIntr(); // enable spi interrupt 
      call WakeupTimer.start(TIMER_ONE_SHOT, sleeptime); 
      break; 
 
    default: 
      call WakeupTimer.start(TIMER_ONE_SHOT, CC1K_LPL_PACKET_TIME*2); 
    } 
    return SUCCESS; 
  } 
 
  command result_t StdControl.stop() { 
    atomic RadioState = DISABLED_STATE; 
 
    call WakeupTimer.stop(); 
    call CC1000StdControl.stop(); 
    call SpiByteFifo.disableIntr(); // disable spi interrupt 
    return SUCCESS; 
  } 
 
  command result_t StdControl.start() { 
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    uint8_t chkRadioState; 
    atomic chkRadioState = RadioState; 
    if (chkRadioState == DISABLED_STATE) { 
      atomic { 
        rxbufptr->length = 0; 
        RadioState  = IDLE_STATE; 
        bTxPending = bTxBusy = FALSE; 
        sMacDelay = -1; 
        preamblelen = ((PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_PreambleLength[lplpowertx*2]) << 8) | 
                       PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_PreambleLength[(lplpowertx*2)+1])); 
      } 
      if (lplpower == 0) { 
        // all power on, captain! 
        call CC1000StdControl.start(); 
        call CC1000Control.BIASOn(); 
        call SpiByteFifo.rxMode();  // SPI to miso 
        call CC1000Control.RxMode(); 
        call SpiByteFifo.enableIntr(); // enable spi interrupt 
      } 
      else { 
        uint16_t sleeptime = ((PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_SleepTime[lplpower*2]) << 8) | 
                       PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_SleepTime[(lplpower*2)+1])); 
        atomic RadioState = POWER_DOWN_STATE; 
        call TimerControl.start(); 
        call WakeupTimer.start(TIMER_ONE_SHOT, sleeptime); 
      } 
    } 
    return SUCCESS; 
  } 
 
  command result_t Send.send(TOS_MsgPtr pMsg) { 
 result_t Result = SUCCESS; 
 atomic { 
  if (bTxBusy) { 
   Result = FAIL; 
  } 
  else { 
   bTxBusy = TRUE; 
   txbufptr = pMsg; 
   txlength = pMsg->length + (MSG_DATA_SIZE - DATA_LENGTH - 2); 
   // initially back off a message + [0,127] radio bytes 
   sMacDelay = MSG_DATA_SIZE + (call Random.rand() & 0x7F); 
   bTxPending = TRUE; 
  } 
 }  
 if (Result) { 
  uint8_t tmpState; 
  atomic tmpState = RadioState; 
  // if we're off, start the radio 
  if (tmpState == POWER_DOWN_STATE) { 
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   // disable wakeup timer 
   call WakeupTimer.stop(); 
   call CC1000StdControl.start(); 
   call CC1000Control.BIASOn(); 
   call CC1000Control.RxMode(); 
   call SpiByteFifo.rxMode();  // SPI to miso 
   call SpiByteFifo.enableIntr(); // enable spi interrupt 
   call WakeupTimer.start(TIMER_ONE_SHOT, CC1K_LPL_PACKET_TIME*2); 
   atomic RadioState = IDLE_STATE; 
  } 
  
  // SecRose tasks to prepare packet   
  atomic {  
   txbufptr = pMsg; 
    
   TxByteCnt = 1;  
  } 
  
  // from ChannelMon.startSymDetect() : 
  atomic { 
   // from ChannelMon.idleDetect() 
   flag = call rose.findFlag(txbufptr); 
  } 
 
  // normal packet. allways set the source address so that it will be included in the MAC calculation 
  txbufptr->source = TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS; 
 
  if ( txbufptr->flag == 3 ) call rose.calcACK(txbufptr, txbufptr->addr); // For ACK packets calculate the ACK 
  else call rose.calcMAC(txbufptr, txbufptr->addr, SEND);   // For all other packets calculate the MAC 
 
  // encrypt packet 
  call rose.packetEncDec(txbufptr, ENCRYPT); 
   
  atomic { 
   handle_index = TRUE; 
   actual_data_len = txbufptr->length + txbufptr->pad_size; // calculate data+pad length 
   partial_stream_len = header_len+actual_data_len;  // calculate header+data+pad subtotal 
   stream_len = header_len+actual_data_len+mac_len+1;  // calculate grand total 
   // overload the len with the flag 
   flag = call rose.writeFlag(txbufptr); 
   // normal packet. we have to replace destination addr with source addrr 
   if ( flag == 0 ) { txbufptr->addr = TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS; } 
  } 
 }   
 return Result; 
  } 
   
 
  async event result_t SpiByteFifo.dataReady(uint8_t data_in) { 
#ifdef ENABLE_UART_DEBUG 
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    UARTPutChar(RadioState); 
#endif 
 
    if ( RadioState == IDLE_STATE ) {      
     if ( data_in ) { 
  if (((data_in == (0xaa)) || (data_in == (0x55)))) { 
   PreambleCount++; 
   if (PreambleCount > PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_ValidPrecursor[lplpower])) { 
    PreambleCount = SOFCount = 0; 
    RxBitOffset = RxByteCnt = 0; 
    rxlength = MSG_DATA_SIZE-2; 
    RadioState = SYNC_STATE; 
   } 
  } 
   } 
 else if (bTxPending && (--sMacDelay <= 0)) { 
  bRSSIValid = FALSE; 
  call RSSIADC.getData(); 
  PreambleCount = 0; 
  RadioState = PRETX_STATE; 
 } 
 return; 
    } 
 
    switch (RadioState) { 
    case TX_STATE: 
      { 
 call SpiByteFifo.writeByte(NextTxByte); 
 TxByteCnt++; 
 switch (RadioTxState) { 
 
 case TXSTATE_PREAMBLE: 
   if (!(TxByteCnt < preamblelen)) { 
     NextTxByte = SYNC_BYTE; 
     RadioTxState = TXSTATE_SYNC; 
   } 
   break; 
 
 case TXSTATE_SYNC: 
   NextTxByte = NSYNC_BYTE; 
   RadioTxState = TXSTATE_DATA; 
   TxByteCnt = -1; 
   signal RadioSendCoordinator.startSymbol(); // for Time Sync 
   break; 
 
 case TXSTATE_DATA: 
  if ( TxByteCnt <= stream_len ) { 
   if ( flag != 3 ) { 
    if ( handle_index ) { 
     // normal packet, only has source addr 
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     if ( (flag==0) && (TxByteCnt==3) ) { TxByteCnt += 2; handle_index = FALSE; } 
     // broadcast packet, does not have source or dest 
     if ( (flag==1) && (TxByteCnt==1) ) { TxByteCnt += 4; handle_index = FALSE; } 
    } 
 
    if(TxByteCnt == partial_stream_len){ 
     TxByteCnt = MAC_POS; 
     stream_len = MAC_POS+SECROSE_MAC_LENGTH; 
    } 
 
    NextTxByte = ((char*)txbufptr)[TxByteCnt];  
   } 
   else { // control packets are less generic in mica2 due to lack of time 
    if ( SECROSE_MAX_NODES > 255 ) { 
     switch (TxByteCnt) { 
      case 3: NextTxByte = txbufptr->mac[0]; break; 
      case 4: NextTxByte = txbufptr->mac[1]; break; 
      case 5: RadioTxState = TXSTATE_FLUSH; break; 
      default: NextTxByte = ((char*)txbufptr)[TxByteCnt]; 
     } 
    } 
    if ( SECROSE_MAX_NODES < 255 ) { 
     switch (TxByteCnt) { 
      case 2: NextTxByte = txbufptr->mac[0]; break; 
      case 3: NextTxByte = txbufptr->mac[1]; break; 
      case 4: RadioTxState = TXSTATE_FLUSH; break; 
      default: NextTxByte = ((char*)txbufptr)[TxByteCnt]; 
     } 
    } 
     
   } 
   signal RadioSendCoordinator.byte(txbufptr, (uint8_t)TxByteCnt); 
  }   
  else { 
   RadioTxState = TXSTATE_DONE; 
  } 
   
  break; 
 
 case TXSTATE_FLUSH: 
   if (TxByteCnt > 3) { 
     RadioTxState = TXSTATE_DONE; 
   } 
   break; 
 
 case TXSTATE_DONE: 
   call SpiByteFifo.rxMode(); 
   call CC1000Control.RxMode(); 
   bTxPending = FALSE; 
   if (post PacketSent()) { 
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  // If the post operation succeeds, goto Idle 
  // otherwise, we'll try again. 
  RadioState = IDLE_STATE; 
   } 
   break; 
 default: 
   break; 
 } 
      } 
      break; 
 
    case PRETX_STATE: 
     
      { 
 if (((data_in == (0xaa)) || (data_in == (0x55)))) { 
   // Back to the penalty box. 
   sMacDelay = (((call Random.rand() & 0xf) + 1) * (MSG_DATA_SIZE)); 
   RadioState = IDLE_STATE; 
 } 
 else if (bRSSIValid) { 
   if (usRSSIVal > PRG_RDB(&CC1K_LPL_SquelchInit[lplpower])) { 
     // ROCK AND ROLL!!!!! 
     call CC1000Control.TxMode(); 
     call SpiByteFifo.txMode(); 
     TxByteCnt = 0; 
     RadioState = TX_STATE; 
     RadioTxState = TXSTATE_PREAMBLE; 
     NextTxByte = 0xaa; 
     call SpiByteFifo.writeByte(0xaa); 
   } 
   else { 
     // Russin frussin freakin frick o frack 
     sMacDelay = (((call Random.rand() & 0xf) + 1) * (MSG_DATA_SIZE)); 
     RadioState = IDLE_STATE; 
   } 
 } 
      } 
      break; 
 
    case SYNC_STATE: 
      { 
 uint8_t i; 
 if (bInvertRxData) data_in = ~data_in; 
 
 if ((data_in == 0xaa) || (data_in == 0x55)) { 
   // It is actually possible to have the LAST BIT of the incoming 
   // data be part of the Sync Byte.  SO, we need to store that 
   // However, the next byte should definitely not have this pattern. 
   // XXX-PB: Do we need to check for excessive preamble? 
   RxShiftBuf.MSB = data_in; 
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 } 
 else { 
   uint16_t usTmp; 
   switch (SOFCount) { 
   case 0: 
     RxShiftBuf.LSB = data_in; 
     break; 
    
   case 1: 
   case 2:  
     // bit shift the data in with previous sample to find sync 
     usTmp = RxShiftBuf.W; 
     RxShiftBuf.W <<= 8; 
     RxShiftBuf.LSB = data_in; 
 
     for(i=0;i<8;i++) { 
       usTmp <<= 1; 
       if(data_in & 0x80) 
  usTmp  |=  0x1; 
       data_in <<= 1; 
       // check for sync bytes 
       if (usTmp == SYNC_WORD) { 
                if (rxbufptr->length !=0) { 
                  call Leds.redToggle(); 
                  RadioState = IDLE_STATE; 
                } 
                else { 
                  RadioState = RX_STATE; 
                  call RSSIADC.getData(); 
                  RxBitOffset = 7-i; 
                  signal RadioReceiveCoordinator.startSymbol(); // Time sync 
                   
                  // reset some variables for proper packet reception 
    j = 1; 
    RxByteCnt = 0; 
    ack_send = FALSE; 
    handle_flag = TRUE;                   
                } 
  break; 
       } 
#if 0 
       else if (usTmp == NSYNC_WORD) { 
  RadioState = RX_STATE; 
  RxBitOffset = 7-i; 
  bInvertRxData = TRUE; 
  break; 
       } 
#endif 
     } 
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     break; 
 
   default: 
     // We didn't find it after a reasonable number of tries, so.... 
     RadioState = IDLE_STATE;  // Ensures we wait till the end of the transmission 
     break; 
   } 
   SOFCount++; 
 } 
 
      } 
      break; 
    case RX_STATE: 
      { 
       if (bInvertRxData) data_in = ~data_in; 
 RxShiftBuf.W <<=8; 
 RxShiftBuf.LSB = data_in; 
 
 Byte = (RxShiftBuf.W >> RxBitOffset); 
 
 ((char*)rxbufptr)[RxByteCnt] = Byte; 
 RxByteCnt++; 
 
 signal RadioReceiveCoordinator.byte(rxbufptr, (uint8_t)RxByteCnt); 
   
 if (handle_flag) {      // we have just received the first byte. this is allways the length+flag 
  handle_flag = FALSE; 
  flag = call rose.readFlag((uint8_t)Byte); // find the overloaded flag 
  Byte = call rose.fixFlag(rxbufptr);  // remove the overloading 
  rxbufptr->length = Byte;    // set the correct length of data_in   
   
  if ( flag == 0 ) { // this is a normal packet 
   /* TODO: broadcast or discard packet (depending on route) */ 
   rxbufptr->addr = 0; // manually set the destination addr 
  } 
  
  else if (flag == 1) { // this is a broadcast packet 
   /* tasks to implement: 
   1. re-send packet 
   */ 
   rxbufptr->addr = TOS_BCAST_ADDR; 
   rxbufptr->source = 0;   // only the base station might send broadcast pkts. source HAS to be 0. 
  } 
  
  else if (flag == 2) { // this is a long packet 
   /* tasks to implement: 
   1. forward packet (depending on route) */ 
  } 
  if ( flag == 3 ) { } 
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  else { ; } // reserved, we should never reach here  
  
  // now determine how much is there to be received 
  handle_index = TRUE; 
  actual_data_len = rxbufptr->length;   // length as reported 
  stream_len = header_len+actual_data_len+mac_len+1; // add header length and mac length 
 
  if ( rxbufptr->length == 1 ) actual_data_len++; 
  partial_stream_len = header_len+actual_data_len; // note the length before MAC 
  rec_stop = MSG_DATA_SIZE;    // when to stop receiving data 
 } // end flag handling 
  
 if ( handle_index ) { 
  // Jumps regarding the packet headers, determined by the packet type and reported by the flag: 
  if ( (flag==0) && (RxByteCnt==3) ) { RxByteCnt += 2; handle_index = FALSE; } // normal packet, only has dest addr 
  if ( (flag==1) && (RxByteCnt==1) ) { RxByteCnt += 4; handle_index = FALSE; } // broadcast packet, does not have source or dest 
  if ( flag==3 ) {        // control packet does not have type, group, source 
   if ( (SECROSE_MAX_NODES > 255) && (RxByteCnt==3) ) { 
    if ( rxbufptr->length == 0 ) { RxByteCnt = partial_stream_len; } 
    else { RxByteCnt = DATA_START_NUMBER; } 
    handle_index = FALSE; 
   } 
   if ( (SECROSE_MAX_NODES < 255) && (RxByteCnt==2) ) { 
    if ( rxbufptr->length == 0 ) { RxByteCnt = partial_stream_len; } 
    else { RxByteCnt = DATA_START_NUMBER; } 
    handle_index = FALSE; 
   } 
  } 
 } 
  
  
 // we have reached the end of headers+data. Now we need to jump to receive the mac 
 if ( RxByteCnt==partial_stream_len ) { 
  RxByteCnt = MAC_POS; 
  if ( flag == 3 ) { rec_stop-=2; } // MAC of control packets is 2 bytes less 
 } 
 
  
 if ( RxByteCnt==rec_stop ) { // just received the last byte. now we do the MAC validation etc  
  if ( flag == 0 ) { 
   rxbufptr->source = rxbufptr->addr; // rxbufptr->addr actually contains the source addr on normal pkts 
   rxbufptr->addr = 0;   // and the dest addr should be zero 
  } 
  else if ( flag == 1 ) { 
   rxbufptr->source = 0; 
   rxbufptr->addr = TOS_BCAST_ADDR; 
  } 
  else if ( flag == 2 ) { ; }  // long packets. No need to do anything 
  else if ( flag == 3 ) { ; }  // control packets are better handled bellow 
  else { ; }    // reserved 
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  // ACK Implementation  (counterHandle() will do most of this for us) 
  if ( (flag==3) && (rxbufptr->addr==TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS) ) { 
   // update the key AND the rxbufptr->source field on data 
   call rose.counterHandle(rxbufptr, ACK_TEST_START); 
   RadioState = IDLE_STATE; 
   RxByteCnt = 0; 
   return 1;  // Control packet STOPS here. 
  } 
 
   
  // make a copy of rxbufptr to rxbufptr_copy 
  rxbufptr_copy = malloc(sizeof(TOS_Msg)); 
  memcpy(rxbufptr_copy, rxbufptr, sizeof(TOS_Msg)); 
 
  
  // decrypt with active key 
  call rose.packetEncDec(rxbufptr, DECRYPT);  
 
  // MAC validation, first set some vars, assuming that MAC is not valid 
  mac_valid = FALSE; ack_send = FALSE; rxbufptr->crc = 0; // the crc is left for compatibility  
 
  mac_valid = call rose.validateMAC(rxbufptr); // attempt to validate 
  
  if ( !mac_valid ) { // if MAC is not valid 
   call rose.counterHandle(rxbufptr, CNT_REVERT);  // revert to backup key 
   call rose.packetEncDec(rxbufptr_copy, DECRYPT);  // decrypt the copy of rxbufptr with backup key 
   mac_valid = call rose.validateMAC(rxbufptr_copy); // attempt to validate again 
   if ( mac_valid ) { rxbufptr = rxbufptr_copy; }  // make rxbufptr point to rxbufptr_copy then 
  }  
  else { ack_send = TRUE; } // first validation attempt was successfull, so send ACK 
  // end of MAC validation. mac_valid now contains TRUE/FALSE  info if MAC is valid or not 
 
  // respond to the result of MAC validation, send ACK etc 
  if ( mac_valid ) { 
   if ( flag != 3 ) {  // was not a control packet,  prepare for higher layers 
    rxbufptr->crc = 1; // left here for the shake of compatibility 
   } 
  } 
  else { // MAC still not ok! (but we do nothing about it here, packetReceive() will discard the packet) 
   dbg(DBG_USR1, "%i. Cannot validate MAC for received packet from node %i.\n", TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS, rxbufptr->source);  
  
  } 
  free(rxbufptr_copy); 
  // end SecRose RX. Continue with CC1000 stuff 
 
 
  call SpiByteFifo.disableIntr(); 
  RadioState = IDLE_STATE; //DISABLED_STATE; 
  rxbufptr->strength = usRSSIVal; 
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  if (!(post PacketRcvd())) { 
   // If there are insufficient resources to process the incoming packet 
   // we drop it 
   rxbufptr->length = 0; 
   RadioState = IDLE_STATE; 
   call SpiByteFifo.enableIntr(); 
  } 
   
  #if 0 
  if (bTxPending) { 
   sMacDelay = (((call Random.rand() & 0xf) +1 ) * (MSG_DATA_SIZE)); 
  } 
  #endif   
 }  
      } 
      break; 
 
    case DISABLED_STATE: 
      break; 
    
    default: 
      break; 
    } 
#if 0 
    RSSISampleFreq++;  
    RSSISampleFreq %= (preamblelen + 2 + offsetof(struct TOS_Msg,data) + 3) >> 1); 
    if ((RSSISampleFreq == 0) && (bTxPending || (RadioState == RX_STATE))) { 
     call RSSIADC.getData(); 
    } 
#endif 
  return SUCCESS; 
} 
 
async event result_t RSSIADC.dataReady(uint16_t data) { 
  //rxbufptr->strength = data; 
  atomic { 
    usRSSIVal = data; 
    bRSSIValid = TRUE; 
  } 
  return SUCCESS; 
} 
 
// Default events for radio send/receive coordinators do nothing. 
// Be very careful using these, you'll break the stack. 
default async event void RadioSendCoordinator.startSymbol() { } 
default async event void RadioSendCoordinator.byte(TOS_MsgPtr msg, uint8_t byteCount) { } 
default async event void RadioReceiveCoordinator.startSymbol() { } 
default async event void RadioReceiveCoordinator.byte(TOS_MsgPtr msg, uint8_t byteCount) { } 
} 
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File SecRoseM.nc 
 
module SecRoseM { 
 provides interface SecRose; 
 uses interface Leds as l; 
} 
 
implementation { 
  
 uint32_t iKey[] = { 0x00A3D709, 0x0083F848, 0x00F6F4B3, 0x00211578, }; 
 uint32_t fKey[4] = { 0 }; 
 ROSE_counter counter[SECROSE_MAX_NODES+1]; // counters table 
 // vars for acks 
 ROSE_acks acks[SECROSE_MAX_ACK+1];      
 uint8_t num_acks = 0; 
 enum { ADD_VALUE, REMOVE_VALUE };  
 // arrays for calcMAC() and calcACK() and btea. By allocating them here we use less memory 
 uint8_t kalpha[8] =  { 0 }; // key K1 
 uint8_t kbeta[8] =   { 0 }; // key K2 
 uint8_t kbuffer[8] = { 0 }; // buffer for keys 
 uint8_t v[56] = { 0 };  // temp v[] array to pass to btea.cipher(). Size value is not optimized 
 uint8_t ack[2] = { 0 };  // temp array to store the last prepared ack for use by the ACK paacket in a while 
 
/* FUNCTIONs */ 
 // function to mix iKey+counter and produce fKey 
 async command void SecRose.mixKey(uint32_t dest) { 
  if ( dest == TOS_BCAST_ADDR ) { 
   dest = SECROSE_MAX_NODES; 
  } 
  atomic fKey[0] = iKey[0] + counter[dest].active >> 24; 
  atomic fKey[1] = iKey[0] +  counter[dest].active >> 16; 
  atomic fKey[2] = iKey[0] + counter[dest].active >> 8; 
  atomic fKey[3] = iKey[0] + counter[dest].active >> 0; 
 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 async command void SecRose.counterHandle(TOS_MsgPtr data, uint8_t action) { 
  uint8_t flag = call SecRose.readFlag(data->length); 
  uint8_t cur_counter = data->count_value; 
  uint16_t node = 10000; 
  uint8_t pos = 0; 
 
  atomic {  
   if ( action == PKT_SENT ) { 
    if ( flag == 0 ) { 
     node = 0;    
    } 
    else if ( flag == 1 ) { 
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     node = SECROSE_MAX_NODES;   // a virtual node on last pos of table 
     counter[node].backup = counter[node].active; // keep backup 
     counter[node].active += cur_counter;  // update active counter 
    } 
    else if ( flag == 2 ) { 
     node = data->addr; 
    } 
    else { ; } 
 
    counter[node].temp = cur_counter; 
  
    // prepare an ACK using the temp counter, not the active. The fastest way to do it 
    // is to temporarly set the active counter += temp counter 
    call SecRose.ackTable(data, ADD_VALUE, node);  // and store the value. 
   } 
   else { 
    if ( data->addr == TOS_BCAST_ADDR ) {  
     node = SECROSE_MAX_NODES;    // set to be the virtual node 
    } 
    else { node = data->source; } 
     
    if ( action == PKT_RECV ) { 
     counter[node].backup = counter[node].active; // keep the backup first 
     counter[node].active += cur_counter; 
    } 
    else if ( action == ACK_TEST_START ) { 
     data->ack = 0;     // default is to assume invalid ack 
     for(pos=0;pos<=SECROSE_MAX_ACK;pos++) { 
      node = acks[pos].addr; 
      if ( (data->mac[0]==acks[pos].ack[0]) && (data->mac[1]==acks[pos].ack[1]) ) { 
       counter[node].active += counter[node].temp; // add the temp 
       data->ack = 1; 
       call SecRose.ackTable(data, REMOVE_VALUE, pos); 
       break; 
      } 
     } 
    } 
    else if ( action == CNT_REVERT ) {   // revert to backup (old) counter 
     counter[node].active = counter[node].backup; 
    } 
    else {;} 
   } 
  } 
 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 async command result_t SecRose.ackTable(TOS_MsgPtr data, uint8_t action, uint16_t node) { 
  uint8_t pos, pos2; // temps 
   
  if ( action == ADD_VALUE ) { 
   num_acks++; 
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   if ( num_acks >= SECROSE_MAX_ACK ) { num_acks--; } 
   pos2 = num_acks; 
   for (pos=(num_acks-1);pos<SECROSE_MAX_ACK;pos--) { // shift whole array 1 place to the right 
    acks[pos2].ack[0] = acks[pos].ack[0]; 
    acks[pos2].ack[1] = acks[pos].ack[1]; 
    acks[pos2].addr = acks[pos].addr; 
    pos2--; 
   } 
   // now set the first location    
   acks[0].ack[0] = data->ack_value[0]; 
   acks[0].ack[1] = data->ack_value[1]; 
   acks[0].addr = node; 
  }   
  if ( action == REMOVE_VALUE ) { 
   num_acks--; // by decreasing num_acks we cause the rest of the code to remove the oldest entry 
   // shift table one place to the left after num_acks 
   pos2 = node+1; 
   for (pos=node;pos<=(num_acks+1);pos++) { 
    acks[pos].ack[0] = acks[pos2].ack[0]; 
    acks[pos].ack[1] = acks[pos2].ack[1]; 
    acks[pos].addr = acks[pos2].addr; 
    pos2++; 
   } 
  } 
  return 0; 
 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 // The top function in the encryption suite. Provides interfacing with the other components 
 async command result_t SecRose.packetEncDec(TOS_MsgPtr data, bool action) { 
  uint16_t tmp = 0; 
  uint8_t end, pos; 
   
  data->pad_size = 0; // make sure this is reset by default 
 
  // 1. mix the key according to conditions (only if we got some data!) 
  if ( data->length != 0 ) { 
   if ( data->flag == 1 ) { tmp = TOS_BCAST_ADDR; } 
   else { 
    if ( action == ENCRYPT ) { tmp = data->addr; } 
    if ( action == DECRYPT ) { tmp = data->source; } 
   } 
   call SecRose.mixKey(tmp); 
  } 
  else { return 1; } // when there is no data, do not encrypt anything 
   
  // call steal + encrypt function 
  call SecRose.stealEncDec(data, action);    
 
  return SUCCESS; 
 } 
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/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 // Function to apply encryption and stealing. 
 async command result_t SecRose.stealEncDec(TOS_MsgPtr data, bool action) { 
  uint8_t pos, pos2, stolen_mac_bytes, stolen_header_bytes; 
  pos = pos2 = stolen_mac_bytes = stolen_header_bytes = 0;     
  // add all data to v[] 
  for (pos=0;pos<data->length;pos++) {      
   atomic v[pos] = data->data[pos]; 
  } 
  // complement v[] with data from mac[] untill the last 4-byte block is complete 
  pos2 = 0;                 
   
  while ( (pos % 4) != 0 ) {      // check last block size 
   atomic v[pos] = data->mac[pos2]; 
   pos++; pos2++; stolen_mac_bytes++; 
  } 
  // for very small packets, add more data to v[] from mac, group, type or pad 
  if ( (data->length+stolen_mac_bytes) < 8 ) {  
   // not all 4 bytes of MAC are always used 10 lines above. Continue using them here. This code needs improvement/debug 
   while ( (pos % 8) != 0 ) { 
    atomic v[pos] = data->mac[pos2]; 
    pos++; pos2++; stolen_mac_bytes++; 
    if ( stolen_mac_bytes == 4 ) break;   // max MAC size is 4 bytes 
   } 
   // is the block complete? 
   if ( (data->length+stolen_header_bytes+stolen_mac_bytes) < 8 ) {  
    atomic v[pos++] = data->type;    // no ? add type 
    stolen_header_bytes++;     // kep track of count to use later 
   } 
   // is the block complete? 
   if ( (data->length+stolen_header_bytes+stolen_mac_bytes) <8 ) {   
    atomic v[pos++] = data->group;    // not yet? then add group 
    stolen_header_bytes++; 
   } 
   // still not complete? add a pad byte 
   if ( (data->length+stolen_header_bytes+stolen_mac_bytes) < 8 ) {   
    if ( action == ENCRYPT ) {    // do not destroy pad byte when a packet is received 
     atomic v[pos++] = 0;    // when sending, pad byte is simply a 0 
    } 
    else {       // on reception (decryption), the pad byte includes information 
     atomic v[pos++] = data->data[data->length]; // so we use it. put it on v[] 
    } 
    stolen_header_bytes++; 
    data->pad_size = 1; 
   } 
  }   
  // call btea section 
  if ( action == ENCRYPT ) {      // encrypt or ... 
   call SecRose.btea(v, pos, fKey); }  
  if ( action == DECRYPT ) { 
228 
 
   call SecRose.btea(v, -pos, fKey); }   // ... decrypt 
  // now place the contents of v[] to apropriate fields of packet 
  pos2 = 0;        // put start of v[] to data[] 
  for (pos=0;pos<data->length;pos++) { 
   atomic data->data[pos] = v[pos2++]; 
  } 
  for (pos=0;pos<stolen_mac_bytes;pos++) {    // put middle of v[] to mac[] 
   atomic data->mac[pos] = v[pos2++]; 
  } 
  if ( stolen_header_bytes > 0 ) {     // if there were bytes stolen from header    
   atomic data->type = v[pos2++];     // replace type 
   stolen_header_bytes--; 
   if ( stolen_header_bytes > 0 ) {    // replace group if more 
    atomic data->group = v[pos2++]; 
    stolen_header_bytes--; 
   } 
   if ( stolen_header_bytes > 0 ) {    // replace pad if even more 
    atomic data->data[data->length] = v[pos2]; 
   } 
  } 
  return SUCCESS; 
 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */  
 async command void SecRose.btea(uint8_t* vs, int32_t n, uint32_t* ks) { 
  int pos; 
  call SecRose.bteaCipher(((uint32_t*)vs), n/4, ks); 
 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */  
 async command void SecRose.bteaCipher(uint32_t* vl, int32_t n, uint32_t* k) { 
  uint32_t z, y=vl[0], sum=0, e, DELTA=0x9e3779b9; 
  uint8_t n_minus_one; // optimisation 
  uint32_t p, q; 
 
  if (n > 1) {          // Coding Part 
   n_minus_one = n-1; 
   q = SECROSE_TEA_CYCLES; 
   z = vl[n_minus_one]; 
    while (q-- > 0) { 
    sum += DELTA; 
    e = (sum >> 2) & 3; 
    for (p=0; p<n_minus_one; p++) { 
     y = vl[p+1]; 
     z = vl[p] += (z>>5^y<<2) + (y>>3^z<<4)^(sum^y) + (k[p&3^e]^z); 
    } 
    y = vl[0]; 
    z = vl[n_minus_one] += (z>>5^y<<2) + (y>>3^z<<4)^(sum^y) + (k[p&3^e]^z); 
   } 
  } 
   
  else if (n < -1) {  // Decoding Part 
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   n = -n; 
   n_minus_one = n-1; 
   q = SECROSE_TEA_CYCLES; 
   sum = q*DELTA; 
   z=vl[n_minus_one]; 
   while (sum != 0) { 
    e = (sum >> 2) & 3; 
    for (p=n_minus_one; p>0; p--) {  
     z = vl[p-1]; 
     y = vl[p] -= (z>>5^y<<2) + (y>>3^z<<4)^(sum^y) + (k[p&3^e]^z); 
    } 
    z = vl[n_minus_one]; 
    y = vl[0] -= (z>>5^y<<2) + (y>>3^z<<4)^(sum^y) + (k[p&3^e]^z); 
    sum -= DELTA; 
   } 
  } 
 
  return; 
 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 // Get the ack vzalue from ack[] and place them on mac[] because MHSR reads from mac[] only 
 async command void SecRose.calcACK(TOS_MsgPtr data, uint16_t node) { 
  uint8_t tmp; 
  atomic data->mac[0] = ack[0]; 
  atomic data->mac[1] = ack[1]; 
 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 // Function to calculate the MAC of a packet.  
 // Implements: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf 
 async command result_t SecRose.calcMAC(TOS_MsgPtr data, uint16_t node, bool action) { 
  uint8_t pos, pos2, end, flag;     // temp and control variables 
  bool condition; 
   
  // mix the key for "node" 
  if ( data->flag == 1 ) { call SecRose.mixKey(TOS_BCAST_ADDR); } 
  else { call SecRose.mixKey(node); } 
  flag = call SecRose.findFlag(data);    // we need to know the flag, so that we know what to hash 
  // reset v[] 
  for(pos=0;pos<14;pos++) { 
   ((uint32_t*)v)[pos] = 0; 
  } 
  // reset kbuffer[] 
  for (pos=0; pos<2; pos++) ((uint32_t*)kbuffer)[pos] = 0; 
     
  // fill v[] with what we want to hash 
  atomic {  
   // all packets, add data 
   end = data->length; 
   memcpy(v, data->data, data->length); 
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   // add .source. 
   if ( data->source > 255 ) { v[end] = ((uint8_t *)data)[3]; end++; } 
   v[end] = ((uint8_t *)data)[4]; end++; 
    
   // all add .type 
   v[end] = data->type; end++; 
 
   v[end] = data->group; end++; 
  }// end atomic 
 
  // Key set-up   
  // step 1: kbuffer = encrypt a block of 64 0's with key fKey 
  call SecRose.bteaCipher(((uint32_t*)kbuffer), 2, ((uint32_t*)fKey)); 
 
 
  // step 2: (a) if the MSB of kbuffer is 0 then kalpha = (kbuffer << 1) 
  //         (b) else kalpha XOR (kbuffer << 1) with 0x1b   
  atomic {  
   condition = (kbuffer[0] & 0x80);    // keep a copy of the result on the check if MSB of kbuffer == 0 
 
   // The code below does kalpha = (kbuffer << 1) (shitss the whole kbuffer one bit left) 
   // This is needed in every case.  
   // Also the code below fulfills step 1a 
   pos = kbuffer[0] << 1; 
   kalpha[0] = pos; 
   for (pos=1; pos<8; pos++) { 
    kalpha[pos-1] |= kbuffer[pos] >> 7; 
    kalpha[pos] = kbuffer[pos] << 1; 
   } 
   
   // to fullfill step 2a we need to check the original MSB, we use our pre-obtained condition result 
   // note: if condition is met then the contents of alpha assigned above are OVERWRITTEN here 
   //       this means that this might not be the most efficient way to do this 
   if ( !condition ) { 
    for (pos=0; pos<6; pos++) { 
     kbuffer[pos] ^= 0x0;   // bitwise XOR with 0 on first 7 bytes 
     kalpha[pos] = kbuffer[pos];  // assign to kalpha 
    } 
    kbuffer[7] ^= 0x1b;    // for last byte we XOR with 0x1b 
    kalpha[7] = kbuffer[7];    // and assign 
   } 
      
  
   // step 3: (a) if the MSB of kalpha is 0 then kbeta = (kalpha << 1) 
   //    (b) else kbeta XOR (kalpha << 1) with 0x1b 
   //     In essense it's exactly as step 2 with "kalpha" replacing "kbuffer" and  
   //         "kbeta" replacing "kalpha". The rest of code remains the same. See above for comments 
   condition = (kalpha[0] & 0x80); 
  
   pos = kalpha[0] << 1; 
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   kbeta[0] = pos;   
   for (pos=1; pos<8; pos++) {  
    kbeta[pos-1] |= kalpha[pos] >> 7;  
    kbeta[pos] = kalpha[pos] << 1; 
   } 
  
   if ( !condition ) {  
    for (pos=0; pos+1<7; pos++) kalpha[pos] ^= 0x0; kbeta[pos] = kalpha[pos]; 
    kalpha[7] ^= 0x1b; kbeta[7] = kalpha[7]; 
   } 
  }// end atomic 
 
 
  // use 
  // Step 1: if the last block is a full block then XOR it with kalpha 
  atomic { 
   if ( (end % 8) == 0 ) {     // check last block's size 
    pos2 = 0;   
    for (pos=(end-8); pos<end; pos++) {   
     v[pos] ^= kalpha[pos2];   // do the XOR 
    } 
   }      
  
   // (b) else append 1 set bit after the last bye and 7 unset bits. 
   else {  
    v[end] = 0x80; end++;     // append 10000000 to v[end] 
    while ((end % 8) != 0 ) {   // while v[]'s last block is not a complete block,  
     v[end] = 0; end++;   // apend 0's to it untill it is 
    } 
    // and XOR the last block of v[] with kbeta 
    pos2 = 0; 
    for (pos=(end-8); pos<end; pos++) { 
     v[pos] ^= kbeta[pos2]; 
     pos2++; 
    }    
   } 
  }//end atomic 
 
  // Step 4: XOR and encrypt the whole v[] (in blocks) using: 
  // block of v[] for plaintext 
  // kbuffer to store the result of encryption 
  // fKey as key 
  //      use 0's for the first time (when kbuffer is not filled) 
 
  pos2 = 0;       // pos on kbuffer[] 
  for (pos=0; pos<end; pos++) { 
   if ( pos < 8 ) { 
    atomic kbuffer[pos2] = 0 ^ v[pos];   // initialisation, use 0's instead of kbuffer[]'s value 
   } 
   else {  
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    atomic kbuffer[pos2] ^= v[pos];   // step 4a 
   } 
   pos2++; 
   if ( pos2 == 8 ) {  
    pos2 = 0;  
    call SecRose.bteaCipher(((uint32_t*)v), 2, ((uint32_t*)fKey)); 
   } 
  } 
   
  // Step 5: return the calculated MAC 
  // assign first 4 bytes of kbuffer in the mac position of the packet 
  for (pos=0;pos<SECROSE_MAC_LENGTH;pos++) atomic data->mac[pos] = kbuffer[pos]; 
 
  // assign last byte of kbuffer in the count_value position of the packet 
  atomic data->count_value = kbuffer[SECROSE_MAC_LENGTH]; 
  if ( data->count_value == 0 ) { data->count_value++; } 
 
  // if this is a packet that is going to be sent, store the ACK in data->ack_value[]. 
  // this will then be used by counterHandle() 
  if ( action == SEND ) { 
   atomic data->ack_value[0] = kbuffer[5]; 
   atomic data->ack_value[1] = kbuffer[6]; 
  } 
  else { // if it is a received packet store it to ack[] to be used by calcACK() in a while, when the ACK packet will be prepared 
   atomic ack[0] = kbuffer[5]; 
   atomic ack[1] = kbuffer[6];    
  }  
   
  return 1;    
 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 async command bool SecRose.validateMAC(TOS_MsgPtr data) { 
  uint8_t mac_pos;      // a temp counter var 
  uint8_t mac_tmp[SECROSE_MAC_LENGTH];    // for storing the mac 
 
 
  // First make a copy of the received MAC value  
  for (mac_pos=0;mac_pos<SECROSE_MAC_LENGTH;mac_pos++) mac_tmp[mac_pos] = data->mac[mac_pos]; 
   
  call SecRose.calcMAC(data, data->source, RECV);   // calculate what the MAC should be based on the received data 
 
  // compare MAC's 
  if ( (mac_tmp[0]==data->mac[0]) && (mac_tmp[1]==data->mac[1]) && (mac_tmp[2]==data->mac[2]) && (mac_tmp[3]==data->mac[3]) ) { 
   return TRUE;  
  } 
  else { 
   dbg(DBG_USR1, "%i. MAC Missmatch\n", TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS); 
   dbg(DBG_USR1, "."); 
   return FALSE;  
  } 
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 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 // Determines and returns the flag of a packet based on the .addr field of it 
 // if it is a control packet pending to be sent it will determine the flag by the .flag value 
 // Also, this fucntion writes the flag down in the data->flag location of the packet 
 async command uint8_t SecRose.findFlag(TOS_MsgPtr data) { 
  uint8_t flag = 5; 
   
  if ( data->flag == 3 ) { flag = 3; }              
     // control 
  else { 
   if ( data->addr == 0 ) { flag = 0; }             
     // normal 
   if (data->addr == TOS_BCAST_ADDR) { flag = 1; }    // broadcast 
   if ( (data->addr < TOS_BCAST_ADDR) && (data->addr > 0) ) { flag = 2; } // long 
   data->flag = flag; 
  } 
  return flag; 
 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 // determines the flag and overloads the .length value to include the flag 
 // it also updates the .flag field 
 async command uint8_t SecRose.writeFlag(TOS_MsgPtr data) {   
  if ( data->flag == 3 ) {     // control packet 
   data->length |= 0xC0;     // flip both the first and second bits of data->length by OR-ing with 0xC0 
(= 11000000) 
  } 
  else {        // all other packets 
   if ( data->addr == 0 ) { data->flag = 0; }  // normal packet means the first two bits will remain unchanged, 
          // so, just set the data->flag field and nothing else 
           
   else if (data->addr == TOS_BCAST_ADDR) {  // Broadcast packet 
    data->length |= 0x40;     // flip second bit of data->length by OR-ing with 0x40 (= 01000000) 
    data->flag = 1; 
   }   
   else {       // Long packet 
    data->length |= 0x80;    // flip the first bit of data->length by OR-ing with 0x80 (= 10000000) 
    data->flag = 2; 
   } 
  } 
  return data->flag; 
 } 
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 // determines the flag from the overloaded .length value, returns the flag 
 async command uint8_t SecRose.readFlag(uint8_t data) {  
  /* normal packet defaults to do nothing */ 
  if (data < 64) { return 0; }  
  /* Broadcast packet for lengths of the range 64 - 127 */ 
  if ((data >= 64) && (data <= 127)) { return 1; } 
  /* Long packet for lengths in the range 128 - 191 */ 
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  if ((data >= 128) && (data <= 191)) { return 2; } 
  /* Control packet for lengths in the range 192 - 255 */ 
  if ( data >= 192 ) { return 3; } 
  return 5; 
 }  
/* FUNCTION SEPARATOR */ 
 // determines the flag from the overloaded .length value, fixes the overloading and returns the flag 
 async command uint8_t SecRose.fixFlag(TOS_MsgPtr data) { 
  /* normal packet defaults to do nothing */ 
  if (data->length < 64) {  
   data->flag = 0;  
   return data->length;  
  } 
  /* Broadcast packet for lengths of the range 64 - 127 */ 
  if ((data->length >= 64) && (data->length <= 127)) {  
   data->flag = 1; 
   return (data->length)-64;  
  } 
  /* Long packet for lengths in the range 128 - 255 */ 
  if ((data->length >= 128) && (data->length <= 191)) {  
   data->flag = 2;  
   return (data->length)-128;  
  } 
  /* Control packet for lengths in the range 192 - 255 */ 
  if ( data->length >= 192 ) { 
   data->flag = 3; 
   return (data->length)-192;  
  } 
  return 5; 
 } 
} // end implementation 
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